N30689Piper PA-32RT-300 · 1978

On May 10, 2025, about 0935 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32RT-300 airplane, N30689, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yulee, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot’s spouse reported that the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to reposition the airplane from Nassau Airport (83FL), Yulee, Florida, to Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida, where they would wait for approaching thunderstorms to pass through the area before continuing on to Tennessee. She reported that, earlier in the morning, the pilot had dropped her and their dogs off at FHB by ground vehicle before driving back to 83FL, where he planned to finish loading the airplane for their trip and make the short flight to FHB. The straight-line distance between 83FL and FHB was 3.9 nm.

Review of video captured by a motion-activated surveillance camera mounted on a hangar near the end of runway 12 at 83FL showed that the airplane taxied toward runway 12 and began a back-taxi down the runway and out of the video frame (figure 1). During the taxi the airplane’s nose baggage door appeared closed. As the video continued, the airplane re-entered the frame on a takeoff roll about 0934. The video showed that, during the takeoff, the nose baggage door was open. The door stayed open while the airplane became airborne and exited the video frame. Following the accident, a sweep of the usable portion of runway 12 found a case of aviation oil about 100 ft from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. A bag of dog food was also found about 440 ft from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. Review of surveillance video showed the airplane in a nose-high angle of attack just after lifting off. One eyewitness reported that the wings rocked back and forth before the left wing of the airplane dropped and the airplane descended behind trees. Another witness and surveillance videos showed the airplane enter a steep left-wing-low descent just before impacting a tree and the ground about 10 seconds after departing 83FL.

Figure 1. Still frames from surveillance video showing the airplane during taxi and takeoff. Note the nose baggage door area circled in red in each video frame.

The private pilot held an instrument rating. A review of the pilot’s logbook found that the last logged flight was on August 27, 2023, after which he received a logbook entry stating he had satisfactorily completed the flight review required by Title 14 CFR Part 61.56. At the time of the flight review the pilot had a total flight time of 365.6 hours, with 17.2 hours in the make and model of the accident airplane. The pilot’s flight currency could not be determined based upon the available information.

The pilot’s spouse reported that, several weeks before the accident flight, she and the pilot had flown from Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, to 83FL, a flight that was about 1 hour. She reported that they had fully fueled the airplane before that flight and that the accident flight was the first flight since fueling the airplane. She also indicated that 83FL did not have fuel services and they did not add any fuel to the airplane after the flight from CLW to 83FL. Review of the Piper PA-32RT-300 Pilot Operating Handbook showed the airplane had an endurance between 5 and 7 hours depending on the power setting used.

An estimated weight and balance was performed based upon the available information. A weight of 40 lbs was placed in the forward baggage compartment to account for the case of aviation oil and bag of dog food that were found on the runway and likely exited the forward baggage compartment of the accident airplane. Additionally, 100 lbs was placed in the aft baggage compartment because baggage was located in this area of the accident airplane but sustained thermal damage; 100 lbs is the maximum for the aft baggage compartment. Another 100 lbs was placed in the second and third seating rows to account for baggage, “E-bikes,” and more dog food that were found in this area of the accident airplane. Actual baggage weights could not be determined due to the postimpact fire. The calculation included 78 gallons of fuel based on the report made by the pilot’s spouse. The resulting weight and balance was within the airplane's flight envelope. The weight and balance was then recalculated with the 40 lbs placed in the nose baggage removed to simulate the baggage falling out of the open nose baggage compartment. The resulting weight and balance was still within the airplane’s flight envelope.

The manufacturer did not have test data available as to the controllability of the airplane model with the nose baggage door open, but reports from pilots who have experienced a nose baggage door opening in flight in this make and model did not reveal flight controllability issues with the nose baggage door opening in flight.

A regional view of the National Weather Service (NWS) National Reflectivity Mosaic for 0935 showed echoes of 25 to 55 dBZ near the accident site at the accident time. The closest NWS Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) to the accident site was from Jacksonville (JAX), Florida, located 12 miles southwest of the accident site. The reflectivity images depicted portions of reflectivity values between 30 and 45 dBZ (moderate to heavy intensity echoes) near the accident site at the accident time. The moderate to heavy intensity echoes were moving from west to east (figure 2).

Figure 2. JAX WSR-88D reflectivity for the 0.53° elevation scan initiated at 0933:06 with the accident site marked with a black circle.

There was a Convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisory valid for the accident site at the accident time issued by the Aviation Weather Center. SIGMET 42E, issued about 0855, valid through 1055, forecast an area of embedded thunderstorms with tops above flight level 450 ft (FL450), with the SIGMET box area moving from 260° at 25 kts.

A weather station at FHB, which was located about 3 nm east of the accident site, reported about 0935 that the wind was from 180° true at 5 kts, with 10 statute miles of visibility, and scattered clouds at 2,300 ft above ground level (agl) with thunderstorms in the vicinity and lightning distant southwest through north. The same station reported at 0955 wind from 320° at 13 kts gusting to 20 kts, 2 statute miles of visibility in heavy rain and thunderstorms, overcast clouds at 2,100 ft agl, and lightning in all quadrants.

Multiple witnesses reported that it had just begun to rain about the time of the accident. A review of surveillance video showed that there were drops of water consistent with rain on the lens of the camera at the time of the accident.

The pilot’s spouse reported that, several weeks before the accident flight, she and the pilot had flown from Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, to 83FL, a flight that was about 1 hour. She reported that they had fully fueled the airplane before that flight and that the accident flight was the first flight since fueling the airplane. She also indicated that 83FL did not have fuel services and they did not add any fuel to the airplane after the flight from CLW to 83FL. Review of the Piper PA-32RT-300 Pilot Operating Handbook showed the airplane had an endurance between 5 and 7 hours depending on the power setting used.

