N22MWExtra Flugzeugbau Gmbh EA 300/L · 2001

On May 19, 2024, at 1649 Pacific daylight time, an Extra Flugzeugbau GMBH EA 300/L airplane, N22MW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Bandera, Washington. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot was planning to attend an annual International Aerobatic Club (IAC) aerobatic training camp in Ephrata, Washington. The pilot recently had a mishap with his own airplane, an Extra NG, where it was damaged when the canopy opened during takeoff. Because the accident pilot’s airplane was in maintenance, the owner of the accident airplane offered to lend the pilot his airplane to use for the aerobatic camp. The pilot had flown the airplane before and was covered by the owner’s insurance.

A review of ADS-B data revealed that the airplane departed Arlington Municipal Airport (AWO), Arlington, Washington, about 1627. The airplane proceeded south-southeast until intersecting Interstate 90 near Snoqualmie, Washington. The airplane then began to follow I-90 through a mountain pass while generally maintaining an altitude of 1,500 ft agl (see figure 1). The canyon walls along the mountain pass reached up to 5,500 ft msl.

Figure 1. Flight path in reference to the destination airport

About 1647, the airplane entered a 1,500-feet-per-minute climb, with its groundspeed gradually decreasing from 170 kts to 130 kts over a 20-second period. At 1648, the airplane passed to the south of Bandera State Airport (4W0) after reaching an altitude of about 7,000 ft msl and an airspeed of 103 kts. The airplane began to descend and its speed increased to over 185 kts (see figure 2). The airplane leveled off briefly and then began another, steeper descent. During the final seconds of recorded data, the airplane began a 90° left turn and the airspeed decreased while it continued the descent. The last recorded data point was at 1649:06 and showed that the airplane was at 4,500 ft and 120 kts. When the airplane did not arrive at Ephrata, an alert notice was issued, and the wreckage was located the following morning near the final ADS-B position.

Figure 2. End of flight track

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and glider. He held a BasicMed medical certificate issued on May 15, 2023, with the limitation that corrective lenses were required for distant vision and glasses must be available for near vision. He was associated with International Aerobatic Club Chapter 67 and was the waiver holder for the Ephrata aerobatic camp.

According to the pilot’s logbook, at the time of the accident he had accumulated 1,313.5 total hours of flight experience, 6 hours of which were accumulated in the 90 days before the accident. He had extensive aerobatic experience.

The pilot logbooks revealed that the pilot flew from Arlington to Ephrata through Stampede Pass on at least two occasions since October 2021. The routes he flew through the pass on those two occasions were similar to the route of the accident flight. The airplane owner stated that the pilot had flown the route from Arlington to Ephrata through the pass many times, typically following I-90.

It is unknown if the pilot was aware of the weather forecast conditions before departure. There is no record of the pilot reviewing weather information from either Leidos or ForeFlight. After making arrangements with the airplane’s owner the day before the accident to move the airplane to his own hangar, the pilot stated to the owner that the weather forecast was “iffy for getting to Stampede Pass,” so he would likely depart the day of the accident or possibly the next morning.

Aerobatic Camp

The pilot was scheduled to attend an aerobatic camp that started the day after the accident. This camp was structured for one group of pilots to participate for the first three days, followed by another group for the next three days. The first group of pilots were scheduled to land on the day of the accident to receive a briefing at 1600 and to sign in. The pilot indicated to the airplane’s owner that he planned to get up on the morning of the accident and wait for favorable weather, mentioning he might have to wait until May 22 or 23. His camp was scheduled to start on May 22. He told the camp’s organizers that his wife was driving to the airport with the FAA-required Certificate of Waiver (CoW) to be signed at the briefing. About 1450 on the day of the accident, one of the camp’s organizers asked the pilot if he would be at Ephrata that day to help give the briefing. The pilot responded that he would not make the briefing.

The aerobatics training camp required a CoW from the FAA, which was issued to the pilot. The CoW detailed the conditions and responsibilities under which the camp was allowed to conduct aerobatic flight activities in the designated area near the airport, including compliance with specific safety and operational provisions; it stipulated that failure to adhere to the conditions could result in the cancellation of the waiver and legal penalties. The CoW stated, “The holder of this certificate shall be responsible for the strict observance of the terms and provisions contained herein” and that the pilot was the only person “authorized to activate and deactivate” the aerobatic area; no other people were delegated this authority.

Review of the airplane’s records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 30, 2023, at an airframe total time of 1,002 hours. The most recent recorded maintenance was replacement of the tailwheel on May 15, 2024, at an airframe total time of 1,016.8 hours.

According to the airplane’s flight manual, the published stall speeds at a weight of 870 kg were 57 kts at wings level, 61 kts at 30° of bank, and 68 kts at 45° of bank.

The flight manual states that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. It instructs the pilot to immediately exit icing conditions by turning back or changing altitude to reach an outside air temperature less conducive to ice accumulation. It further directs the pilot to plan to land at the nearest suitable airfield.

The closest official weather reporting station was Stampede Pass Airport (SMP), Stampede Pass, Washington, located about 9 miles southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 3,970 ft msl. The automated observation about 30 minutes before the accident reported wind from 250° at 4 kts, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken clouds at 1,500 ft agl, broken clouds at 2,300 ft agl, temperature 5°C, dew point 2°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury (inHg). The automated observation about 30 minutes after the accident reported variable wind at 5 kts, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken clouds at 1,700 ft agl, overcast clouds at 2,500 ft agl, temperature 5°C, dew point 2°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inHg.

