N400DEMooney M20M · 2003

History of Flight

On September 30, 2009, at 1237 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20M airplane, N400DE, was substantially damaged during a post-impact fire after colliding with trees and terrain near Albany, Indiana. The pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by N400DE, LLC, Ada, Michigan, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operating on an instrument flight plan. The personal flight originated from the Gerald R. Ford International Airport (KGRR) near Grand Rapids, Michigan, about 0927.

At 0831, the pilot contacted the Kankakee Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) to file an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and obtain a standard weather briefing. The planned route of flight was KGRR direct to the Traverse City (TVC) VHF Omnidirectional Range/Tactical Aircraft Control (VORTAC) at an altitude of 25,000 feet (FL250), with a return to the departure airport (KGRR) for landing. The pilot confirmed with the briefer that he did not intend to land at Cherry Capital Airport (KTVC), Traverse City, Michigan. After filing the flight plan, the briefer provided the pilot a standard weather briefing.

At 0918, the pilot contacted Grand Rapids ground control for taxi clearance. The pilot told the ground controller that he had already filed an IFR flight plan, but would like to stay in the local traffic pattern to practice touch-and-go takeoffs and landings before picking up his IFR clearance. The ground controller issued a visual flight rules (VFR) transponder code and taxi instructions to runway 35.

At 0927, the flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 35. After departure, the pilot performed two touch-and-go takeoffs and landings before requesting his instrument clearance. At 0942, the flight was cleared direct TVC VORTAC and to climb to 19,000 feet (FL190). At 0944, the pilot was told to contact Grand Rapids departure control who cleared the flight to maintain an altitude of 10,000 feet. At 0952, the pilot was told to contact Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) who cleared the flight to maintain FL190.

At 0957:05, the pilot established radio contact with Minneapolis ARTCC and reported climbing through 14,500 feet for FL250. The pilot subsequently corrected himself, and advised the controller that his altitude clearance was actually FL190. The controller then cleared the flight to FL230. At 1001:35, the pilot was told to contact another Minneapolis ARTCC frequency. At 1002:03, the pilot reestablished radio contact with Minneapolis ARTCC and the flight was cleared to its final cruise altitude of 25,000 feet (FL250). At 1002:14, the pilot acknowledged the clearance to FL250. At this time the airplane was climbing through 18,500 feet.

At 1009:44, as the airplane was climbing through 24,200 feet, the controller asked the pilot what his intentions were upon reaching the TVC VORTAC. The pilot responded at 1009:52, but the recorded audio was unintelligible with excessive background noise. A written statement by the controller indicated that the pilot requested to make a course-reversal upon reaching the TVC VORTAC. At 1009:56, the controller cleared the flight to make a left or right course-reversal upon reaching the TVC VORTAC. At 1010:01, a momentary, 1-second, unintelligible transmission was recorded. No additional audio communications were received from the pilot for the remainder of the flight.

The flight continued northbound toward the TVC VORTAC, reaching FL250 at 1011:10. At 1038:04, the controller asked the pilot how long he wanted to stay at FL250. There was no response. At 1038:59, the airplane crossed over the TVC VORTAC, and made a right turn southbound direct toward KGRR. The controller attempted to reestablish contact with the flight several times without success. At 1042:24, after not receiving a response of any kind, the controller cleared the flight to descend to 17,000 feet. There was no response of any kind, and the flight continued southbound at FL250.

At 1047:54, the controller noted a transponder ident (highlighted radar target on a controller's radarscope) that was associated with the accident flight. The controller acknowledged the transponder ident over the radio and cleared the flight to descend to 11,000 feet. There continued to be no response of any kind as the flight continued southbound at FL250. At 1106:19, the airplane passed directly over KGRR at FL250 while on the southbound track.

At 1133:43, the flight was intercepted by two National Guard F-16 fighter jets at FL250 over Columbia City, Indiana. The F-16 fighters continued to follow the airplane for the remainder of the flight. At 1147:59, about 4.1 miles west of Delaware County Regional Airport (KMIE), Muncie, Indiana, the airplane entered a series of right turns at FL250. At 1151:58, one of the F-16 pilots reported that the accident pilot was unresponsive, lying against the pilot-side cockpit window, and was possibly hypoxic. At 1209:02, about 14.1 miles south of KMIE, the airplane began flying a north-northeast heading at FL250. At 1216:37, about 4.3 miles southeast of KMIE, the airplane began a slow descent from FL250 while maintaining the north-northeast track. The slow descent continued until 1227:33, at which point the airplane turned quickly to a southeast heading and entered a more rapid descent. The last radar return was recorded at 1236:19, about 3.8 miles west of Albany, Indiana, at 6,100 feet.

The airplane subsequently collided with trees and a cornfield about 0.5 miles southeast of the final radar return. The postimpact fire that ensued destroyed most of the fuselage structure.

