N41915Luscombe 8A · 1941

On June 19, 2009, about 1841 central daylight time, a Luscombe 8A, N41915, was substantially damaged following a partial loss of engine power and a subsequent forced landing in Chipley, Florida. The student pilot/owner was seriously injured. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, and no flight plan was filed.

According to the pilot, he kept the airplane in a hangar at Crystal Village Airport (2FL0), Chipley, Florida. About 3 months prior to the accident, the pilot left for an extended international trip. The accident flight was the first flight of the airplane since the pilot returned from his trip, and the airplane was not flown by anyone else in his absence. On the day of the accident, the pilot's plan was to conduct a few circuits of the traffic pattern at 2FL0. The airplane contained about 5 gallons of fuel from the last time it was flown, and the pilot added about 5 more gallons for the flight. He was aware of, and had some concern about, the fact that the engine had not been operated in a few months, and also about the fact that the fuel was "aged." He therefore paid close attention to the engine on start and during the run up, but the engine "ran like a top."

The takeoff was normal, but on the downwind leg, the pilot noticed that the engine speed had decreased to about 1,800 rpm. He did a "quick check" of the engine controls, and confirmed that all were appropriately set. When he re-checked the tachometer, the engine speed had decreased to 1,000 rpm. The pilot determined that the airplane was not going to be able to return to 2FL0, since at that time he was "over water" and "didn’t have a lot of altitude." The pilot sighted a "small clearing" suitable for a forced landing, and set up a descent for the clearing. The engine was still operating, but at a low rpm. When the airplane was on short final, the pilot saw two powerlines just ahead of him. He flew over the first one, and believed, but was not certain, that he flew under the second one. He was convinced that the airplane did not strike either powerline. The airplane touched down short of the selected clearing, and the pilot saw the propeller strike and "shred" a small "scrub tree." The next and last event that the pilot remembered was that the windshield "exploded."

Two witnesses located north of 2FL0, and approximately 3,000 feet west of the accident site, saw the airplane fly overhead at a "very low altitude," with the propeller rotating. One witness said that the engine was "very quiet," and the other witness said that the "engine was pulled back to idle." The airplane struck trees and came to rest inverted, perpendicular to, and on the edge of, a sandy road, about 1/4 mile northeast of the airport.

FAA records indicated that the pilot held a student pilot certificate that was first issued in November 2007, and re-issued in June 2008. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in May 2004. According to the pilot, he had approximately 240 total hours of flight experience, and approximately 35 hours in the accident airplane make and model. The pilot did not provide his flight log for the investigation.

FAA records indicated that the airplane was manufactured in 1941 as a Luscombe 8B. At the time of manufacture, it was equipped with a Lycoming O-145-B2 engine rated at 65 horsepower (hp). In 1949, a Continental A65-8 engine, also rated at 65 hp, was installed, and the airplane was re-designated as a Luscombe 8A.

The type certificate data sheet (TCDS) indicated that the airplane had a maximum weight of 1,200 pounds, and a fuel capacity of 14 gallons. The TCDS listed a maximum of 2,350 rpm for the A65 engine. The TCDS stated that a cockpit placard with the following text was required: "Full carburetor air heat required for takeoff and landing." The TCDS also stated that "The reason for this placard is that during takeoff acceleration and initial high angle-of-attack climb, the fuel flow may not be adequate for proper operation. Application of full carburetor heat in this case helps overcome the possible deficiency of fuel flow during takeoff. Carburetor ice is not a basic consideration in requiring this placard." Examination of the cockpit indicated that the "carburetor air" placard was installed, and that the engine tachometer was marked in accordance with the rpm limit specified in the TCDS.

In May 1991, the engine and airplane were approved to use automotive gasoline ("autogas") by supplemental type certificates (STC) SE634GL and SA730GL, respectively. Both STCs were held by the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA). The STC documentation stated that compliance was attained "by installation of placards and airplane flight manual supplement."

The pilot purchased the airplane from another individual in May 2008, and registered it with the FAA soon thereafter.

The 1853 automated weather observation at Panama City-Bay County International Airport (PFN) Panama City, Florida, located 15 miles south of the accident site, included winds from 280 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 30 degrees C, dew point 26 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.89 inches of mercury.

2FL0 was equipped with a single turf runway that was 3,500 feet long and 75 feet wide. The runway orientation was noted as 3/21, and the elevation was 113 feet MSL. There was no air traffic control tower at 2FL0.

The accident site was located about 1,000 feet north-northeast of the threshold of runway 21. The airplane was inverted, with the vertical stabilizer resting on west edge of the road, and the tail pointing toward approximately 080 degrees magnetic. The only ground scar was an oval area that measured about 6 feet long and 4 feet wide, located about 6 feet from the nose of the airplane. Several power- or telephone-wires were strung parallel to, and on the west side of, the road. These wires were about 20 feet above the ground, and just west of the airplane. Several trees located about 60 feet west of the airplane had freshly broken branches about 10 feet above the ground.

