N280KCPiper PA 46-350P · 1999

On March 23, 2023, about 1644 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N280KC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident in St. Augustine, Florida. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The accident occurred during takeoff at Northeast Florida Regional Airport (SGJ), St. Augustine, Florida. In addition to the pilot and passenger (his wife) being seriously injured, the occupants’ dog was also on board and died from injuries received in the accident.

According to ATC information, the pilot requested runway 24 for departure and was cleared to back taxi to use the full length of the runway and was cleared on course. At that time, the wind was reported by the air traffic controller as being 140º at 12 knots.

A designated pilot examiner who was conducting a private pilot practical test at SGJ heard a high-powered airplane taking off from runway 24 and turned to see the accident airplane rotating near the intersection of runway 24 and taxiway D3. The airplane began a shallow climb and the engine sounded to him as if it was developing full power. After clearing the end of the runway, the airplane began to pitch up into a steep nose-up attitude and climbed to an estimated 100 ft in altitude. The airplane began settling and barely cleared the streetlights along the east side of U.S. Route 1. The airplane then began a slight roll to the left and struck trees to the west of U.S. Route 1, near the extended centerline of runway 24. A large fireball erupted almost immediately upon impact with the trees.

According to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on October 19, 2021. On that date, he reported that he had accrued about 1,800 total flight hours.

The pilot’s flight logbook was in the airplane when the fire occurred and was not recovered. The pilot estimated that he had accrued about 2,000 total flight hours at the time of the accident.

The reported weather at SGJ, at 1654 (about 10 minutes after the accident) included: wind from 140° at 13 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 24° C, dew point 16° C, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.

Examination of the airplane revealed evidence of heavy ground impact forces and postimpact fire. The fire consumed the majority of the airplane’s roof, windscreen, windows, and interior. Fire burn-through was present on the left side of the fuselage.

The left wing displayed heavy impact and fire damage. The outboard portion of the wing was separated by impact and fire damage just outboard of the landing gear well. Fire consumed several portions of the wing. The left main landing gear was found retracted. The left aileron cables remained attached to the aileron sector. The aileron control rod was pulled from the sector. The left aileron remained attached to the wing. The inboard end was burned away. The left flap control rod was fractured at the inboard hinge location.

The right wing was also heavily impact- and fire-damaged. A large portion of the right flap remained attached to the wing and was deformed and burned. The right flap inboard control rod was bent. The right main landing gear was impact- and fire-damaged and was in the retracted position. The right aileron separated from the wing at the hinges and control rod. The control rod remained attached to the aileron. The aileron revealed buckling and tearing. The aileron flight control cables remained attached to the sector. One of the aileron cables displayed unraveling. The right-wing speed brake/spoiler was found retracted. The right-wing main fuel tank cap was in place.

The interior of the aft fuselage was fire damaged. The right half of the horizontal stabilizer was separated from the empennage and remained partially attached to the elevator. The elevator separated from the horizontal stabilizer on the left side and revealed bending and buckling. The elevator trim control surface remained attached to the elevator and to the elevator trim control rods. The left half of the elevator did not reveal fire damage. The right half was fire damaged. The elevator trim actuator was found in the full nose down position. The elevator trim cables were overload separated. The elevator control rod was bent and jammed against the aft former by impact forces. Both elevator control cables remained attached to the quadrant.

The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained intact and attached to the aft fuselage. They revealed only minor deformation and no notable fire damage. The rudder control cables remained attached to the sector. The rudder could be moved by hand when the cables were pulled from where recovery personnel had cut the aft fuselage and control cables. Control cable continuity was confirmed from the cut fuselage location to the elevator, elevator trim, and rudder.

Continuity was confirmed from the location where recovery personnel had made a cut just aft of the outflow valves to the floor of the cockpit location for both the elevator and rudder. Deformation of the cockpit floor bound the elevator and rudder control cables in that location. Sound could be heard in the forward cockpit floor location when the cables were pulled by hand. No movement of the aileron cables between the wing roots and the control columns was obtained, as the aileron cables were bound by impact deformation of the fuselage structure. The left aileron cable ends at the left-wing root had been cut by recovery personnel. The right aileron cable ends at the right-wing root also revealed cuts from recovery personnel with one end displaying some unraveling consistent with overload forces.

No pre-impact failures or malfunctions were discovered with the flight control system.

