N231JFMooney Aircraft M20K · 1979

History of Flight

On November 12, 2014, at 1735 (all times are mountain standard time), a Mooney M20K airplane, N231JF, collided with the terrain in Clines Corners, New Mexico. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire. The airplane was registered to KI Aircraft LLC and was being operated by a private individual as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Localized instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight which was not operated on a flight plan. The flight originated from the Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport (AMA), Amarillo, Texas, at 1616. The intended destination for the flight was the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), Phoenix, Arizona.According to personnel at the fixed base operator (FBO) in AMA, the pilot landed the airplane and taxied to the FBO about 1525. The pilot instructed the line personnel to "top off" the airplane with fuel. FBO personnel reported there was a "light blowing sleet" at the time, but that the airplane was free of any ice. The pilot left the FBO to eat and when he returned, he asked the customer service representative (CSR) if she knew of any airplanes at their facility that had just arrived from or were departing for Phoenix. The CSR replied that there were none. The pilot then struck up a conversation with two business jet pilots who were in the lobby. The FBO manager stated he spoke with the pilot and because the weather was deteriorating, he offered to put the pilot's airplane in a heated hangar for the night. The pilot stated he was not staying the night and that he would be departing shortly. FBO personnel stated that after departing the FBO, the pilot performed an engine run-up and contacted air traffic control for his taxi clearance.

One of the corporate jet pilots recalled the accident pilot asking if anyone was going to Phoenix. The accident pilot then asked him if he knew the altitudes of the cloud ceiling and cloud tops. The accident pilot explained that he was trying to get to Phoenix and he was wondering if the cloud layer was thin enough for him to get through it. The business pilot stated that he flew in from the east and that when they were on top of the clouds, the cloud layer below them extended as far as they could see. He also informed the pilot that they encountered rime and clear ice during their descent into AMA. The accident pilot then questioned himself out loud as to whether or not he would be able to stay below the weather. They discussed the mountains located east of Albuquerque. The accident pilot opened his "tablet" and looked at a satellite image pointing out where he thought the cloud layer ended east of Santa Rosa, New Mexico. The business pilot told the accident pilot that a weather briefer would be able to give him information regarding the ceilings heights along his planned route. The accident pilot thanked him and departed the FBO.

The pilot received visual flight rules (VFR) flight following from air traffic control during the flight. While in contact with the Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZAB), the pilot reported that the airplane was "starting to collect some ice" and requested information regarding the tops of the cloud layer. The pilot stated that he was going to have to turn around to return to AMA. The controller offered the pilot several other airports in the area, but the accident flight continued westbound. The controller questioned the pilot regarding the weather conditions and asked if he was aware of the terrain along the route. The pilot reported that he was familiar with the terrain and that he was below the clouds. The pilot then stated that he was going to fly to the Moriarty Airport (OEO), which was about 28 miles west of his current position.

Radar contact and communication with the airplane were lost about 1735. The wreckage was located in a field just west of Route 285, 7 ½ miles north of I-40 in Clines Corners, New Mexico.

Personnel Information

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating issued on March 21, 2004. He was issued a third class airman medical certificate with no restrictions on March 20, 2014. The pilot was not instrument rated.

Two of the pilot's logbooks were made available for review during the investigation. One logbook contained entries from January 5, 2004 through February 17, 2005. The second logbook contained entries from March 19, 2014 through June 5, 2014. There were 28 additional undated entries, most of which did not have any flight time associated with them. A total of the recorded flight times indicate the pilot had a total flight time of 285.4 hours. Of this time, 27.6 hours were flown in the accident airplane.

FAA records show that on August 17, 2014, they conducted an investigation of a Pilot Deviation involving the accident pilot. According to the deviation report, the pilot unintentionally entered Class A airspace without a clearance or an instrument rating while attempting to climb out of weather.

