N1863YCessna 172C · 1962

On April 18, 2016, about 1910 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172C, N1863Y, collided with trees and terrain during takeoff from Sophie's Choice airstrip, Westmoreland, New York. The private pilot and one passenger were fatally injured, one passenger sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by postcrash fire. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed near the accident site at the time and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which was destined for Griffiss International Airport (RME), Rome, New York.

Earlier that day, the accident pilot and the pilots of two other airplanes flew from a private airstrip near Poland, New York, to Boonville Inc., Airport (1NK7), Boonville, New York, where they landed uneventfully. The three airplanes subsequently departed from 1NK7 and flew to Sophie's Choice airstrip where they landed and secured their airplanes. The pilot-rated airstrip owner reported that, before departure, he suggested to the accident pilot that he begin the takeoff from at least just west of the "break" point of the runway, which allowed for about 1,344 ft of available runway (see figure 1).

Figure 1 - Airstrip Overview with Annotated Positions

The pilot of one of the airplanes that departed before the accident airplane reported seeing the accident airplane stopped on the side of the runway, about 1,150 ft from the departure end of the east runway (see figure 1). Using the radio frequency (122.7 MHz) that they had used throughout the day to communicate, he broadcast for the accident pilot to stop and not initiate takeoff from that point, but the accident pilot did not respond. He also attempted to communicate with the other pilot who had just departed, but he did not respond either.

The pilot-rated passenger onboard the accident airplane stated that, after boarding the airplane, the pilot started the engine and then taxied to the west portion of the runway for an intended takeoff to the east from the down-sloping runway. She indicated that the pilot did not discuss with the passengers where the takeoff should begin. She reported that the winds were calm and that the pilot performed a run-up while on the runway centerline. He initiated the takeoff with an unknown flap extension, and when the flight was past a road located immediately east of the departure end of the runway, she heard the stall warning horn chirp. She did not observe any engine indications and did not recall the airspeed at any time during the flight. When asked if the engine sound changed at any time during the flight, she responded that she did not perceive any change in sound at any time. She stated to an acquaintance postaccident that she and the pilot exited the airplane from the left door because of her inability to open the right door. Because the rear seat occupant needed help exiting the airplane, the pilot attempted to assist him. About that time, the airplane exploded.

The airstrip owner, who was located near the departure end of the runway, recorded the takeoff on his cellular phone. He stated that, during the accident airplane's takeoff roll, he noticed the flaps were extended between 10° and 20° and that the airplane became airborne when it was just past the windsock. He indicated that at no time did he hear any abnormal sounds from the engine, and after becoming airborne, it appeared to him that the airplane was "hanging on the propeller." He indicated that the airplane entered an incipient stall, with the left wing dropping, followed by the right wing. Based on a review of the video, following the sound of the impact, the airstrip owner stated, "…I told them to use more runway." He later reported going to the scene and talking with the female passenger and telling her he thought they should have initiated the takeoff from farther to the west, and she replied that they should have begun the takeoff from a point farther west of where they did.

The airstrip owner's wife, who was about 100 ft east from the airstrip owner, indicated that, as the airplane went past her position, she did not discern any unusual engine sounds.

A 911 call was made at 1912, and first responders were dispatched.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on August 31, 2015, with no limitations.

Including a 2.3-hour flight earlier that day, but excluding subsequent flights later that day, the pilot logged a total time of about 458 hours, 382 hours of which were in the accident airplane make and model and 298 hours of which were as pilot-in-command.

According to FAA records, the pilot-rated passenger in the right front seat held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. She estimated her total flight time was between 100 and 300 hours.

The four-seat, high-wing airplane was manufactured in 1962. It was powered by a 145-horsepower Continental O-300-D engine and equipped with a two-blade McCauley 1C172/EM7653 fixed-pitch propeller.

A review of the airplane's Type Certificate Data Sheet revealed that the maximum red line engine rpm was 2,700.

The maintenance records were reportedly in the airplane at the time of the accident. A review of documents provided by the facility that performed the airplane's last annual inspection revealed it was signed off as being completed on April 5, 2016, at an airframe total time of 3,302.55 hours. Based on pilot logbook entries, including the logged 2.3-hour flight earlier on the accident date but excluding the subsequent unlogged flights later that day, the airplane had been operated 6.2 hours since the annual inspection was completed.

The 1853 recorded weather at RME, located 7 nautical miles north-northeast from the accident site, included wind from 300° at 10 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, clear skies, temperature 20°C (or 68°F), dew point -01°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.13 inches of mercury. A review of an FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin pertaining to carburetor ice revealed that the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were not favorable for the formation of carburetor ice.

According to the airstrip owner, the wind at the time of the accident was nearly calm, or no more than 1 to 2 knots from the west.

The four-seat, high-wing airplane was manufactured in 1962. It was powered by a 145-horsepower Continental O-300-D engine and equipped with a two-blade McCauley 1C172/EM7653 fixed-pitch propeller.