The instrument panel was heavily fire damaged. The throttle and propeller controls were found full forward. The mixture control was found in a mid-range position. The landing gear handle was found in the retracted position. The flap handle was found in a mid-range position that appeared to be 20°. The flap position indicator appeared to be in the 20° extended position. The flap actuator was found near the flaps extended 20° position. The fuel selector handle was found in the right tank position. The induction air control was found in the primary position.

The pilot stated he filled the main tanks before takeoff, providing a fuel load of 120 gallons. The fuel ignited during the impact sequence and was consumed by fire. No fuel remained in either wing. The aircraft was equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks. One auxiliary fuel tank cap, with a diameter smaller than the main tank caps, was found in the wreckage. Two fuel tank finger screens were found in a fire-separated condition. Both screens appeared free of debris. The fuel strainer and emergency fuel pump remained attached to the firewall and were both impact- and fire-damaged. The fuel strainer was removed and opened for examination. The fuel screen inside appeared clean. The emergency fuel pump was opened and revealed melted and fire-damaged internal components. The fuel selector valve was in the right tank position.

Examination of the 3-bladed propeller revealed that it was heavily impact damaged. One blade was fractured about one foot from the hub, with the remaining portion attached to the hub. The other two blades were fractured and had separated from the hub. The propeller spinner revealed torsional deformation consistent with rotation at the time of impact and the propeller governor had remained attached to the engine and no damage was noted. The propeller governor control cable had remained attached to the governor control arm and the arm was positioned at the full increase rpm position. The governor oil screen was absent of debris.

Examination of the engine revealed that the engine was discolored consistent with exposure to the fire. The rear-mounted engine accessories were fire damaged. The engine was partially disassembled to facilitate the examination. The engine crankshaft was rotated in both directions through about 180° of rotation by turning the propeller. Continuity of the crankshaft to the rear gears and to the valvetrain was confirmed. Motion of all pistons in their respective cylinder bores was observed. The rear-mounted accessories and the engine accessory case were removed. Heavy corrosion was observed on the rear gears. No other damage to the gears was observed.

The fuel injector servo remained attached to the engine and was fire damaged. The throttle and mixture cables had been cut by recovery personnel and the positions of the throttle and mixture controls on the servo unreliable. The fuel injector servo was removed and partially disassembled. The rubber diaphragms and plastic parts in the servo exhibited thermal damage. The servo fuel inlet screen was unobstructed. The fuel flow divider remained attached to the engine. The fuel injector lines were secure. The flow divider was partially disassembled and no damage to the diaphragm or other internal components was observed. The fuel injector nozzles were unobstructed. The fuel pump remained attached to the engine and was discolored consistent with exposure to the fire. The pump was removed and the drive assembly was observed to be intact. No other damage to the pump was observed.

Both magnetos remained attached to the engine and were fire damaged. Neither could be rotated to produce spark. The upper spark plug electrodes exhibited gray coloration and worn normal condition. The lower spark plugs were not removed. The ignition harness was fire damaged.

The oil filter media was charred but no metallic debris was observed in the filter media.

The turbocharger systems remained attached to the engine and were discolored consistent with exposure to the fire. Both turbocharger compressor and turbine wheels were secure and could be rotated by hand. The controller was impact- and fire-damaged. The manifold pressure relief valve and the exhaust bypass valve were fire-damaged. No other damage to the turbocharger system components was noted.

Manufacturer’s Guidance

According to the airplane manufacturer, “In order to achieve the performance and flying characteristics which are designed into the airplane, it must be flown with the weight and center of gravity (C.G.) position within the approved operating range (envelope). Although the airplane offers flexibility of loading, it cannot be flown with the maximum number of adult passengers, full fuel tanks and maximum baggage. With the flexibility comes responsibility. The pilot must ensure that the airplane is loaded within the loading envelope before he makes a takeoff.

Misloading carries consequences for any aircraft. An overloaded airplane will not take off, climb or cruise as well as a properly loaded one. The heavier the airplane is loaded, the less climb performance it will have. Center of gravity is a determining factor in flight characteristics. If the C.G. is too far forward in any airplane, it may be difficult to rotate for takeoff or landing. If the C.G. is too far aft, the airplane may rotate prematurely on takeoff or tend to pitch up during climb. Longitudinal stability will be reduced. This can lead to inadvertent stalls and even spins; and spin recovery becomes more difficult as the center of gravity moves aft of the approved limit.

A properly loaded airplane; however, will perform as intended. Before the airplane is licensed, a basic empty weight and C.G. location is computed (basic empty weight consists of the standard empty weight of the airplane plus the optional equipment). Using the basic empty weight and C.G. location, the pilot can determine the weight and C.G. position for the loaded airplane by computing the total weight and moment and then determining whether they are within the approved envelope.”

Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

According to the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA publication FAA-H-8083-25C, compliance with the weight and balance limits of any aircraft is critical to flight safety. Operating above the maximum weight limitation compromises the structural integrity of an aircraft and adversely affects its performance. Operation with the CG outside the approved limits results in control difficulty.

It goes on to say, in part, that balance refers to the location of the CG of an aircraft and is important to stability and safety in flight. The CG is a point at which the aircraft would balance if it were suspended at that point. The primary concern in balancing an aircraft is the fore and aft location of the CG along the longitudinal axis. The CG is not necessarily a fixed point; its location depends on the distribution of weight in the aircraft. As variable load items are shifted or expended, there is a resultant shift in CG location. The distance between the forward and back limits for the position of the center for gravity or CG range is certified for an aircraft by the manufacturer. The pilot should realize that if the CG is displaced too far forward on the longitudinal axis, a nose-heavy condition will result. Conversely, if the CG is displaced too far aft on the longitudinal axis, a tail-heavy condition results.

Performance

Review of the Airport Diagram indicated that runways 6 and 24 were closer to the pilot’s hangar than runway 13.

SGJ’s Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) provided pilots with up-to-date information about the airport’s operational status, and included weather data, such as wind speed, visibility, temperature, and altimeter setting. It also included details about runway conditions, such as surface conditions and any construction or maintenance work in progress.

According to the pilot, the ATIS said that they were using runways 6 and 13, but the windsock indicated that the wind was favoring runway 24. Review of ATIS broadcasts around the time of the accident indicated that the wind was not favoring runway 24 and use of that runway would have resulted in takeoff with a tailwind component.

Review of the Piper PA-46-350P Pilots Operating Handbook (POH) revealed that it did provide a wind component chart that provided crosswind information under normal wind conditions, but it was not designed for use for takeoff with a tailwind. The meteorological conditions that prevailed created a tailwind component of about 3.31 knots, along with an 11-knot crosswind component.

The POH also contained guidance for departure from short runways or runways with adjacent obstructions and advised that a short field takeoff technique with wing flaps set at 20° should be used in accordance with the “Takeoff Ground Roll, 20° Flaps” and “Takeoff Distance Over 50 Ft. Obstacle, 20° Flaps” charts.

The POH advised that maximum power should be established before brake release and the airplane should be accelerated to 69 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) for liftoff. After liftoff, the airplane’s attitude should be controlled to accelerate to 80 KIAS when passing through the 50-ft obstacle height. Once clear of the obstacle, the landing gear should then be retracted, and the airplane should be accelerated through 90 KIAS while retracting the wing flaps. The desired en route climb configuration and speed should then be established.

Further review of the POH also revealed that the Takeoff Ground Roll, 20° Flaps and Takeoff Distance Over 50-ft Obstacle, 20° Flaps charts were designed for airplanes that were within the normal center of gravity limits for weight and balance.

It was discovered that even though the pilot requested and was cleared to take off on runway 24, he did not use the entire length of the runway but initiated takeoff with about 400 ft of runway behind the airplane. This provided for about 2,301 ft of useable runway in front of the airplane. According to the pilot, he did this, as he is always reluctant to cross runway 13, and he believed it would only have given him another 150 ft for takeoff.

The pilot indicated he used 20° of flaps for the takeoff. Review of the Takeoff Ground Roll, 20° Flaps and Takeoff Distance Over 50 Ft. Obstacle, 20° Flaps charts indicated that if the airplane was within the certificated weight and balance envelope, with the wing flaps set at 20°, the ground roll would have been 1,350 ft, and the distance to clear a 50-ft obstacle would have been 2,500 ft.

Weight and Balance

According to the pilot, they did not have any baggage onboard other than a few staples for the weekend.

Examination of the wreckage revealed fire had at least partially consumed many of the items onboard. Therefore, there was no way to estimate the total pre-takeoff weight of the baggage accurately; however, over three cases of beer were found in the main fuselage along with groceries, baggage, and other items. These items, in addition to the weights of the occupants (the pilot, his wife, and their dog), and the fuel the pilot had onboard, indicated that at a minimum, the total weight was in excess of the maximum takeoff weight by about 14 pounds before the accident, even without accounting for the items that had been consumed or partially consumed by the fire.

Examination of the “C.G. Range and Weight Graph” contained in the POH also indicated that the airplane’s center of gravity was outside the forward limit of the operating envelope.