Aircraft Information

The accident airplane was a Mooney M20K, serial number 25-0075. The Mooney M20K is a single-engine, four-place design, with retractable tricycle landing gear. The airplane was powered by a 210-horsepower, Continental Motors TSIO-360-C six-cylinder, reciprocating engine, serial number 309079. The airplane was equipped with a two-blade McCauley model 2A34C316-B propeller assembly.

Records show the pilot purchased the airplane on May 10, 2014. The last aircraft logbook contained entries from July 30, 2009, through May 14, 2014. The last airframe annual inspection was completed on May 9, 2014, at a Hobbs time of 390.7 hours and a tachometer time of 8.2 hours. The last entry in the aircraft logbooks was dated May 14, 2014, which was for the transponder, encoding altimeter, and static system check. The last aircraft total time that was listed in the logbook was 3,445.5 hours on December 17, 2012, at a Hobbs time of 380.9 hours.

The last engine logbook contained entries from July 30, 2009, through May 14, 2014. The last engine annual inspection was competed on May 9, 2014, at an engine total time of 3,455.3 hours and a time since major overhaul of 1,727.3 hours.

The total time on the aircraft and engine at the time of the accident could not be determined from the logbook information collected during the investigation.

The pilot requested the airplane be filled with fuel with fuel before his last departure. Fueling records indicate the airplane was fueled with 20.9 gallons of 100LL.

Meteorological Information

The Clines Corners, New Mexico (CQC), Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), is located about 7 miles south-southeast of the accident site. At 1732, the CQC ASOS recorded weather conditions as: wind from 120 degrees at 15 knots; visibility 4 miles with light snow and mist; broken clouds at 800 feet above ground level (agl); temperature minus 12 degrees Celsius (C); dew point minus 14 degrees C; altimeter 30.13 inches of mercury.

The Moriarty Airport (0E0) in Moriarty, New Mexico, is located 16 miles west-southwest of the accident site. At 1735, the 0E0 ASOS recorded weather conditions as: wind 130 at 8 knots; visibility 10 miles or greater; overcast clouds at 2,000 ft agl; temperature minus 8 degrees C; dew point minus 13 degrees C; altimeter 30.22 inches of mercury.

The Santa Fe Municipal Airport (SAF) ASOS was located about 41 miles northwest of the accident site. At 1733, the SAF ASOS recorded weather conditions as: wind from 140 degrees at 23 knots gusting to 30 knots; visibility 10 miles or greater; broken clouds at 1,500 ft agl; temperature minus 7 degrees Celsius; dew point minus 14 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.12 inches of mercury.

The Albuquerque International Sunport Airport (ABQ) ASOS was located about 51 miles west of the accident site. At 1752, the ABQ ASOS recorded weather conditions as: wind from 080 degrees at 25 knots; visibility 10 miles or greater; few clouds at 4,000 ft agl, few clouds at 8,000 ft agl; temperature 0 degrees Celsius; dew point minus 11 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.07 inches of mercury.

Atmospheric data was retrieved from 1700 Rawinsonde launches from ABQ and AMA, where each launch likely retrieved low-level meteorological data beginning between 1600 and 1630. The ABQ sounding showed two temperature inversions with one located just above the surface and the other surrounding an altitude of 9,000 ft above mean sea level (msl). The freezing level was about 8,400 ft msl. Above the freezing level, the temperature increased to 3 degrees C at about 9,500 ft msl and remained above freezing up to 11,000 ft msl. Wind near the surface was from the east at 20 knots. The wind then changed to the south at 10 knots at about 7,000 ft msl, and to a westerly wind of 25 knots at about 10,000 ft msl. Assessments of icing made by the Universal Rawinsonde Observation program (RAOB) for this sounding did not identify any icing potential.

The AMA sounding showed multiple temperature inversions, with several in the layer between 6,000 and 8,000 ft msl. Another inversion was located between 12,200 and 13,700 ft msl. The entire atmosphere was below freezing. Wind near the surface was from the northeast at 10 knots. The wind changed above the surface, becoming a west wind at 45 knots at an altitude of 9,000 msl. Assessments of icing made by the RAOB for this sounding identified the potential for moderate rime and clear icing along with the potential for significant turbulence between 7,000 and 9,000 ft msl.

