N123JBBeech 35-A33 · 1961

On May 27, 2020, about 1458 eastern daylight time, a Beech 35-A33 airplane, N123JB, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees during a forced landing near Cambridge, Ohio. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 ferry flight.

According to airplane track data, at 1403:43, the airplane was established in a climb after it departed from runway 27L at Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio. The airplane flew to the west before it entered a climbing right turn to a northeast course. The airplane continued the climb to 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) before it turned to an east-southeast course, as shown in figure 1. The airplane then climbed to a final cruise altitude of 3,500 ft msl and maintained an east-southeast course.

Figure 1 – Aircraft Track Data

According to engine monitor and airplane track data, during takeoff and initial climb the fuel flow was 22- to 23 gph. As the airplane climbed to 3,500 ft msl the fuel flow was 20 to 25.5 gph. According to Beech 35-A33 performance data, the fuel flow is about 22 gph when the engine is operated at the rated horsepower and manifold pressure, and the fuel flow is about 13.4 gph when the engine is operated at 75% power and leaned for cruise flight at 3,500 ft. Between 1423:45 and 1425:45, the fuel flow averaged 22 gph in cruise flight at 3,500 ft msl. Between 1425:45 and 1428:28, the fuel flow gradually increased to 28 gph.

About 25 minutes into the flight, at 1428:28, the fuel flow decreased rapidly from 28 gph to 11 gph with corresponding decreases in EGT and CHT at each cylinder, as shown in figure 2. Within 6 seconds, the fuel flow returned to 28 gph with corresponding increases to EGT and CHT at each cylinder. As the airplane continued cruise flight at 3,500 ft msl, between 1430 and 1446, the average fuel flow and EGT were 29 gph and 1,482° F, respectively.

At 1442:45, the pilot contacted Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) to continue visual flight rules flight following. At 1443:48, Cleveland ARTCC lost radar contact with the airplane when it flew into an area of reduced radar coverage at 3,500 ft msl. The controller and the pilot remained in radio contact for the remainder of the flight.

Beginning about 1445, the No. 3 cylinder EGT and CHT decreased at a higher rate when compared to the other cylinders, while the fuel flow remained at 28-29 gph. Over the next 8-10 minutes, the No. 3 cylinder EGT continued to decrease and became inconsistent with normal engine operation, as shown in figure 2.

At 1448:31, the pilot told the controller that he was conducting a ferry flight with the landing gear down and that the airplane’s speed was about 110 knots.

At 1450:15, the airplane began to descend from 3,500 ft msl. At 1452:33, the pilot reported an unspecified issue and that he was going to divert to Barnesville-Bradfield Airport (6G5), Barnesville, Ohio, and asked the controller if the airport had an automatic terminal information service (ATIS). At 1453:20, the controller told the pilot that 6G5 did not have an ATIS and provided him with the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).

At 1454:04, the pilot declared an emergency due to a loss of engine power and reported that he had an airport at his one o'clock position, which he subsequently identified as Cambridge Municipal Airport (CDI), Cambridge, Ohio. The pilot then asked the controller to verify the CTAF frequency at CDI. Between 1454:20 and 1454:25, the fuel flow increased from 27.7 to 30.1 gph. At 1454:34, the No. 5 cylinder EGT and CHT started to decrease and became inconsistent with normal operation, as shown in figure 2.

At 1455:28, the pilot stated that he did not believe he was going to reach the airport. At 1455:51, the controller asked the pilot what he was doing. The pilot did not respond. At 1456:04, the controller again inquired if the pilot was still on the frequency. At 1456:10, the pilot replied that he could still hear the controller and that the airplane was about 3 miles from CDI at 2,000 ft msl.

The controller told the pilot to advise when he saw the airport, and to provide the airplane’s current bearing. At 1456:21, the pilot replied that the airplane was on a 210° bearing. At 1456:27, the pilot stated that the airplane was north of CDI, lined up with an unknown runway. The controller told the pilot that the hard surface runway at CDI was runway 4/22. At 1456:39, the pilot confirmed that the airplane was lined up with runway 22 at CDI.

Between 1456:40 and 1457:30, as shown in figure 2, the No. 5 cylinder EGT increased about 420°, while the No. 1 cylinder EGT decreased about 100°, Nos. 2-, 4-, and 6-cylinder EGT decreased 300-500°, and the No. 3 cylinder EGT continued to decrease and was significantly lower than the other cylinders.

At 1457:16, the pilot stated again that he was not going to make it to CDI. At 1457:24, the engine monitor ceased recording EGT for the No. 3 cylinder after it decreased below 450° F. At 1457:30, the pilot stated, “[unintelligible] off to my left, I’ll have to put it down.” At 1457:34, the pilot told the controller that he was going to land in a field. The controller asked the pilot if he could write down a phone number. At 1457:40, the pilot replied “ah, not right now sir.” There were no additional radio transmissions from the pilot.