The lower cowl was crushed in the up and aft direction, and both main landing gear wheel pants exhibited crush and deformation damage in the same direction as the cowl. The spinner was crushed in the same direction as the cowl, but neither the spinner nor the propeller exhibited any rotational scoring. The fuselage aft of the firewall sustained longitudinal crush damage, and the aft fuselage was slightly buckled. The vertical stabilizer and outboard leading edge of the left wing also sustained crush damage.

According to the FAA inspector, the cap from the left fuel tank was found under the left wing, and there was only a "light smell of automotive gasoline" at the site. Acquaintances of the pilot transported the airplane to the pilot's hangar, still in the inverted position. No record of the airplane or engine total time in service (TT) at the time of the accident was provided.

Airplane Maintenance Records

Two logbooks, one each "aircraft" and "engine," were obtained and reviewed. Each logbook bore the notation "#2" on its respective front page, and the first entry in each logbook was dated October 5, 2005. No evidence of an annual inspection within the 12 months preceding the accident was found in any of the maintenance records. The most recent annual inspection that was documented in both logbooks was completed on November 18, 2006. Those entries indicated that the airplane had a TT of 3,429.7 hours, and that the engine had a TT, time since major overhaul (TSMOH), and time since top overhaul (TSTOH) of 3424.7, 779.7, and 84.7 hours respectively. The November 2006 annual inspection entry was the most recent entry in the aircraft logbook; the majority of the pages were still blank.

The engine logbook contained two entries subsequent to the November 2006 annual inspection, and like the aircraft log, most pages were still blank. The first post-November 2006 entry was dated March 2, 2008, indicated that an annual inspection was completed on the engine, at a TSMOH of 790.3 hours, and a TSTOH of 95.3 hours. The most recent entry was dated April 26, 2008, and documented a cylinder compression check. The entry indicated a TSMOH of 791.1 hours, and a TSTOH of ".8" hours. Neither entry contained a TT for the engine.

STC Information

According to the EAA, incorporation of the original STCs (SE634GL and SA730GL) required installation of one placard per fuel tank, and a supplement for insertion into the airplane flight manual. The placards, flight manual supplement and STC instructions all contained the statement "Do not use automotive gasoline containing alcohol."

According to the FAA, on March 5, 2004, STC SE634GL was surrendered and superseded by STC SE01943CH, and STC SA703GL was surrendered and superseded by STC SA01944CH. The STCs were superseded to incorporate new ASTM standards applicable to autogas, and the new STCs were also held by the EAA. The new ASTM standards applied to "gasoline and its blends with oxygenates, such as alcohols." The old and new placards, flight manual supplements, and STC instructions contained the statement "Do not use automotive gasoline containing alcohol." The STC instructions stated that each supplied placard was to be placed "adjacent to the fuel inlet," and that the supplement "must be in the aircraft and available to the pilot anytime the aircraft is being operated" on autogas. STC documentation and the flight manual supplement required that the supplement "must be in the aircraft and available to the pilot anytime the aircraft is being operated" on autogas. The STC documentation also stated that the authorization to use autogas "shall remain with the aircraft upon transfer of ownership."

A representative of the EAA stated that when SE634GL and SA703GL were superseded, the new STCs were provided to the registered holders of the superseded STCs. SE634GL and SA703GL were superseded about 4 years prior to the accident pilot's acquisition of the airplane. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was unable to verify whether the EAA provided SE01943CH and SA01944CH to the then-owner of the accident airplane, but the EAA did not provide those STCs to the accident pilot when he acquired the airplane.

FAA Actions Regarding Autogas and Ethanol

In June 1998, the Small Aircraft Directorate wrote a letter to the EAA in response to EAA concerns that a previous FAA publication "highlighted autogas use [in aircraft] in a negative way." The FAA letter stated that "Autogas use has been extensively compared, tested, and analyzed. Autogas has been shown to be an acceptable alternative to avgas for the airplanes and engines approved for such use. Airplanes and engines approved for autogas use have met the FAA certification requirements for engine detonation, engine cooling, fuel flow, hot fuel testing, fuel system compatibility, vapor lock, and performance." The FAA concluded that the "service history for airplanes and engines using autogas has been good and is comparable to avgas." However, the letter did not mention ethanol or alcohol.