A review of the airplane's Type Certificate Data Sheet revealed that the maximum red line engine rpm was 2,700.

The maintenance records were reportedly in the airplane at the time of the accident. A review of documents provided by the facility that performed the airplane's last annual inspection revealed it was signed off as being completed on April 5, 2016, at an airframe total time of 3,302.55 hours. Based on pilot logbook entries, including the logged 2.3-hour flight earlier on the accident date but excluding the subsequent unlogged flights later that day, the airplane had been operated 6.2 hours since the annual inspection was completed.

The airplane crashed in the yard of a residence; the main wreckage was located about 089° and 520 ft from the departure end of runway 08. The main wreckage was upright heading 020° on gently sloped terrain with the wings oriented upslope and downslope.

Examination of the accident site revealed impact damage to trees and ground about 40 ft west of the resting position of the airplane. A tree left of the resting position of the main wreckage was damaged about 30 ft above ground level (agl); the left wingtip was found in the tree, and the left elevator counterweight was found on the ground at the base of the tree, or about 482 ft past the departure end of the runway. Nearly in-line with the tree contact was a ground contact scar with specs of white paint in the dirt. A section of the right aileron and right wingtip were located on the ground slightly east of the ground contact location. Immediately adjacent to the ground contact was damage to several small diameter trees about 8 ft agl.

Fire damage was noted in the area immediately adjacent to the resting position of the wreckage. Examination of a tree that was resting partially on the engine cowling revealed one limb about 1.75 inches in diameter that exhibited a 45° cut; the cut was located about 108 inches agl. Two small diameter tree sections with opposite 45° cuts were found immediately adjacent to the accident site. The trees were associated with the first contact small diameter trees between 1.0 and 1.5 inches in diameter. The limbs were about 14 inches long and exhibited black transfer marks on the cut surfaces.

The cockpit, cabin, and inboard portions of both wings were nearly consumed in the postcrash fire. The manual flap selector was found positioned to the 10° extension position. All four female portions of the lapbelts were located, none of which had the male portion connected. The pilot's lapbelt, which exhibited heat damage, was buckled and noted to easily release. The remains of the fuel selector handle and plate were located; however, the body of the fuel selector valve was not identified.

All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or were found near the resting position of the main wreckage. Flight control continuity was confirmed for roll, pitch, and yaw from each control surface to each respective cockpit control. During examination of the elevator trim system cable, one cable broke at the swedged end of the chain. The fracture surface was noted to be fresh and did not exhibit soot. Flap cable continuity was confirmed from the flap selector handle to each flap bellcrank adjacent to the control surface.

Examination of the right entry door revealed that about two-thirds of it, including the forward and upper portions, was consumed by postcrash fire; the hinges were found loose in the wreckage. The exterior door handle was in the "closed" position, which corresponded with the door latch being extended (locked), and it moved by hand actuation. Deformation was noted to the lower portion of the door; it could not be determined whether the deformation was due to fire or impact.

Examination of the fuselage revealed that it was nearly consumed by postcrash fire to fuselage station (FS) 140, but it was continuous from that point to FS 228. The vertical stabilizer with attached rudder and right horizontal stabilizer with attached elevator and counterweight remained attached to the empennage. Examination of the elevator trim tab actuator revealed it was extended about 1.70 inches, which equates to 20°-tab trailing edge up (maximum is 28°). The trim tab control cables were continuous to the cockpit. The left horizontal stabilizer with attached elevator was separated and found immediately forward of the right horizontal stabilizer. The tail tiedown located at FS 228 had dirt adhering to it. Examination of the bulkhead at FS228 revealed no damage at the bottom or at the lower elevator control cable attachment pass-through area. A wrinkle was noted on the fuselage bottom from FS 214 to 219.

Examination of the separated baggage door, which was found in the main wreckage and had sustained heat damage, revealed that the outer latch was in.

Examination of both wings revealed that they sustained impact and postaccident fire damage. Both fuel tank outlet screens were unobstructed. Examination of the left fuel tank vent check valve revealed that the check valve flapper was in place, and it moved freely by hand actuation.

Examination of the engine compartment revealed that the fuel strainer was separated from its attachment point on the firewall and exhibited extensive fire damage. The inlet was separated, but a flexible hose remained connected to the outlet fitting. The B-nut of the hose connected at the outlet fitting was about 2.5 flats loose. Disassembly of the fuel strainer revealed that the screen exhibited some corrosion on the exterior surface.

Examination of the engine revealed that the upper and lower engine cowlings were in place. Following removal of the upper cowling, heat damage was noted to the engine. The engine remained attached to the airframe, and the case halves matched. The oil dipstick and oil filler cap were found in place; no oil level registered on the dipstick. The engine was removed from the airframe, and following removal of the lower engine cowling, engine oil was noted resting on the interior surface. Rotation of the propeller revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity, including continuity to the accessory section; during rotation, the impulse coupling was heard to activate. Thumb suction and compression were noted in all cylinders.