Between 1458:00 and 1458:22, the fuel flow decreased from 26.7 to 9.6 gph with a corresponding significant decrease in EGT for all cylinders below 550° F. The engine monitor did not record data past 1458:22.

There were numerous witnesses that reported seeing the airplane flying at a low altitude with a noticeable engine issue. Several of these witnesses reported hearing the engine "sputtering" or "misfiring" before the airplane descended out of their sightline behind trees. One witness reported seeing a “noticeable but faint, wispy, transparent film” trailing the aircraft and “white or light gray puffs” near the exhaust.

Figure 2 – Engine Monitor Data

According to maintenance documentation, on February 5, 2019, at 3,861.1 total airframe hours, the installed Continental IO-470-K engine was removed and replaced with a factory rebuilt Continental IO-470-N engine, s/n 1036858, in accordance with supplemental type certificate (STC) No. SA5527SW. Additionally, a McCauley 3A36C434/80VEA propeller, s/n 190011, and McCauley C290D3/T35 propeller governor, part number (p/n) D20309-31, s/n 180680, were installed in accordance with STC No. SA00718CH.

The last annual inspection of the airplane was completed on March 15, 2019, at 3,872.9 total airframe hours, at which time the engine had accumulated 11.8 hours since the factory rebuild.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) incident data, on February 3, 2020, the pilot inadvertently landed the airplane with the landing gear retracted at Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio. According to maintenance logbook documentation, after the wheels-up landing, the Continental IO-470-N engine, s/n 1036858, was shipped to Continental Services, Fairhope, Alabama, to be disassembled, inspected, and repaired for any propeller strike damage. After the engine was inspected, it was reinstalled on the airplane on May 22, 2020, at 4,056.8 total airframe hours, by the Ohio State University Airport certified repair station with a new McCauley 3A36C434/80VEA propeller, s/n 191236, and an overhauled McCauley C290D3-R/T35 propeller governor, s/n 180680.

Postaccident review of recorded engine data revealed that on May 22, 2020, following the engine/propeller installation, the engine was run at least twice, accumulating about 10.8 minutes. The first engine run was 9 minutes in duration and included a fuel flow of 22.3 gph during an evident max power cycle. The second engine run was about 1.8 minutes in duration and did not appear to include a max power cycle. A review of the engine data for both test runs did not reveal any anomalies, and the maximum fuel flow during the first test run was consistent with the manufacturer’s specification of 22 gph for the engine at rated power.

On May 27, 2020, at 4,057 total airframe hours, the damaged flaps were removed, and a serviceable pair of flaps were installed by a mechanic representing Plane Care, LLC, a certified repair station at Hagerstown Regional Airport (HGR), Hagerstown, Maryland. The mechanic disabled the flaps in the up position by pulling and collaring the flap circuit breaker. The landing gear was disabled in the extended position by pulling and collaring the landing gear circuit breaker.

On May 27, 2020, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the airplane to be flown from OSU to HGR where additional airframe repairs were to be completed.

At the time of the accident, the airframe total time was about 4,058.1 hours. The engine had accumulated about 197 hours since the factory rebuild and 1.3 hours since it was reinstalled on the airframe after the propeller strike inspection.

Figure 3 – Engine Monitor Data During Engine Test Run on May 22, 2020

According to maintenance documentation, on February 5, 2019, at 3,861.1 total airframe hours, the installed Continental IO-470-K engine was removed and replaced with a factory rebuilt Continental IO-470-N engine, s/n 1036858, in accordance with supplemental type certificate (STC) No. SA5527SW. Additionally, a McCauley 3A36C434/80VEA propeller, s/n 190011, and McCauley C290D3/T35 propeller governor, part number (p/n) D20309-31, s/n 180680, were installed in accordance with STC No. SA00718CH.

The last annual inspection of the airplane was completed on March 15, 2019, at 3,872.9 total airframe hours, at which time the engine had accumulated 11.8 hours since the factory rebuild.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) incident data, on February 3, 2020, the pilot inadvertently landed the airplane with the landing gear retracted at Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio. According to maintenance logbook documentation, after the wheels-up landing, the Continental IO-470-N engine, s/n 1036858, was shipped to Continental Services, Fairhope, Alabama, to be disassembled, inspected, and repaired for any propeller strike damage. After the engine was inspected, it was reinstalled on the airplane on May 22, 2020, at 4,056.8 total airframe hours, by the Ohio State University Airport certified repair station with a new McCauley 3A36C434/80VEA propeller, s/n 191236, and an overhauled McCauley C290D3-R/T35 propeller governor, s/n 180680.

Postaccident review of recorded engine data revealed that on May 22, 2020, following the engine/propeller installation, the engine was run at least twice, accumulating about 10.8 minutes. The first engine run was 9 minutes in duration and included a fuel flow of 22.3 gph during an evident max power cycle. The second engine run was about 1.8 minutes in duration and did not appear to include a max power cycle. A review of the engine data for both test runs did not reveal any anomalies, and the maximum fuel flow during the first test run was consistent with the manufacturer’s specification of 22 gph for the engine at rated power.

