N1532WTeam MINI-MAX 1300-R · 1991

On September 30, 2012, about 1835 Pacific daylight time, an experimental amateur-built TEAM INC Mini-Max 1300-R, N1532W, light-sport airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain following a complete loss of engine power during its return to John Nichol's Field airport (0CL3), Chula Vista, California. The pilot/owner received minor injuries. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight.

According to the pilot, he based the airplane at 0CL3, which he termed an "ultralight park," and departed on the flight about 90 minutes before the accident. During the return to 0CL3, when the airplane was several miles west of the airport, at an altitude of about 1,000 to 1,200 feet, the engine "froze up." The pilot selected a flat area in a park for his forced landing, but on the final approach, he realized that he had too much airspeed to land and stop in the available remaining distance, so he intentionally stalled the airplane to stop it quickly. The airplane struck and came to rest against an embankment that bordered the park. The pilot reported that he "had no idea" why the engine ceased operation. Examination by a Chula Vista Police Department officer determined that the fuel tank was about 3/4 full after the accident.

The pilot was issued a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical/student pilot certificate in February 1996, and that certificate expired in February 1998. He did not hold any other FAA certificates, including a repairman certificate applicable to the accident airplane. The pilot did not provide any flight experience information.

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1991. In 2007, the Detroit Flight Standards District Office issued the Phase 1 Operating Limitations and an Airworthiness Certificate for the airplane in the light-sport category. Those limitations stated that "except for takeoffs or landings, this airplane may not be operated over densely populated areas," and that any changes required "FAA concurrence in writing." No such concurrence was ever requested of, or issued by, the FAA.

The airplane was equipped with a Rotax 503 series non-certificated, pull-start engine. Although required by the FAA, the airplane was not equipped with an emergency locator transmitter (ELT). Registration of the airplane in the light-sport category enabled a pilot to operate the airplane without an FAA medical certificate.

The accident pilot was the fourth owner of the airplane. The pilot reported that he had purchased the airplane about 4 months prior to the accident, and spent time and effort making unspecified repairs and modifications to the airplane to "get it the way I like it." He stated that he was in possession of the maintenance records, but despite requests, he never provided them to representatives of either the FAA or NTSB. The pilot stated that he did not know what specific information was in the maintenance records, and that he did not know how diligent or accurate any of the previous owners were regarding maintenance records entries. The investigation was unable to determine the build, in-service, or maintenance history of the airplane or engine

The 1853 automated weather observation at an airport about 6 miles southwest of the accident location included calm winds, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 24 degrees C, dew point 17 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury.

The accident site was located about 3 miles west of O3CL. The tractor-configuration monoplane came to rest upright, against a light pole and an embankment in a suburban park. The pilot reported that he attempted to land in the park because that was the most suitable space available to him. The right wing was severely damaged, and the left wingtip, undercarriage, and empennage were significantly damaged. The wood propeller remained intact, consistent with lack of engine power at impact. The propeller remained attached to the engine, and the engine was intact and undisturbed.

An examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector the following day revealed that the fuel lines were clear flexible plastic. The airplane was equipped with an in-line fuel filter that was located between the firewall and the carburetor. The filter was located about 5 inches from the firewall, and about 12 inches from the carburetor. The filter and lines were not secured by any clamps, stays, or standoffs to support them, or to prevent any motion. The fuel line that penetrated the firewall was not secured at the firewall.

When the inspector first saw the fuel line between the filter and the carburetor, it was "kinked" about 90 degrees, which choked the line, and significantly impeded or stopped the flow of fuel to the carburetor. By moving the filter manually about 1 inch fore and aft, the inspector could kink or unkink the fuel line. The fuel line was able to be moved freely through the firewall, which permitted unrestricted fore-aft motion of the filter, and thereby kinked or unkinked the fuel line. The investigation was unable to positively determine whether the fuel filter was in the position to kink the fuel line at the time of the accident.

Slow activation of the pull start resulted in the engine turning over easily. No compression, ignition spark checks, or any other tests were attempted on the engine. The inspector did not note any pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded continued engine operation.

The investigation was unable to determine the maintenance history of the airplane, the history of the subject fuel line, including when and by whom it was installed, and whether any clamps had been removed.

The Rotax engine installation manual did not provide any specific guidance regarding fuel line security or rigidity. FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1B (Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair) and FAA-8083-30 (Aviation Maintenance Technicians Handbook) included guidance that "flexible hose should be installed so that it will be subject to a minimum of flexing during operation," and that inspection of lines and hoses should include checks for "improper installation" and "looseness."

Although the owner/pilot was not the builder of the airplane, he did report that he conducted some unspecified upgrades to the airplane, and also that he never flew without "looking over everything for safety." He did not report what guidance he used to conduct his maintenance or inspection activities, and did not report whether he was familiar with the Rotax or FAA guidance.