Personnel Information

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the accident pilot, age 43, held a commercial pilot certificate, issued on September 29, 1985, with airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument ratings. He also held an expired flight instructor certificate, issued on July 13, 1995, with airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 22, 2007, when he was issued a second-class medical certificate with no limitations. A search of FAA records showed no accident, incident, enforcement, or disciplinary actions.

The most recent pilot logbook entry was dated August 30, 2009. At that time, the pilot had accumulated 1,595.1 hours total flight time, of which 1,447.2 hours were as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,275.4 hours in single-engine airplanes, 242.6 hours in multi-engine airplanes, 124.0 hours at night, and 260.4 hours in actual instrument conditions. He had flown 427.7 hours in the accident airplane since accepting delivery from the manufacturer on September 26, 2003.

According to the logbook information, the pilot had flown 46.4 hours during the past year, 27.1 hours during the prior 6 months, and 16.5 hours during previous 90 days. All of the flight time accumulated during the prior year was completed in the accident airplane, besides a 1-hour flight that was completed in a Cessna model 515 corporate jet.

According to a flight-tracking website, the accident airplane had flown two additional flights since the last pilot logbook entry. These two flight legs totaled about 1.8 hours. The accident flight was the only flight recorded during the previous 24 hours.

The pilot's most recent flight review and instrument competency check was completed in the accident airplane on March 9, 2009, and March 16, 2009, respectively.

Aircraft Information

The accident airplane was a 2003 Mooney model M20M airplane, serial number (s/n) 27-0320. The airplane was a low wing, all-metal, single-engine, four-place monoplane. The airplane had a certified maximum takeoff weight of 3,368 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing-conditions. A Lycoming model TIO-540-AF1B turbocharged reciprocating engine, s/n L-10817-61A, powered the airplane. The 270-horsepower engine provided thrust through a McCauley model B3D32C417-D, s/n 001737, constant-speed, three-blade, metal propeller.

The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on September 9, 2003. The pilot purchased the airplane from the manufacturer on September 29, 2003. The recording hour meter was destroyed during the postimpact ground fire, which prevented the determination of the total service time at the time of the accident. The airframe, engine, and propeller had a total service time of 450.6 hours at the last annual inspection, which was completed on April 13, 2009. On July 7, 2009, tests on the static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were completed at a total service time of 462.8 hours. The last recorded maintenance was performed on August 21, 2009, at a total service time 463.2 hours, to diagnose and resolve excessive temperatures observed on the Nos. 2 and 5 engine cylinders. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues.

The airplane had total fuel capacity of 95 gallons, of which 89 gallons were usable, distributed evenly between two wing fuel tanks. The fuel tank selector valve draws fuel from one tank at a time. According to fueling documentation, the airplane was serviced with 50 gallons of aviation fuel before departing on the accident flight. The airplane's fuel consumption at 25,000 feet was between 12.1 gallons per hour (gph) and 16.6 gph, depending on the selected engine rpm and manifold pressure setting.

The airplane was equipped with two Garmin model GNS 530 devices. The GNS 530 was a combined global positioning system/navigation/communication device. The airplane was also equipped with a Honeywell model KC225 two-axis automatic flight control system. The integration of these two avionic devices could have allowed the accident airplane to progress through a planned route automatically.

The airplane was equipped with a four-place oxygen system that provided supplementary oxygen for continuous flight at high altitudes. An oxygen cylinder was located in the aft equipment bay, accessible through a removable panel on the aft wall of the baggage compartment. A combined pressure regulator/shutoff valve, attached to the oxygen cylinder, automatically reduces cylinder pressure to the delivery pressure required for the specific operating altitude. A pilot's oxygen panel on the side wall near the pilot's armrest contains a cylinder pressure gauge, which also serves as a quantity gauge, and a control knob, which is mechanically connected to the shutoff valve installed on the oxygen cylinder. When the control knob is in the "ON" position, the system provides sufficient oxygen flow at the airplane's maximum operating altitude (25,000 feet). During flight operations lower than the airplane's maximum operating altitude, the reducing valve automatically economizes the flow of oxygen to conserve oxygen for longer durations or future availability, without requiring any action by the pilot.

The most recent oxygen cylinder service was on March 31, 2009, when it was refilled during the last annual inspection. There was no record of the oxygen cylinder being serviced at the airports that the airplane had traveled to since the annual inspection. The 115.7 cubic-foot composite oxygen cylinder is fully charged under a maximum pressure of 1,850 psi at 21-degrees Celsius. The amount of time at altitude with use of supplemental oxygen is dependent on the cylinder pressure, cabin pressure altitude, and the number of occupants using the system. For pilot-only operations, a fully charged oxygen cylinder will provide about 16 hours of supplemental oxygen at 25,000 feet. At 200 psi, the partially charged oxygen cylinder will provide a single-occupant with about 1.5 hours of supplemental oxygen at 25,000 feet.

