N10510Piper J3C-65 · 1956

On March 7, 2023, at 14:00 eastern standard time, a Piper J3C airplane, N10510, and a Piper PA-28-161 airplane, N9221D, collided in midair in Winter Haven, Florida. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction in each airplane were fatally injured. Both flights were operated as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flights.

According to the operator of the float-equipped J3C, the airplane was returning to Jack

Brown’s Seaplane Base (F57), Winter Haven, Florida for a water landing after a local flight. A witness reported the J3C was on a southerly heading, had just turned to a westerly direction, and appeared lower than the PA-28 just before the collision.

According to recorded CTAF radio transmissions and ADS-B data, the PA-28 departed from the airplane’s home airport, Lakeland Linder International Airport (LAL), Lakeland, Florida. The flight proceeded to Winter Haven Regional Airport (GIF), Winter Haven, Florida, where the pilot receiving instruction was performing power-off 180° landing maneuvers to runway 29. The flight school chief pilot reported that the purpose of this flight was to practice power-off 180° landing maneuvers as the pilot receiving instruction had been graded unsatisfactory in the previous flight lesson. The maneuver during which the accident occurred was the fourth such maneuver. Shortly after the PA-28 pilot announced a left turn to the base leg of the traffic pattern, the airplanes collided nearly head-on. ADS-B data revealed that the collision occurred at an altitude about 575 ft mean sea level. Surveillance video footage showed neither airplane made altitude or heading changes immediately before the collision. The right wing of the PA-28 fractured during the collision and both airplanes impacted a lake east of the approach end of runway 29 at GIF.

The white-and-red-colored Piper PA-28 was a single-engine, low-wing airplane. It was equipped with a rotating beacon light, anticollision strobe lights, navigation position lights, and a landing light. The operational status of each lighting system at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the airworthiness file for the PA-28 revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate December 12, 1988. The record also showed that it was not equipped with an active traffic system that was interfaced to the electronic cockpit instruments, such as ADS-B in. This was confirmed during postaccident examination, which found no avionics compatible with an in-cockpit traffic display. The airplane was equipped with ADS-B out and a two-way communications radio.

The yellow-colored Piper J3C was a single-engine, high-wing airplane. A review of the airworthiness file for the J3C revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate July 18, 1956. Postaccident examination found the airplane was not equipped with ADS-B in or out, a two-way radio, or any avionics that would support an in-cockpit traffic display, nor was it required to be.

The white-and-red-colored Piper PA-28 was a single-engine, low-wing airplane. It was equipped with a rotating beacon light, anticollision strobe lights, navigation position lights, and a landing light. The operational status of each lighting system at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the airworthiness file for the PA-28 revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate December 12, 1988. The record also showed that it was not equipped with an active traffic system that was interfaced to the electronic cockpit instruments, such as ADS-B in. This was confirmed during postaccident examination, which found no avionics compatible with an in-cockpit traffic display. The airplane was equipped with ADS-B out and a two-way communications radio.

The yellow-colored Piper J3C was a single-engine, high-wing airplane. A review of the airworthiness file for the J3C revealed that the airplane received its original airworthiness certificate July 18, 1956. Postaccident examination found the airplane was not equipped with ADS-B in or out, a two-way radio, or any avionics that would support an in-cockpit traffic display, nor was it required to be.

All major portions of both airplanes, except for the right wing and aileron of the PA-28, were recovered from the lake. Examination of the Piper PA-28 revealed impact damage to the forward fuselage and wings. The cabin door was impact separated forward of its hinge attachment points. The right wing was separated from the airplane in the wing root area. A 50-inch section of the inboard portion of the right wing was recovered with a 37-inch portion of the flap attached by two hinges. A 48-inch piece of the right flap was impact separated and recovered; however, the rest of the outboard portion of the right wing was not recovered. There was significant hard body impact damage and fragmentation to the leading edge and wing structure at the outboard separation point.

Examination of the J3C revealed that the fuselage and empennage remained intact; however, the inboard lower corner of the right float was crushed along a 30-inch span beginning about 28 inches aft of the bumper, with impact scars along the longitudinal axis of the float. An 87-inch span of the chine and inboard sister keelson were torn away 52 to 139 inches aft of the bumper, leaving a 6 to 8-inch opening in the float hull. The bulkheads adjacent to this missing section were impact-displaced aft.

Examination of both airframes and engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplanes.

See and Avoid Concept

Title 14 CFR 91.113 addresses aircraft right-of-way rules and states, in part, the following:

(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.

The FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), dated September 5, 2024, paragraph 5-5-8, includes pilot procedures for see-and-avoid while in flight and states, "When meteorological conditions permit, regardless of type of flight plan or whether or not under control of a radar facility, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic, terrain, or obstacles."

The AIM, paragraph 4-1-9, also describes operations to/from airports without an operating control tower and the use of a common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and states, in part, the following:

a. Airport Operations Without Operating Control Tower

1. There is no substitute for alertness while in the vicinity of an airport. It is essential that pilots be alert and look for other traffic and exchange traffic information when approaching or departing an airport without an operating control tower. This is of particular importance since other aircraft may not have communication capability or, in some cases, pilots may not communicate their presence or intentions when operating into or out of such airports. To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that all radio-equipped aircraft transmit/receive on a common frequency identified for the purpose of airport advisories.

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25C), chapter 14, addresses scanning procedures for visually acquiring traffic:

The pilot can contribute to collision avoidance by being alert and scanning for other aircraft. This is particularly important in the vicinity of an airport.

Effective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regularly spaced eye movements that bring successive areas of the sky into the central visual field. Each movement should not exceed 10º, and each should be observed for at least 1 second to enable detection. Although back and forth eye movements seem preferred by most pilots, each pilot should develop a scanning pattern that is most comfortable and then adhere to it to assure optimum scanning. Even if entitled to the right-of-way, a pilot should yield if another aircraft seems too close.

The AIM 4-5-6 discusses traffic information services (TIS) which provides information to the cockpit via data link, which is like VFR radar traffic advisories normally received over voice radio:

TIS is intended to improve the safety and efficiency of “see and avoid” flight through an automatic display that informs the pilot of nearby traffic and potential conflict situations.

TIS alert status messages identify a potential collision hazard within 34 seconds. This alert may be visual and/or audible, such as a flashing display symbol or a headset tone. A target is a threat if the time to the closest approach in vertical and horizontal coordinates is less than 30 seconds and the closest approach is expected to be within 500 feet vertically and 0.5 nautical miles laterally.

The Office of the District Medical Examiner 10th Judicial Circuit of Florida ruled the cause of death for all occupants as multiple blunt force traumatic injuries and the manner of death for all occupants as accident.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the PA-28 flight instructor. Cetirizine was detected at 95 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 645 ng/mL in liver tissue. Cetirizine is a second-generation antihistamine medication that is available over the counter and is commonly used to treat allergy symptoms. Cetirizine often carries a warning that users may experience drowsiness and should be careful when driving a motor vehicle or operating machinery. Data on sedation and psychomotor impairment from cetirizine are mixed, with some studies finding some sedating and impairing effects. The FAA states that pilots should wait 48 hours after using cetirizine before flying, to allow time for the drug to be cleared from circulation.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the PA-28 pilot receiving instruction. Ethanol was detected at 0.011 g/dL in cavity blood and was not detected in urine. Fexofenadine and its metabolite azacyclonol were detected in cavity blood and liver tissue. Ethanol is the intoxicating alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor, and, if consumed, can impair judgment, psychomotor performance, cognition, and vigilance. FAA regulation imposes strict limits on flying after consuming ethanol, including a prohibition on piloting a civil aircraft while having a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. Alcohol consumption is not the only possible source of ethanol in postmortem specimens. Ethanol may sometimes be produced by microbes in a person’s body after death, potentially elevating ethanol levels in some postmortem specimens but not others. Fexofenadine is an over-the-counter non-sedating antihistamine commonly used to relieve symptoms of seasonal and environmental allergies. Fexofenadine is not generally considered impairing.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the J3C flight instructor. No tested-for substances were detected.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the J3C pilot receiving instruction. Metoprolol was detected in heart blood and liver tissue. Pravastatin was detected in liver tissue and was not detected in heart blood. Metoprolol is a prescription medication that can be used as part of treatment for high blood pressure, certain arrhythmias, and certain types of heart failure. Pravastatin is a prescription medication commonly used to control cholesterol and reduce cardiovascular risk. Metoprolol and pravastatin are not generally considered impairing.

A video study of surveillance footage that captured the accident was conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board’s Office of Research and Engineering. The study was able to estimate the location, speed, and altitude of the J3C. The study showed that the ground speed of the J3C at the time of collision was about 46 knots. The ground speed of the PA-28 at the time of collision, based on ADS-B data, was about 80 knots. Based on the altitude of the J3C 5 seconds before collision, its descent rate was 456 ft/minute and the descent rate of the PA-28 during the 5 seconds was 792 ft/minute. The study found the collision occurred at 465 ft above ground level, near head-on.