N252DL is a 1975 Cessna 310R. It is a fixed-wing multi-engine aircraft with 6 seats, powered by a Cont Motor IO 520 series rated at 285 horsepower. The registration is active, with the registrant based in Paradise, TX. Its standard airworthiness certificate was issued in May 1975. It has been registered to its current owner since Dec 2019. This page also carries 1 NTSB event.
- 51 years old
- 1 of 380 Cessna 310R
2019
1975
That's everything on file so far — TailWiki checks the FAA registry daily and adds new entries as N252DL's record changes.
On January 14, 2024, about 1215 central standard time, a Cessna 310R airplane, N252DL, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Poolville, Texas. The pilot and the two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot filed an IFR flight plan for the cross-country flight. Before departing, the pilot obtained a standard weather briefing of the forecast and observed weather conditions along the route of flight, which included AIRMETs for icing conditions.
ADS-B data revealed that the airplane departed Carrizo Springs Airport (CZT), Carrizo Springs, Texas, about 1100 and was en route to Bridgeport Municipal Airport (XBP), Bridgeport, Texas. A review of ATC communications records revealed that the pilot checked in at 1149 while the airplane was cruising at 7,000 ft msl. At 1158, the pilot asked the controller if there had been any reports of icing through the cloud layers, and the controller replied that there were reports of trace rime icing between 18,000 and 21,000 ft msl. The controller asked the pilot to verify that he had the current weather at XBP, which the pilot confirmed.
At 1204, when the airplane was about 45 nm south of the destination airport, the controller cleared the flight to descend to 3,000 ft msl. Between 1205 and 1206, the controller and pilot exchanged brief communications about other traffic in the area. At 1208, the controller told the pilot that there was more traffic in the area, but the pilot did not respond. The controller made several repeated attempts to contact the pilot during the next several minutes, including providing low altitude alerts at 1211 and 1212, but the pilot did not reply.
Flight track data indicated that the airplane began a descent of between 600 to 750 ft per minute from about 7,000 ft msl on a heading of about 016° and remained on that heading until impact with the ground. This descent took place over a period of about 10 minutes and covered a horizontal distance of about 32 nautical miles. A witness driving eastbound on a road about 1.5 miles south of the accident site reported that he saw the airplane flying north and level at a low altitude above the tree line. He said the landing gear were retracted, and both propellers were rotating. There were no known witnesses to the accident.
A review of the pilot’s logbook revealed that he completed a flight review on “October 5,” but there was no year associated with the entry. There was also no evidence that the pilot had completed recent instrument proficiency requirements to act as pilot in command in instrument meteorological conditions.
Airplane delivery documents indicated that the airplane was originally delivered with wing and horizontal stabilizer pneumatic de-icing boots and propeller electric de-icing boots. The accident airplane’s serial number was listed on the March 24, 1997, Cessna service bulletin MEB97-4, which referenced the installation of a placard to indicate that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. The service bulletin contained a note stating that some airplanes “may be originally equipped with anti-ice and/or de-ice equipment that could make the airplane appear to be certified for flight in known icing conditions when actually it is not.” Effective April 7, 2014, FAA airworthiness directive 2014-03-03 mandated compliance with this service bulletin.
A review of the airplane’s maintenance records did not show a transponder, altimeter, and pitot static system inspection completed within the previous 24 calendar months, which is required to fly in instrument meteorological conditions.
The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from CZT to XBP at 0934 the morning of the accident. The filed cruise altitude was 7,000 ft msl with an estimated time en route of about 1 hour 23 minutes.
The pilot obtained an electronic weather briefing on the morning of the accident. The briefing included AIRMETs for moderate icing between CZT and XBP during the time filed for the flight. The briefing included PIREPs in the Dallas/Fort Worth area for light rime ice between 4,000 and 6,000 ft msl. The briefing also included forecast conditions along the route of flight, which included freezing drizzle and ice pellets.