According to available information, the airplane had flown approximately 27 hours in the 6 month period following the most recent oxygen cylinder service. A review of previous flights in that time period indicated that the pilot typically flew at cruise altitudes below 12,500 feet, above which the use of supplemental oxygen would be required by pilots for durations exceeding 30 minutes.

Meteorological Information

The closest weather reporting facility was at Delaware County Regional Airport (KMIE), Muncie, Indiana, located about 12.5 miles west-southwest of the accident site. The airport was equipped with an automated surface observing system (ASOS).

At 1253, the KMIE ASOS reported the following weather conditions: Wind 350 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 10 miles; overcast ceiling at 3,300 feet agl; temperature 13 degrees Celsius; dew point 4 degrees Celsius; altimeter setting 30.14 inches of mercury.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane collided with several trees before impacting a cornfield about 4 miles east of Albany, Indiana. The wreckage debris path was orientated on a northerly heading and was about 180 feet long. All airframe structural components and flight control surfaces were located along the wreckage debris path or amongst the main wreckage. The left wing was found suspended in trees, about 15 feet above ground level, at the beginning of the debris path. The right wing was located about 20 feet north of the tree line. The individual empennage components, right flap, and both main landing gear were found distributed between the right wing and the main wreckage. The main wreckage included the entire fuselage, engine, and propeller. There was evidence of an extensive postimpact ground fire that completely destroyed the fuselage cabin and cockpit. The nose landing gear was found in the retracted position. The fuel selector was found positioned to draw fuel from the right fuel tank. All structural component failures were consistent with overload separations. Flight control system continuity could not be established due to multiple separations. All observed flight control system separations were consistent with overload failures or fire damage. Both wing fuel tanks were extensively damaged and contained no recoverable fuel.

The entire oxygen system was extensively damaged during impact and the postimpact fire. The composite oxygen cylinder was found in the aft fuselage with the appropriate attach strapping remaining intact around the cylinder. The cylinder was orientated parallel to the fuselage's longitudinal axis, with the shutoff valve facing forward. The valve's control cable had melted or otherwise separated from the activation lever. The shutoff valve was observed in the "ON" position. The cylinder could not be hydrostatically tested because of extensive fire damage. The control knob assembly was found lying on the cabin floor and was extensively damaged by the fire. The position of the mechanical gearing for control knob was consistent with the oxygen system being "OFF"; however, its position could have been altered during impact, the postimpact fire, or subsequent wreckage recovery. The filler cap was secured on the service-port valve stem. Most of the oxygen delivery lines were consumed by fire. All four oxygen outlet ports exhibited extensive fire damage. One of the four receptacles appeared to be engaged to a mask hose fitting. The cockpit pressure gauge was destroyed by fire.

The engine remained partially attached to the fuselage firewall and exhibited extensive fire damage to the rear accessory drive components. The engine was not disassembled during the investigation. There were no exhaust leaks or weld failures noted during the disassembly of the exhaust manifold heater shroud used for cabin heat. The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. All three blades were bent aft. Two of the three propeller blades exhibited spanwise S-shape bending and blade twisting.

The postaccident investigation revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have prevented the normal operation of the airplane.

Medical and Pathological Information

On October 1, 2009, an autopsy was performed on the pilot by East Central Indiana Pathologists, located in Muncie, Indiana. The pilot's cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries sustained during the accident. The autopsy report cited arteriosclerotic heart disease and the possibility of environmental hypoxia as contributory factors. The report noted 55 percent and 75 percent stenosis of the left anterior descending and right coronary arteries, respectively. There were no thrombi or plaque hemorrhages seen in the coronary arteries. The heart's myocardium, valves, chambers, and great vessels were unremarkable.

The FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on the pilot. No carbon monoxide or cyanide was detected in blood samples. No ethanol or drugs were detected in urine samples.

Additional Information

Federal aviation regulations require that the minimum flight crew use supplemental oxygen when the cabin pressure altitude is above 12,500 feet, but lower than 14,000 feet, for periods over 30-minutes. Cabin pressure altitudes above 14,000 feet require the minimum flight crew to use supplemental oxygen at all times. Cabin pressure altitudes above 15,000 feet require all occupants be provided supplemental oxygen.

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge provides data on how long pilots can typically make rational, life-saving decisions and carry them out at a given altitude without use of supplemental oxygen. As cabin pressure altitude increases above 10,000 feet, the symptoms of hypoxia increase in severity, and the time of useful consciousness rapidly decreases. At 20,000 feet, a pilot can expect about 30-minutes of useful consciousness without use of supplemental oxygen. At 22,000 feet, the useful consciousness decreases to 5-10 minutes. At 25,000 feet, a pilot can expect 3 to 5 minutes of useful consciousness.