N456FLRaytheon Aircraft 400A · 2003

On November 1, 2020, about 1400 eastern standard time, a Raytheon 400A airplane, N456FL, operated by Georgia Jet Incorporated, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida. One passenger sustained minor injuries, and the pilot, copilot, and three passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight.

The flight departed from Naples Municipal Airport (APF), Naples, Florida, about 1304 in visual meteorological conditions. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), at 1337:22, while the airplane was en route to its destination, air traffic control informed the flight crewmembers that they would be entering an area of moderate-to-heavy precipitation in the next 1.5 miles and that an area of heavy-to-moderate precipitation was directly over FHB. The pilots then discussed the weather that was over the airport and the runway to use. The pilots stated that the airplane had plenty of fuel for holding if the weather over the airport did not improve before their arrival in the FHB area.

At 1349:46, the flight crew requested a descent to 2,500 ft, which was approved by the controller. Upon reaching 2,500 ft, the flight crew discussed that the airplane was still in instrument meteorological conditions. The flight crew then asked the approach controller for vectors for the area navigation (RNAV) approach for runway 13. The copilot stated that, if needed, the airplane could hold at a waypoint before attempting the approach. At 1352:22, the copilot told the pilot that they should attempt the approach. The pilot agreed and noted that the reported weather was “just a little rain shower” and that he did not expect any concerns with windshear. At 1355:25, the controller cleared the airplane for the RNAV approach to runway 13.

In a postaccident statement, the copilot described that he checked the automated weather observing system on the downwind leg of the approach. The wind was from about 110° at 4 knots gusting to 18 knots. Rain showers had passed over the airport before the airplane’s arrival in the FHB area. He also described that the landing data calculations were within limits for a 5,152-ft-long wet runway (based on the wind reported by the automated weather observation).

At 1357:39, the flight crew performed the before landing checklist and stated that the landing gear was down and that the flaps were at 30°. At 1358:04 the copilot stated, “I got you at ref (Vref) plus 20” (the airplane’s calculated Vref speed was 110 knots). At 1358:30, the pilot stated, “we’ll probably just go hold for 15 minutes and try it again.” The copilot replied, “yeah you got a 22-knot tailwind.” The flight crew continued the approach. At 1359:05, the copilot reported 300 ft until minimums and stated that he had the runway in sight. The pilot stated he had the runway in sight and that the approach would continue. At 1359:52, the copilot stated, “speeds good. Hold whatcha got and put [the airplane] on down. Still got a tailwind.”

In their post accident statements, the pilot and copilot described the subsequent landing. The copilot stated that the engine was at idle power when the airplane was 50 ft above ground level. The airplane touched down on speed, on centerline, and on aim point. The copilot deployed the speed brakes when the airplane’s speed was about 97 knots. The pilot applied the brakes, but the airplane was not decelerating normally. The pilot further described that he knew immediately that there was a problem with the brakes because he received “zero feedback.” The pilot then instructed the copilot to deactivate the anti-skid system during the final third of the runway, but the braking action did not improve. The pilot was able to reduce the airplane’s groundspeed with side-to-side steering, and then he straightened out the airplane as it departed the end of the runway.

According to data retrieved from the airplane’s flight data recorder, after touchdown, ground speed was initially in excess of 120 knots. The weight on wheels switch did activate indicating that the airplane had transitioned from air to ground mode, and the speed brakes were deployed after touchdown. However, about 6-seconds after being deployed (at a ground speed of more than 100 knots), the speed brakes were retracted (at 1400:18).

At 1400:11, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airplane touching down on the runway. Afterward, the pilot stated, “it won’t stop.” The copilot reported the speed as 105 knots. The pilot repeated, “it won’t stop” and “hang on.” Four alert tones, similar to the landing gear warning tone, were then recorded. The pilot stated, “anti-skid off,” and the copilot replied that the antiskid was off. The copilot stated, “go around,” and the pilot replied, “I can’t go around,” to which the copilot stated, “okay.” At 1400:35, a sound similar to the airplane departing the paved surface was recorded. After the airplane came to rest, the CVR recorded the pilot stating, “man those brakes did not work at all,” and the copilot replying, “nope.” Neither pilot reported any anomalies with the antiskid system, and no “ANTISKID FAIL” annunciation occurred during the accident flight.

In his postaccident statement, the copilot described that the airplane stopped about 150 ft beyond the runway in soft soil and grass. According to the pilot, when he observed the runway after the accident it appeared wet and opaque with no standing water. The pilot also stated that there were no skid marks on the runway except in the area of the side-to-side skidding.

According to a witness, who was flying his airplane about the time of the accident and landed at the airport shortly afterward, he could see some weather coming through the airport area. Air traffic control had vectored him to the west; while he was outbound on the vector, the visibility decreased to about 1/2 mile, the wind direction shifted to 340°, and the wind gusts increased to 20 to 30 knots, and heavy rain began. After landing, the witness noticed that the runway was extremely wet.