The 1528 area forecast issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) in Albuquerque, called for instrument flight rule (IFR) and marginal visual flight rule (MVFR) conditions at the central and eastern terminal sites. The 1652 area forecast called for areas of MVFR to IFR ceilings and visibility in light snow, mist, and freezing fog near the northeast New Mexico border as well as between the central mountain chain and the Pecos Valley. After 1900, the wind was forecast to gust between 30 and 35 knots at Santa Fe and ABQ.

Airmen Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisories for altitudes below FL 180 were issued for New Mexico and active at the time of the accident. AIRMET SIERRAs which called for IFR conditions and mountain obscuration due to clouds, precipitation and mist encompassed the area along the route of flight and the accident site. AIRMET ZULU which encompassed an area just north of the route of flight and the accident site called for moderate ice below 16,000 ft msl.

A witness who heard the impact stated the weather conditions at the time were blowing snow flurries, windy, and very cold temperatures. A captain from the Santa Fe County Fire Department stated that it began to snow heavily, the wind was gusting, and the visibility decreased as he was responding to the accident scene.

Communications

The pilot established contact with the ZAB sector 87 radar controller at 1637 stating he was at 6,400 ft. The controller asked the pilot if he was aware of the high terrain along his route of flight. The pilot responded that he was looking for a "…spot to us go up uh do you know what the tops are at here." The controller informed the pilot that he did not have any top reports and he cleared the pilot to contact ZAB on another frequency.

The pilot checked in with the sector 16 (R16) controller at 1703 stating he was at 7,200 ft. At 1716, the pilot asked the controller if he knew where the cloud tops were as he was starting to pick up some ice. The controller responded that he did not know where the cloud top reports. The pilot then informed the controller that he needed to turn around and descend. The controller reiterated that the pilot was going to descend and return to Amarillo. The pilot responded that was correct. The controller stated to the pilot that he wasn't picking up any precipitation on his radar so he didn't know where the cloud layers were, but he offered several nearby airports at which the pilot could land.

At 1720, the controller asked the pilot if he was going to continue on course and if he was aware of the terrain along the course. The pilot replied that he was going to continue and that he was aware of the terrain.

At 1722, the pilot stated "… it's getting worse up higher I'm gonna have to turn around and reroute." The pilot then asked where the closest airport was located. The pilot did not declare an emergency. The controller provided the pilot with the distances and directions to several airports. The pilot replied that he was going to reverse course to Santa Rosa (SXU) and he asked the controller what the weather was like there. The controller replied, "….unfortunately Santa Rosa's not an adapted weather station." At 1725, the controller informed the pilot that 0E0 was 28 miles away if he didn't want to continue toward Albuquerque. The pilot responded that he was going to Moriarty. The controller then stated to the pilot "…unfortunately Moriarty is not an adapted weather station either so I don't have a weather report there." The controller asked the pilot if he was below the clouds. The pilot replied he was and asked the controller where the cloud tops were. The controller responded that he didn't have any cloud top reports. The controller queried an air carrier about the cloud layers. The air carrier pilot responded the clouds were below him at maybe 8,000 or 10,000 ft. The accident pilot then responded that he was going to just keep going and that "…hopefully it'll break up here for me open up." This was the last communication from the pilot. The controller reported that radar contact was lost at 1735.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane came to rest in an open field 60 ft west of state Route 285 at a location about 7 ½ miles north of the town of Clines Corners, New Mexico. The airplane came to rest on a magnetic heading of 020 degrees. Impact damage on the airplane indicated that the airplane impacted the terrain in about a 60 degree nose down attitude. The wreckage was contained in one location and a post impact fire ensued. The terrain northwest of the wreckage was scorched from the fire.

The cockpit was destroyed by postimpact fire. The throttle quadrant was visible and the engine controls were in the forward position. The fuselage skin on the right side of the fuselage was burned and crushed. The fuselage skin on the left side of the fuselage was destroyed by fire.