The AIRMET for icing conditions was issued at 0845 and valid for 1200, which forecast moderate icing between the surface and flight level 220 for the area near the accident site. Meteorological data and PIREPs indicated that there was cloud cover between 3,000 ft and 6,000 ft msl in the immediate area where the accident occurred. A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model indicated moderate rime icing between 3,000 and 5,000 ft msl, and freezing temperatures below 5,750 ft msl. The current icing product and forecast icing product revealed that cloud cover had the potential to support moderate or greater icing with a 40 to 50% chance of supercooled large droplets.
The weather at XBP about the time of the accident included an overcast cloud layer at 3,000 ft agl, temperature of -11°C, dew point of -21°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.34 inches of mercury.
Airplane delivery documents indicated that the airplane was originally delivered with wing and horizontal stabilizer pneumatic de-icing boots and propeller electric de-icing boots. The accident airplane’s serial number was listed on the March 24, 1997, Cessna service bulletin MEB97-4, which referenced the installation of a placard to indicate that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. The service bulletin contained a note stating that some airplanes “may be originally equipped with anti-ice and/or de-ice equipment that could make the airplane appear to be certified for flight in known icing conditions when actually it is not.” Effective April 7, 2014, FAA airworthiness directive 2014-03-03 mandated compliance with this service bulletin.
A review of the airplane’s maintenance records did not show a transponder, altimeter, and pitot static system inspection completed within the previous 24 calendar months, which is required to fly in instrument meteorological conditions.
The airplane impacted a flat field and a wooded area about 13 miles southwest of XBP. The fuselage and right engine propeller blades initially contacted the flat field about 1/2 mile south of the main wreckage. The right propeller hub separated from the crankshaft flange and came to rest about 1/4 mile south of the main wreckage. Several trees at the beginning of the main debris field exhibited 45° cuts about 30 ft above the ground. The left engine and propeller blades remained together and were separated from the fuselage; they were found about 40 ft north of the main wreckage in a pond. All six propeller blades (three on each engine) exhibited significant polishing, chordwise scratches, and blade tip curling.
The remainder of the airplane, spread over about 370 ft, was fragmented and scattered throughout the wooded area in a relatively straight path on a heading of 360°. Both wings, the complete empennage, fuselage, left and right fuel nacelles, and right engine were found in the debris field. Portions of all flight controls were identified. Lengths of several flight control cables were noted but could not be positively attributed to a flight control system. All breaks in the flight control cables showed signs consistent with tensile overload. The empennage, wings, fuel nacelles, and part of the fuselage were burned by a postimpact fire.
There was no evidence of any anti-icing or de-icing systems observed in the wreckage.
About 17 minutes before the accident, while cruising at 7,000 ft msl, the pilot asked the air traffic controller if there had been any reports of icing through the cloud layers, and the controller replied that there were reports of trace rime icing between 18,000 and 21,000 ft msl. The controller asked the pilot to verify that he had the current weather at the destination airport, which the pilot confirmed. About 13 minutes before the accident, the controller cleared the pilot to descend the airplane to 3,000 ft from 7,000 ft msl. About 1 minute later, the controller and pilot exchanged brief communications about other traffic in the area. The pilot stopped responding to the controller about 7 minutes before the accident. Flight track data indicated that the airplane began a descent of between 600 to 750 ft per minute from about 7,000 ft msl on a heading of about 016° and remained on that heading until impact with the ground. This descent took place over a period of about 10 minutes and covered a horizontal distance of about 32 nautical miles.
An autopsy of the pilot was performed at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, Texas, on January 15, 2024. The pilot’s autopsy identified 50% narrowing of the right coronary artery and 50% narrowing of the left anterior descending coronary artery. The pilot’s cause of death was blunt force injuries, and his manner of death was an accident.
The FAA Forensic Science Laboratory performed toxicological testing. Ethanol was detected in vitreous fluid and urine. Ethanol is the intoxicating volatile alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor. Ethanol can also be produced by microbes in a person’s body tissues and fluids after death. Toxicology results also indicated the pilot had used the medication cetirizine. Cetirizine is a second-generation antihistamine medication that is available over the counter and commonly used to treat allergy symptoms.
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