According to a passenger aboard the accident airplane, during the landing, they “hit the ground” and it felt “like a push, like they were going up again.” The airplane started to slide and then went off the runway into dirt. The passenger heard the pilot say that he had no brakes. She could see the left wing dig into the dirt and thought that the airplane was going to flip over.

Wheel Brake System

The main landing gear wheels were equipped with full-powered brakes operated by pressing on the rudder pedals. The brake system can work with or without the anti-skid system. Emergency braking could be accomplished through a nitrogen brake system using the emergency brake control lever, which was installed on the upper right side of the cockpit pedestal.

Antiskid System

The antiskid system was electrically controlled. The system detected the start of a skid condition at the wheels and automatically released the brake pressure for both wheels based on the severity of the skid. The system was activated by placing the “ANTI SKID” switch, which was located on the center pedestal, in the “ON” position. A stationary wheel speed transducer, mounted inside each main gear axle, would electrically sense any change in wheel rotation speed. As a skid was detected, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which would then release hydraulic pressure from the brakes. With brake pressure released, the wheel speed would then increase, and hydraulic pressure would be restored to the brakes. The antiskid system would continue this cycle if the braking pressure was causing the skidding condition. The “OFF” position on the “ANTI SKID” switch would restore the system to the power brake mode after a 2- to 3-second delay.

Avionics System

The airplane had a Collins Pro Line 21 integrated avionics system. The system had four adaptive flight displays that showed attitude, heading, altitude, airspeed, navigation, flight control functions, and engine and systems indications.

The primary flight display and multifunction display had overlays that showed weather hazards. Groundspeed was displayed in knots along the bottom of the multifunction display. Wind speed and direction were displayed on the primary flight display and the multifunction display. An arrow showed the wind direction relative to the airplane’s position.

Weight and Balance Information

Review of the passenger load and fuel load found that the airplane was within weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident.

Weather at Time of Accident

A trough was moving through the area near the accident site at the time of the accident. The trough helped to initiate a line of rain showers that moved eastward across the area during the period surrounding the accident.

The 1355 meteorological aerodrome report for FHB indicated a southeast wind gusting to 18 knots, heavy rain, and temporary instrument meteorological conditions. The wind quickly shifted to the northwest by 1400 with gusts to 23 knots. The wind remained from the northwest through 1410.

Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler indicated moderate-to-heavy precipitation over the airport before the accident, and the 1400 high-resolution rapid refresh sounding indicated downdraft or gusting surface wind up to 37 knots.

Accident Weather Forecast

A center weather advisory issued at 1254, which was valid through 1500, warned that areas of scattered rain showers and isolated thunderstorm could occur near the accident site. The Jacksonville International Airport (JAX), Jacksonville, Florida, terminal aerodrome forecast warned of gusting wind conditions during the time surrounding the accident. (JAX was the closest airport to the accident site with a terminal aerodrome forecast.)

Pilot Weather Information

The pilot stated that, before departure, he briefed the copilot of likely low-level rain showers during the arrival at FHB. While en route, the pilots discussed other potential landing options if needed because of rain shower activity. The pilot stated that he and the copilot checked the wind observations from FHB on the downwind leg only, at which time the wind was favorable for a landing from the northwest.

Wheel Brake System

The main landing gear wheels were equipped with full-powered brakes operated by pressing on the rudder pedals. The brake system can work with or without the anti-skid system. Emergency braking could be accomplished through a nitrogen brake system using the emergency brake control lever, which was installed on the upper right side of the cockpit pedestal.

Antiskid System

The antiskid system was electrically controlled. The system detected the start of a skid condition at the wheels and automatically released the brake pressure for both wheels based on the severity of the skid. The system was activated by placing the “ANTI SKID” switch, which was located on the center pedestal, in the “ON” position. A stationary wheel speed transducer, mounted inside each main gear axle, would electrically sense any change in wheel rotation speed. As a skid was detected, an electrical signal was supplied to the system, which would then release hydraulic pressure from the brakes. With brake pressure released, the wheel speed would then increase, and hydraulic pressure would be restored to the brakes. The antiskid system would continue this cycle if the braking pressure was causing the skidding condition. The “OFF” position on the “ANTI SKID” switch would restore the system to the power brake mode after a 2- to 3-second delay.

Avionics System

The airplane had a Collins Pro Line 21 integrated avionics system. The system had four adaptive flight displays that showed attitude, heading, altitude, airspeed, navigation, flight control functions, and engine and systems indications.

The primary flight display and multifunction display had overlays that showed weather hazards. Groundspeed was displayed in knots along the bottom of the multifunction display. Wind speed and direction were displayed on the primary flight display and the multifunction display. An arrow showed the wind direction relative to the airplane’s position.

Weight and Balance Information

Review of the passenger load and fuel load found that the airplane was within weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident.

The nose landing gear had completely collapsed and separated from its mounting location. The nose section of the airplane was severely damaged, and the forward pressure bulkhead sustained substantial damage to the lower half of the bulkhead and deformation throughout the bulkhead. Some exterior skins were damaged, and frame damage was observed on the lower sections of several frames.