On May 27, 2020, at 4,057 total airframe hours, the damaged flaps were removed, and a serviceable pair of flaps were installed by a mechanic representing Plane Care, LLC, a certified repair station at Hagerstown Regional Airport (HGR), Hagerstown, Maryland. The mechanic disabled the flaps in the up position by pulling and collaring the flap circuit breaker. The landing gear was disabled in the extended position by pulling and collaring the landing gear circuit breaker.

On May 27, 2020, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the airplane to be flown from OSU to HGR where additional airframe repairs were to be completed.

At the time of the accident, the airframe total time was about 4,058.1 hours. The engine had accumulated about 197 hours since the factory rebuild and 1.3 hours since it was reinstalled on the airframe after the propeller strike inspection.

Figure 3 – Engine Monitor Data During Engine Test Run on May 22, 2020

The airplane wreckage was at the edge of a field located about 3 nautical mile northeast of CDI, as shown in figures 4 and 5. There was no evidence that the airplane's wheels contacted the ground before the airplane flew into the trees at the eastern edge of the field on an east heading. Based on the damage to the trees and the airplane, the airplane impacted the trees a few feet above ground level in a level pitch attitude, as shown in figure 6.

Fuel was present in both main fuel tanks and the fuel filter assembly, and there was no water or particulate matter observed in fuel samples recovered from both main fuel tanks. The fuel selector valve handle was found in the left main tank position. The fuel selector valve functioned as designed when tested. About 16 gallons of fuel remained in the fuel system when the airplane was recovered from the accident site.

Visual examination of the fuselage’s exterior revealed fuel streaks emerging from a louvered vent and access panel at the lower right side of the engine compartment, and continued aft along the lower right fuselage, as shown in figures 7-11. There was no evidence of fuel pooling or streaking on the internal surfaces of the engine cowling, but there were a few rivet bucktails that exhibited fuel staining.

The fuel lines forward of the firewall exhibited no evidence of fuel leaks. All fuel lines from the firewall to the fuel manifold were clear of obstructions when air was blown through them. All fractured fuel line fittings exhibited features consistent with impact related damage. There was no damage, debris, or obstructions to the fuel manifold, stainless steel injector lines, or fuel injector nozzles Nos. 1-4 and No. 6. The No. 5 fuel injector nozzle exhibited impact related damage but appeared clear of debris.

The No. 3 cylinder head exhibited blue fuel stains on several cooling fins located on the forward-facing side of the intake port, as shown in figures 12-13. There were no apparent cracks or fuel stains around the fuel injector nozzle or spark plug ports. The inter-cylinder baffle between the No. 3 and 5 cylinders exhibited prominent fuel straining and streaking, as shown in figure 14. The intake flange gasket compression faces were flattened around the inner diameter hole and there were no apparent kinks or tears. The No. 3 cylinder intake elbow and cylinder intake port flange face did not exhibit any fuel stains. The remaining cylinders and engine components did not exhibit any visible fuel stains.

The postaccident engine examination did not reveal a mechanical failure that would have prevented normal operation.

Figure 4 – Aerial Photograph Showing Accident Site Location (FAA Photo)

Figure 5 – Aerial Photograph Showing Accident Site Location (FAA Photo)

Figure 6 – Main Wreckage at Accident Site (AMF Aviation Photo)

Figure 7 – Fuel Streaks on Lower Right Engine Cowl

Figure 8 – Fuel Streaks on Lower Right Engine Cowl

Figure 9 – Fuel Streaks on Lower Right Side of Fuselage (FAA Photo)

Figure 10 – Fuel Streaks on Lower Right Side of Fuselage (FAA Photo)

Figure 11 – Fuel Streaks on Lower Right Side of Fuselage (AMF Aviation Photo)

Figure 12 – Fuel Stains on No. 3 Cylinder and Inter-Cylinder Baffle

Figure 13 – Fuel Stains Near No. 3 Cylinder Intake and on Inter-Cylinder Baffle

Figure 14 – Fuel Streaking on Inter-Cylinder Baffle Between Cylinders Nos. 3 and 5

An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Franklin County Forensic Science Center, Office of the Coroner, Columbus, Ohio, which identified the cause of death as blunt force injuries of the head, and the manner of death was accident. No significant natural disease was identified during the autopsy.

Toxicological testing completed by the Federal Aviation Administration’s Forensic Sciences Laboratory identified the sedating antihistamine diphenhydramine in the pilot’s urine but not in his blood. The gastric reflux medication famotidine was detected in his urine and in his muscle tissue and the asthma medication albuterol was detected in his lung tissue; these two medications are considered non-impairing.