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model sounding for 1700 depicted the lifted condensation level and level of free convection at 4,273 ft msl and the convective condensation level at 5,425 ft msl. The sounding identified a cloud layer between about 4,000 and 12,500 ft msl. Light to moderate clear, mixed, and rime icing was indicated in two layers between 5,500 ft and 10,000 ft. The freezing level was located at 5,446 ft. At about 6,500 ft msl, near the accident airplane’s altitude before descent, the wind was from 335° at 6 kts, the temperature was about -8.6°C, the dew point was about -10.3°C, and the relative humidity was about 84%.

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 18 visible and infrared satellite imagery from about 1651 depicted cloud cover above the accident site. The infrared imagery indicated a brightness temperature above the accident site consistent with cloud tops near 8,000 ft msl. Graphical forecasts for aviation valid at 1700 depicted broken cloud coverage with cloud bases around 5,000 ft and cloud tops around 9,000 ft msl. Text and graphical AIRMETs were valid for mountain obscuration and icing in the area.

Pilot statements and witness interviews also documented adverse weather in the area of Stampede Pass. One pilot described the weather as unseasonably cold, rainy, and windy, with isolated areas of heavy rain, poor visibility, and moderate turbulence. Another witness reported considerable cloud cover in the Snoqualmie and Stampede Pass areas, isolated showers associated with reduced visibility, ragged clouds, and mountain obscuration. A pilot report issued near the time of the accident described light to moderate turbulence and light rime icing at 6,000 ft msl. One pilot who flew in the immediate area about 30 minutes before the accident reported that the tops of the clouds were at 10,000 ft msl and dissipated as he flew west, out of the pass.

Review of the airplane’s records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 30, 2023, at an airframe total time of 1,002 hours. The most recent recorded maintenance was replacement of the tailwheel on May 15, 2024, at an airframe total time of 1,016.8 hours.

According to the airplane’s flight manual, the published stall speeds at a weight of 870 kg were 57 kts at wings level, 61 kts at 30° of bank, and 68 kts at 45° of bank.

The flight manual states that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. It instructs the pilot to immediately exit icing conditions by turning back or changing altitude to reach an outside air temperature less conducive to ice accumulation. It further directs the pilot to plan to land at the nearest suitable airfield.

The accident site was located on a north-facing slope of densely forested mountainous terrain at an altitude of about 3,100 ft msl. The airplane came to rest among densely populated cedar and fir trees that reached 150 ft agl. The site varied in slope between 45° and 60°. Numerous branches directly above the main wreckage displayed fresh breaks, and the top of one small fir tree had been severed. None of the nearby trees showed evidence of impact to their trunks.

The debris field was estimated to be 100 ft in diameter, with the main wreckage in the center. The debris field consisted of pieces of clear plastic, fragmented composite, paint chips, and propeller splinters. The main wreckage included the engine, fuselage, wings, and empennage. The empennage was folded over the fuselage in a scorpion-like position.

Both wings came to rest partially embedded in topsoil and remained attached to the fuselage. The wing skin panels were fragmented and distributed throughout the wreckage field, and the leading edges exhibited extensive crushing and fragmentation. The main wing spar was fractured in multiple locations, with the outboard portions of both wings exhibiting the greatest crush deformation. Both ailerons were fragmented, with only the inboard sections identifiable. The right aileron inboard section remained attached to its fitting; however, the control rod and bellcrank assembly were loose within the wreckage. A tree branch was lodged in the upper skin of the right aileron inboard section, and the right spade remained attached. The left aileron exhibited greater crush deformation and was fragmented into additional pieces. The left spade had separated from the aileron skin.

The vertical stabilizer was fragmented, with only partial rib structure remaining attached. The rudder remained attached, and the rudder control horn remained attached to the control cables and could oscillate laterally between stops. The main landing gear was impact-separated from the fuselage and located alongside the lower portion of the fuselage. The forward control bellcrank and control sticks were crushed and the rudder pedals were damaged. Due to extensive fragmentation, control continuity could not be established.

The engine sustained extensive crush deformation and the oil sump was impact-fractured. Multiple pushrods were separated, and several rocker arms were not located. The upper spark plugs displayed light gray coloration. Both magnetos were impact-damaged, and timing could not be established. The piston faces exhibited normal carbon deposits. No evidence of detonation or foreign object ingestion was observed. The oil filter was removed and cut open, and the pleats contained no metallic contamination. Postimpact examination revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure.

The propeller hub came to rest beneath the engine. All three wooden blades were shattered, and fragments were distributed throughout the accident site.

Both cockpit seats were crushed, and no survivable space remained. The airplane was equipped with five-point restraint systems for both seating positions. The seatbelt latch position at impact could not be definitively determined. The lower lap belt on the pilot’s seat appeared latched, with the crotch strap engaged. Comparison between the pilot’s restraints and those of the forward seat, which was known to be unoccupied, revealed deformation of the pilot’s lap belt hooks consistent with engagement at the time of impact. The parachute the pilot was wearing was still packed and there was no indication he attempted to bail out of the cockpit.

The airplane was equipped with a Garmin aera 660. Its terrain function used GPS position and GPS-derived msl altitude to display surrounding terrain and obstacles relative to the airplane and could provide visual and aural terrain, obstacle, and descent-rate alerts, including caution and warning annunciations. According to the manufacturer, the feature was intended as a situational awareness aid only and was not intended for primary terrain avoidance.

It could not be determined how the Garmin aera 660 was configured at the time of the accident, including whether terrain alerting was enabled and what alert sensitivity, caution elevation, look-ahead time, or terrain audio settings had been selected. According to the airplane’s owner, the pilot had limited familiarity with the system.

An autopsy was conducted on the pilot by the King County Medical Examiner’s Office. The cause of death was reported as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicological testing of postmortem specimens, performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory, did not reveal any drugs of abuse.