Examination of the upper and lower spark plugs revealed normal wear; the lower plugs of the odd cylinders were noted to be oil soaked, but the engine was resting with those cylinders in a lower elevation than the opposite-side cylinders. The ignition harness was heat damaged. Both magnetos were tightly installed to the accessory case, and during hand rotation of the propeller, no spark was noted at the heat damaged ignition leads. The left magneto was partially disassembled, which revealed that the distributor block was destroyed, the rotor gear was not in place, and the distributor gear exhibited heat damage. The right magneto exhibited heat damage to the rotor and distributor gears. During rotation of the propeller, the rotor shafts of both magnetos rotated.

Examination of the carburetor revealed that it remained attached to the oil sump but exhibited heat damage. The mixture and throttle cables, which remained attached to each respective control levers, were in the full rich and nearly full wide-open positions, respectively. Examination of the carburetor heat control revealed that the control cable remained attached to the control lever, which was found oriented nearly parallel to the lower surface of the oil sump and correlated to the open, or cold, position. Disassembly of the carburetor revealed that one float had separated; the other float remained attached but was not fully seated. Examination of the separated float revealed resolidified solder. Dark discoloration was noted in the carburetor bowl.

Examination of the propeller, which remained attached to the engine, revealed one blade was fractured about 31 inches from the hub centerline, whereas the other blade was full span; the separated blade piece was not located. The fractured blade exhibited a slight forward bend beginning about 7 inches from the fracture point of the blade; no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The full span blade exhibited "S" bending, the center points of which were located 12 and 25 inches, respectively, from the bulkhead location. The outer 4.5 inches of the leading edge exhibited blade damage, which was curled forward.

Weight and Balance

Weight calculations were performed using the empty weight listed from a weight and balance form dated October 23, 2008 (1,516.83 lbs), the weight of oil (15.0 lbs), the pilot's weight per his last medical application (168 lbs), the weight of the right front seat passenger (138 lbs), the estimated weight of the rear seat occupant (162 lbs), and the estimated fuel load (161 lbs). The airplane weight at engine start was estimated to be about 2,161 lbs, or about 89 lbs less than the maximum certificated gross weight of 2,250 lbs. Center-of-gravity calculations indicated that the loaded aircraft moment was 87.85 lb-inches, which was within the normal category envelope of 2,161 lbs.

Takeoff Performance

According to the takeoff data chart contained in the owner's manual, which was for a hard-surfaced runway with flaps retracted, based on the airport elevation (average 618 ft), the temperature about the time of the accident (68°F), the estimated airplane weight at the time of the accident (2,161 lbs), and no headwind, the ground run was calculated to be about 786 ft, and the distance to clear a 50-ft obstacle was calculated to be about 1,370 ft. The chart did not contain figures for a grass surface nor any tailwind or sloped runway components. The owner's manual also indicated that 10° of flap extension shortened the ground run about 10%, but the advantage was lost to climb over a 50-ft obstacle.

The owner's manual also contained a chart for stall speeds, which was predicated on the airplane being operated at gross weight and power off, and true airspeeds were provided in mph. Based on a flap position of 10°, the stall speeds at 0°, 20°, and 40° of bank were 54, 56, and 62 mph, respectively.

Sound Spectrum Study

According to a sound spectrum study of the provided takeoff video, the engine was operating about 2,340 rpm, or 360 rpm below the full red line rpm of 2,700 at the time the airplane passed the camera (near the departure end of the runway) during takeoff. The study also indicated that, because the airplane's speed was unknown, it was not possible to accurately determine the engine rpm throughout the takeoff roll.

Speed Study

According to a speed study of the provided takeoff video, the impact occurred 9.25 seconds after the airplane passed the windsock. The average groundspeed from the point where the airplane passed the windsock just before becoming airborne to the accident site was about 47 knots (54 mph).

According to a representative of the propeller manufacturer, based on the temperature at the time of the accident and the airstrip elevation, the required theoretical true airspeed that would have allowed the propeller to achieve 2,700 rpm (full red line rpm) would have been 84 knots. The representative also indicated that, based on the temperature, elevation, and the average groundspeed calculated by the NTSB, the engine rpm was 2,402, the power absorbed (hp) was about 124, and the lbs of thrust was about 462.

The pilot died 6 days after the accident while hospitalized, and an autopsy was not performed. According to the death certificate, the cause of death was listed as "complications of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries."

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted toxicological testing on the pilot's serum samples. The FAA toxicology report stated that it did not perform testing for carbon monoxide and cyanide and that no volatiles were detected in the serum samples. Unquantified amounts of ketamine and midazolam and 0.13 ug/ml norketamine were detected in the serum samples. These medications are only available in IV form and are generally used during resuscitation efforts.

The rear seat occupant died the day after the accident while hospitalized, and an autopsy was not performed. According to the external examination report, the cause of death was listed as "complications of thermal and inhalational injuries due to airplane crash."

According to the front seat passenger, after the airplane came to rest, all occupants were alert and conscious. She was unable to open the right door and attributed this to either the impact or operational issues.