Both engines had ingested mud, and foreign object damage was observed. The left-wing trailing edge was damaged from contact with the ground, and the trailing-edge skin was damaged at the center wing flap track location. The left wing flap had been pushed up into the wing, and the upper surface of the wing skin was damaged by contact with the left wing flap when it entered the wing structure. Examination of the wing alignment revealed that the alignment between the wings had shifted, which resulted in the left and right wings being asymmetric.

The antiskid switch was found in the OFF position, and the emergency brake control lever was found in the OFF position with its safety wire intact. No anomalies with the brake or antiskid systems were found, and during a postaccident test they operated normally according to functional testing guidance.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79A, Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing, indicated (in-part) that the following hazards increase the risk of a runway overrun:

o delayed use of deceleration devices;

o landing with a tailwind; and

o a wet or contaminated runway.

The AC stated the following about the effect of a tailwind on the landing distance:

The effect of a tailwind on landing distance is significant and is a factor in determining the landing distance required. Given the airplane will land at a particular airspeed, independent of the wind, the principal effect of a tailwind on operational landing distance is the change in the ground speed at which the airplane touches down.

The AC also stated that the effect of a tailwind would increase the landing distance by 21% for the first 10 knots of a tailwind and that tailwind landings affect all types of airplanes.

Regarding wet or contaminated runways, the AC stated the following:

Landing distances in manufacturers-supplied airplane flight manuals (AFM) provide performance in a flight test environment that is not necessarily representative of normal flight operations. For those operators conducting operations in accordance with specific FAA performance regulations, the operating regulations require the AFM landing distances to be factored to ensure compliance with the pre-departure landing distance regulations. These factors should account for pilot technique, wind and runway conditions, and other items stated above. Pilots and operators should also account for runway conditions at the time of arrival (TOA) to ensure the safety of the landing….

A safety margin of 15 percent should be added, and the resulting distance should be within the runway length available. The FAA considers a 15 percent margin to be the minimum acceptable safety margin….

Know you can stop within the landing distance available. The cumulative effect of the conditions that extend the airplane’s landing distance, plus the 15 percent safety margin, can be a substantial increase to the AFM/POH data, unless the pilot is aware of the items presented, and possesses the knowledge and flying discipline to mitigate the risk of a runway overrun.

In addition, the AC stated the following:

When the runway is wet or slippery, reverse thrust (if the airplane is equipped), may be the dominant deceleration force just after touchdown, and throughout the deceleration if the runway has poor or worse braking conditions. As the airplane slows down, the wheel brakes become the dominate deceleration force. When the runway length is limited, for airplanes equipped with an antiskid system, maximum wheel braking should be applied immediately after touchdown. For airplanes without an antiskid system slow back pressure should be applied to the yoke such that it will not raise the nose of a nose gear airplane for aerodynamic braking while maximum braking that will not cause skidding is applied. In all situations, braking should be maintained until the airplane slows to a safe taxi speed for the conditions.

Regarding the use of deceleration/maximum braking, the AC advised that, for those airplanes equipped with deceleration devices such as spoilers, thrust reversers, and brakes,

the touchdown point is important since the wheel brakes are much more effective in retarding the airplane than the air drag during the airborne part of the landing distance. The sooner the airplane touches down and starts braking, the shorter the total distance will be. The Flight Safety Foundation Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (FSF ALAR) Task Force found that delayed braking action during the landing rollout was involved in some of the accidents and serious incidents in which slow/delayed crew action was a causal factor. The FSF Runway Safety Initiative (RSI) team found that improper use and malfunction of speed brakes, wheel brakes, and reverse thrust were significant factors in a number of runway excursion landing accidents.

Prompt and proper operation of all means of deceleration has a major influence on landing distances. Spoilers greatly decrease lift, dump the weight on the wheels, and thereby make the brakes effective. It should be noted that manual spoilers, operated by the pilot, involve a delay. Even 2 seconds at speeds of 200 ft/second (118 knots (kts)) can increase the stopping distance by almost 400 ft. Landing distance data in the AFM is typically based on a time increment of 1 second between successive actions to manually deploy/engage the deceleration devices…. A conservative approach is to add 200 ft to the landing distance for every second in excess of 2 seconds to deploy the airplane’s deceleration devices. A prudent pilot will make a reasonable adjustment to the airplane’s landing distance for any delay in employing the airplane’s deceleration devices.

In addition, the AC advised that, to achieve the benefits of antiskid (for airplane so equipped),

The brakes must be applied firmly throughout the deceleration process. When maximum braking is required, it is accomplished by holding maximum brake application pressure and allowing the antiskid system to operate. Letting up on the brakes (unless required to regain directional control) defeats the purpose of the antiskid system. The pulsation caused by the modulation of the brake pressure by the antiskid system indicates that the antiskid system is operating normally although the pulsation may be disconcerting to the pilot.