The left wing was destroyed by fire and impact. This skin was crushed rearward. The remaining wing structure was bent upward and twisted rearward beginning just outboard of the flap. The thermal and impact damaged left flap remained partially attached to the wing. The left aileron was destroyed by thermal damage. The aileron push-pull tube was visible and intact along the length of the wing up to the cockpit area.

The right wing was scorched with the inboard section of the wing having been destroyed by the fire. The outboard ¾ of the leading edge and bottom of the wing was crushed rearward. Both the flap and aileron remained attached to the wing. The aileron push-pull tube at the inboard hinge was bent. The push-pull tube was intact throughout the wing up to the cockpit area.

The empennage was intact with the elevator and rudder remained attached to their respective stabilizers. The left side of the empennage sustained thermal damage with the right side being lightly covered with soot. The outboard half of the right stabilizer and elevator were bent upward. The outboard half of the left elevator and stabilizer were bent downward. The leading edge of the vertical stabilizer was crushed rearward and to the right. Both elevator balance weights were separated and located near the wreckage. The elevator and rudder control systems were traced from the flight control surfaces to the cockpit area. All separations within the flight control system were consistent with impact damage.

The trim jackscrew and the flap jackscrew were measured. The longitudinal trim assembly jackscrew indicates the trim was at the takeoff setting. The flap actuator tube measurement equated to the flaps being extended about 10 degrees which is the takeoff flap setting. The landing gear was in the retracted position.

The horizontal situation indicator, directional gyro, altimeter, and artificial horizon were found in wreckage. All sustained impact and thermal damage. The artificial horizon was opened. The gyro housing was fractured and gyro was outside the housing. No visible scoring marks were identified inside of the housing.

The engine sustained impact and thermal damage. The top of the crankcase sustained impact damage and it was fractured leaving a large hole between the number 5 and 6 cylinders. The crankshaft was visible through the hole. The crankshaft was bent at the front main bearing saddle. Impact forces bent the crankshaft, propeller flange, and propeller to the right. The oil sump was fractured open with pieces missing, leaving the lower interior of the engine visible. All of the lifters were intact. The camshaft was visibly bent at the rear of the engine.

The fuel injectors were attached to each cylinder and the air manifold-tube assemblies sustained impact damage. The upper deck pressure system sustained impact damage and several components were missing. The top of the fuel manifold was missing. The diaphragm was burned away. Several of the distribution lines were broken and missing.

All of the accessories had separated from the engine. Both magnetos were located in the main wreckage. It could not be determined which magneto was the left and which one was the right. The magnetos were opened and both sustained thermal damage making them inoperable. The ignition harness sustained impact and thermal damage.

The cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. Cylinders 5 and 6 were pushed rearward from impact forces. All of the rocker box covers were intact. All of the pushrods were intact with the exception of the number 6 exhaust pushrod and rod housing which sustained impact damage. The pushrods for the number 5 cylinder sustained impact damage, but they were in place.

All of the sparkplugs were removed and the inside of the cylinders, valves, and piston heads were examined using a lighted boroscope. All of the intake and exhaust valves, and pistons were in place and exhibited normal combustion deposits. The spark plugs were found in the worn condition as compared to the Champion Check-A-Plug chart. The plugs exhibited normal to dark coloration.

The engine driven fuel pump was intact, but was pushed rearward. The pump was removed and the drive coupling was found intact and in place. The fuel pump housing was broken and the pump vanes were intact.

The vacuum pump was separated from the engine. The pump was disassembled. The carbon blades and the rotor sustained impact and thermal damage.

The propeller remained attached to the crankshaft propeller flange. The crankshaft was bent to the right starting at the front main bearing saddle due to impact. The propeller hub was broken and one of the propeller blades was loose in the hub. This propeller blade was marked "A" for identification purposes. This blade exhibited chordwise scratching on the front of the blade and gouges toward the blade tip. The blade was bent forward beginning about 12 inches from the blade shank. Blade "B" was secure in the propeller hub. This blade was found sticking upward at the accident site. The blade exhibited slight forward bending about 18 inches from the blade shank.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Office of the Medical Investigator, UNM Health Services Center, on November 13, 2014. The pilot's death was attributed to blunt trauma sustained as a result of the accident.