In October 2006, the FAA Aircraft Certification Service issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-07-06, which alerted operators "of an airworthiness concern where you could have alcohol (ethanol or methanol) present in the automobile gasoline on any General Aviation airplane type certificated (TC) to use automobile gasoline or with automobile gasoline supplemental type certificates (STCs)." The SAIB stated that "Automobile gasoline containing alcohol is not allowed to be used in aircraft." Two reasons cited for the statement were that alcohol "adversely affects the volatility of the fuel, which could cause vapor lock," and that alcohol "is corrosive and not compatible with the rubber seals and other materials used in aircraft, which could lead to fuel system deterioration and malfunction." The SAIB recommended that operators "use automobile gasoline that conforms to the specifications listed in the airplane flight manual or automobile gasoline STC flight manual supplement," and to "verify the fuel has the allowable oxygenates." The SAIB then restated that "Automobile gasolines containing alcohol (methanol or ethanol) are not acceptable, unless specifically approved by the TC or STC," and suggested that if an operator was "unsure about the presence of alcohol in your automobile gasoline," an alcohol-detection test should be performed. Finally, the SAIB stated that "If you cannot obtain automobile gasoline that conforms to the specifications listed in the airplane flight manual or automobile gasoline STC flight manual supplement, use aviation gasoline."

According to personnel from the FAA Small Aircraft Directorate, once the SAIB was issued, it was published in the magazine "FAA News" and posted on the FAA Regulatory and Guidance Library (RGL) website. The magazine and the RGL website were intended for pilots, owners and operators, and the RGL website was accessible to the public. Interested individuals could also sign up for an electronic subscription service for SAIBs. The SAIB was also published in several aviation association magazines, including those of the EAA and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

Pilot Knowledge and Actions

The pilot stated that he did not recall owning any type of operating handbook or flight manual for the airplane, and that he obtained most of the pertinent information about operating the airplane from other, unspecified sources. No operating handbook or flight manual was provided for the investigation.

The pilot was aware of the requirement to use carburetor heat in all climbs, and stated that he did use the carburetor heat for the climb during the accident flight. According to the pilot, prior to the accident, the engine was in "very very good" condition; it was equipped with Millennium brand cylinders, and the airplane was continuously hangared.

The pilot stated that the airplane was approved to use autogas, and that he normally used autogas in the airplane. Prior to the accident, the pilot's understanding was that autogas sometimes contained ethanol, and that it was "preferred" not to use autogas that contained ethanol, but using autogas that contained ethanol was "not prohibited." The pilot stated that it was his understanding that ethanol in autogas decreased the lubricating properties of the fuel, and therefore he used Marvel Mystery Oil to partially compensate for the decreased lubrication. He used "a small amount" of Marvel Mystery Oil in the fuel and in the crankcase for each flight, including the accident flight. He said there were no placards in the airplane that specified certain procedures or precautions for using autogas, or that prohibited the use of autogas containing alcohol or ethanol. The pilot was not aware of any FAA guidance or prohibition regarding the use of ethanol in his airplane.

The pilot was aware of only a few service stations that sold autogas that did not contain ethanol. After the accident, he discovered that only the highest-octane fuel sold at the service station where he normally purchased the autogas for the airplane was ethanol-free, but he did not use that grade of fuel.

The pilot provided two different accounts about the conduct and timing of the airplane's most recent annual inspection. Initially, he said that the agreement that he had with the mechanic was that the mechanic would perform the inspection at the mechanic's pace over the course of several weeks, during the months of March and April, 2009, while the pilot was away on his international trip. One day subsequent to that account, the pilot said that he was present for most of the period(s) when the mechanic performed the annual inspection.

The pilot stated that prior to the accident flight, he understood that the mechanic had "nearly completed" the annual inspection, and that the uncompleted inspection items were primarily paperwork, in particular the Airworthiness Directive compliance record. The pilot knew that the mechanic did not make any corresponding entries in the maintenance records. He did not specifically recall what work was accomplished during the annual inspection, but he did recall that a compression check was done, and that the results were "satisfactory." He said that the mechanic indicated to him that the airplane was in "acceptable condition," but that the mechanic did not explicitly caution him about operating the airplane without a maintenance records entry for a current annual inspection. That information did not deter the pilot from conducting the accident flight.

The pilot told the NTSB that he wore his lap belt for the accident flight, and that the airplane was not equipped with a shoulder harness. The pilot recovered slowly from his injuries, and he did not respond to NTSB inquiries until about 10 months after the accident. After the accident, but before he contacted the NTSB, the pilot disposed of the airplane. He was not able to provide the flight manuals or any additional maintenance records for the airplane. He was not aware of any detailed examination of the wreckage or engine to determine the conditions that might have led to the engine rpm drop.

It was the pilot's opinion that the partial power loss was fuel-related. The pilot cited the following three reasons why he did not consider water contamination to be the cause of the rpm decrease:

- The airplane was always hangared, and therefore not exposed to rain

- The pilot had checked for, and did not detect any, water in the fuel during the preflight inspection

- The power loss was gradual, and the engine continued to operate smoothly, albeit at a low rpm, until the impact.