An estimated weight and balance was performed based upon the available information. A weight of 40 lbs was placed in the forward baggage compartment to account for the case of aviation oil and bag of dog food that were found on the runway and likely exited the forward baggage compartment of the accident airplane. Additionally, 100 lbs was placed in the aft baggage compartment because baggage was located in this area of the accident airplane but sustained thermal damage; 100 lbs is the maximum for the aft baggage compartment. Another 100 lbs was placed in the second and third seating rows to account for baggage, “E-bikes,” and more dog food that were found in this area of the accident airplane. Actual baggage weights could not be determined due to the postimpact fire. The calculation included 78 gallons of fuel based on the report made by the pilot’s spouse. The resulting weight and balance was within the airplane's flight envelope. The weight and balance was then recalculated with the 40 lbs placed in the nose baggage removed to simulate the baggage falling out of the open nose baggage compartment. The resulting weight and balance was still within the airplane’s flight envelope.

The manufacturer did not have test data available as to the controllability of the airplane model with the nose baggage door open, but reports from pilots who have experienced a nose baggage door opening in flight in this make and model did not reveal flight controllability issues with the nose baggage door opening in flight.

The wreckage was examined at the accident site. The initial impact point was identified as a broken branch about 40 ft up a tree. A crater in the ground was identified about 24 ft away from the tree, and the wreckage came to rest upright about 15 ft from the crater, on a magnetic heading of 264°. The calculated angle of descent between the initial tree impact and the crater was about 50°. An 84-inch-long outboard portion of the left wing was impact separated with the left aileron attached, and remained near the crater.

The cockpit and majority of the fuselage were consumed by postimpact fire. The left flap, right wing, rudder, vertical stabilizer, and a majority of the stabilator and stabilator trim were also consumed by the postimpact fire. Aileron flight control continuity was confirmed from the aileron bellcranks to the flight control attachment points in the cockpit. Rudder flight control continuity was confirmed from the rudder control drum to the rudder pedals in the cockpit. Stabilator control continuity was confirmed from the stabilator control bellcrank to the lower portion of the cockpit control. The stabilator trim actuator was measured and equated to a trim setting halfway between full nose down and neutral. The nose baggage door was not located in the wreckage; the location of the nose baggage door was consumed by the postimpact fire.

The three-blade propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. The propeller blades exhibited aft bending and chordwise scratching. Engine crankshaft and valvetrain continuity were established when the propeller was rotated 720°. Thumb suction and compression were observed on all cylinders. The vacuum pump remained attached to the engine accessory case; the drive gear and carbon veins all remained intact. The left impulse coupled magneto and right electronic magneto were removed and exhibited thermal damage. The fuel pump exhibited impact and thermal damage. The fuel injector assembly was impact-separated and exhibited thermal damage. The sparkplugs were removed and exhibited normal wear and coloration consistent with normal engine operation when compared to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug AV-27 chart. The fuel injector nozzles were removed and were free of debris.

The postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane’s fuel system. Both main wing fuel tanks were breached and exhibited thermal damage.

The Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3C) discusses door openings in flight. It stated the following:

In most instances, the occurrence of an inadvertent door opening is not of great concern to the safety of a flight, but rather, the pilot's reaction at the moment the incident happens. A door opening in flight may be accompanied by a sudden loud noise, sustained noise level, and possible vibration or buffeting. If a pilot allows himself or herself to become distracted to the point where attention is focused on the open door rather than maintaining control of the airplane, loss of control may result even though disruption of airflow by the door is minimal.

In the event of an inadvertent door opening in flight or on takeoff, the pilot should adhere to the following:

• Concentrate on flying the airplane. Particularly in light single and twin-engine airplanes; a cabin door that opens in flight seldom if ever compromises the airplane's ability to fly. There may be some handling effects, such as roll and/or yaw, but in most instances these can be easily overcome.

• If the door opens after lift-off, do not rush to land. Climb to normal traffic pattern altitude, fly a normal traffic pattern, and make a normal landing.

• Do not release the seat belt and shoulder harness in an attempt to reach the door. Leave the door alone. Land as soon as practicable, and close the door once safely on the ground.

• Remember that most doors do not stay wide open. They usually bang open and then settle partly closed. A slip towards the door may cause it to open wider; a slip away from the door may push it closed.

• Do not panic. Try to ignore the unfamiliar noise and vibration. Also, do not rush. Attempting to get the airplane on the ground as quickly as possible may result in steep turns at low altitude.

• Complete all items on the landing checklist.

• Remember that accidents are almost never caused by an open door. Rather, an open door accident is caused by the pilot's distraction or failure to maintain control of the airplane.

The Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (PHAK) (FAA-H-8083-25C) discusses external pressures. It states the following:

External pressures are influences external to the flight that create a sense of pressure to complete a flight---often at the expense of safety. Factors that can be external pressures include the following:

• Someone waiting at the airport for the flight's arrival

• A passenger the pilot does not want to disappoint

• The desire to demonstrate pilot qualifications

• The desire to impress someone (Probably the two most dangerous words in aviation are "Watch this!")

• The desire to satisfy a specific personal goal ("gethome-itis," "get-there-itis," and "let's-go-itis")

• The pilot's general goal-completion orientation

The PHAK also goes on to describe multiple operational pitfalls, including “get-there-itis.” When discussing “get-there-itis” the PHAK states, “This disposition impairs pilot judgment through a fixation on the original goal or destination, combined with a disregard for any alternative course of action.”

The Florida District 4 Medical Examiner ruled the cause of death for the pilot as blunt impact trauma and the manner of death as accident.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. Atorvastatin was detected in the liver and blood. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) is an HMG CoA Reductase inhibitor (statin) used to treat high cholesterol and is acceptable for pilots. No other tested-for substances were detected.