The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) toxicology report noted the following:

50 (mg/dL, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Kidney

48 (mg/dL, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Muscle

39 (mg/dL, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Liver

28 (mg/dL, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Spleen

According to CAMI, the ethanol levels detected were most likely a result of putrefaction.

Additional Information

During the flight, the pilot informed the controller of his intent to divert to SXU and then 0E0, both of which were equipped with automated weather observing systems (AWOS); however, weather information for these airports was not readily available to the controller for either airport because neither AWOS had been adapted into the ZAB en route automation modernization system (ERAM). The ERAM is an air traffic management system designed to increase air traffic flow and improve automated navigation and conflict detection service. In March 2015, ERAM replaced the en route host computer and backup systems at 20 ARTCCs.

An adapted weather site is an official weather facility or official automated weather reporting station that sends weather reports to the Weather Message Switching Center Replacement System (WMSCR). The weather data is then linked or adapted to be accessible from the ATC positions within the ARTCC ERAM's system. An official weather station uses weather reporting systems from the National Weather Service (NWS), the FAA, or contractors which provide weather data. That data is then delivered to the WMSCR and made available to users. There is a fee associated with the data-link that is normally paid by the weather station owner/operator (i.e. airport, city, state). If the service fee is unpaid, the weather station is dropped from the weather network. ZAB is unable to adapt a weather station into ERAM that is not in the WMSCR.

As the FAA updated the current radar system to the ERAM system, ARTCCs are updating similar characteristics and capabilities. One of these capabilities is adapting weather reporting airports within the ZAB airspace. This ongoing process includes adding and removing airports from the weather adapted list as determined by the availability of information from the WMSCR. Once a reporting station is adapted, the ARTCC controller can execute a current weather request by typing the station identifier on a keyboard. Neither SUX nor 0E0 were adapted at the time of the accident. 0E0 was subsequently adapted on January 9, 2015.

An ERAM initiated weather request is one of several methods an ARTCC controller has available to acquire current weather information from an airport. Weather information is available from most weather reporting stations via a telephone number or radio broadcast frequency. The telephone numbers and frequencies are available to the controller via the digital airport facilities directory accessible from the controller's station. The controllers at ZAB did not have access to outside telephone lines, but the supervisors did. Another source of current weather information at ZAB was the NWS center weather service unit (CWSU). Meteorologists at the CWSU have access to numerous weather products including the specific weather information that had been requested by the accident pilot.

The ZAB R16 controller did not provide airport weather for the suggested divert airports, nor did the controller provide weather information from the CQC ASOS even though the CQC ASOS data was adapted into the ZAB ERAM.

The ATC North Specialty Front Line Manager stated he was aware of the situation with the accident airplane and considered the issue to be a VFR pilot trying to maintain VFR conditions. He asked the controller who was working the airplane if he needed assistance and the controller stated that he did not. The supervisor called the ABQ tower and asked for a visibility report to the east, which was the direction from which the accident airplane was approaching. ABQ tower reported that the visibility to the east was not a problem. The supervisor passed this information to the controller. The supervisor stated that the weather for Las Vegas, New Mexico, and Tucumcari, New Mexico, had been acquired via ERAM utilizing the request weather functions and he was "pretty sure" that the controller passed this weather information to the pilot. The supervisor did not consider the ZAB CWSU as a resource for specific airport weather data, nor did he recall ever seeing the ZAB CWSU provide tactical support such as specific weather information in the past.

The R16 controller who was working the accident airplane stated that when the pilot established contact on the frequency and he wanted to turn around and go back to AMA, and that he requested information regarding the cloud tops. The controller stated he thought the request was "weird" and that it was a "red flag" to him. He did not recall hearing the pilot report that he was picking up ice. The controller stated there were no significant meteorological information (SIGMETs) in effect and that there was no radar displayed precipitation. He informed his supervisor of the pilot's request and his supervisor asked if he needed the assistance of a radar assistant. He did not consider the assistance necessary. The controller provided distance and heading information for several airports in the area. He stated the pilot implied that he wanted to get above the clouds. He did not consider the pilot to be in distress, but rather trying to remain in VMC, which he did not consider to be an emergency. This controller did not provide weather for the suggested divert airports because the airports were not "weather adapted". He did not consider directing the pilot to the AWOS/ASOS frequencies, asking the supervisor for airport weather, or asking the supervisor to solicit airport specific weather from the CWSU because the only weather data he ever received from the CWSU was a macro view. He could not recall ever seeing a supervisor reach out to the CWSU to provide tactical weather support.

FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 10-2-7. VFR Aircraft in Weather Difficulty, states in part:

If VFR aircraft requests assistance when it encounters or is about to encounter i ns t r u m e nt f l i ght r ul e s ( IFR) weather conditions, determine the facility best able to provide service. If a frequency change is necessary, advise the pilot of the reason for the change, and request the aircraft contact the appropriate control facility. Inform that facility of the situation. If the aircraft is unable to communicate with the control facility, relay information and clearances.

FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 10-2-8, Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft in Weather Difficulty, states in part:

If a VFR aircraft requests radar assistance when it encounters or is about to encounter IFR weather conditions, ask the pilot if he/she is qualified for and capable of conducting IFR flight.

If the pilot states he/she is qualified for and capable of IFR flight, request him/her to file an IFR flight plan and then issue clearance to destination airport, as appropriate.

If the pilot states he/she is not qualified for or not capable of conducting IFR flight, or if he/she refuses to file an IFR flight plan, take whichever of the following actions is appropriate:

1. Inform the pilot of airports where VFR conditions are reported, provide other available pertinent weather information, and ask if he/she will elect to conduct VFR flight to such an airport.

2. If the action in subpara 1 above is not feasible or the pilot declines to conduct VFR flight to another airport, provide radar assistance if the pilot:

(a) Declares an emergency.

(b) Refuses to declare an emergency and you have determined the exact nature

of the radar services the pilot desires.

3. If the aircraft has already encountered IFR conditions, inform the pilot of

the appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. If the aircraft is below appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude and sufficiently accurate position information has been received or radar identification is established, furnish a heading or radial on which to climb to reach appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude.

En route air traffic controllers provide approach control information to those airports within their airspace that do not fall under a terminal approach control. There were many such airports in ZAB airspace. FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 4-7-10, Approach Information, states in part:

Both en route and terminal approach control sectors must provide current approach information to aircraft destined to airports for which they provide approach control services. This information must be provided on initial contact or as soon as possible thereafter. Approach information contained in the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) broadcast may be omitted if the pilot states the appropriate ATIS code. For pilots destined to an airport without ATIS, items 3-5 below may be omitted after the pilot advises receipt of the automated weather; otherwise, issue approach information by including the following:

1. Approach clearance or type approach to be expected if two or more approaches are published and the clearance limit does not indicate which will be used.

2. Runway if different from that to which the instrument approach is made.

3. Surface wind.

4. Ceiling and visibility if the reported ceiling at the airport of intended landing is below 1,000 feet or below the highest circling minimum, whichever is greater, or the visibility is less than 3 miles.

5. Altimeter setting for the airport of intended landing.

Upon pilot request, controllers must inform pilots of the frequency where automated weather data may be obtained and, if appropriate, that airport weather is not available.

On June 25, 2015, the FAA issued a memorandum to each ATRCC directing that "within 30 days of the date of this memo, each ARTCC is required to review the list of available weather stations for their airspace and direct the Facility Automation Support Team (FAST) to adapt any additional sites pertaining to them. FAST must adapt the additional weather stations on the next available chart date and by no later than August 20 [2015]. Each facility must review and update their list of weather stations quarterly."