N47WTBeech V35 · 1966

On May 15, 2024, at 1202 central daylight time (CDT), a Beech V35-TC airplane, N47WT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Franklin, Tennessee. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot departed from Louisiana Regional Airport (REG), Gonzales, Louisiana, on an IFR flight plan about 0850 and was enroute to Bowman Field Airport, Louisville, Kentucky, to pick up an additional passenger before returning to REG. The planned flight was about 550 nm.

ADS-B data provided by the FAA showed that about 15 minutes into the flight the pilot climbed the airplane to 9,000 ft msl and leveled off on a track of about 027°. In the vicinity of the Mississippi border, the pilot descended to 7,000 ft msl, where he remained until approaching Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee airspace, which was about 351 nm from REG. The pilot was in communication with the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) prior to entering the BNA approach controller’s airspace.

Audio communications information provided by the FAA revealed that the pilot requested a deviation from the ARTCC controller, which was passed along to the BNA approach controller prior to communications transfer from ARTCC to BNA approach. The deviation was approved, but the reason for the deviation was not mentioned by the pilot nor did the controller inquire. In addition, the pilot requested a higher altitude, which was coordinated with the ARTCC controller by the approach controller and was approved. During the climb to 9,000 ft msl, the pilot was instructed to fly a heading of 360° (for traffic) and advised to, “then expect on course in probably about fifteen miles.” There was no response from the pilot.

About a minute and a half later the controller cleared the pilot to fly direct to the EWO (New Hope, Kentucky) VORTAC, and the pilot acknowledged the clearance; however, he did not make the necessary turn to the right and continued on a northerly heading.

The airplane climbed to 9,500 ft msl before the controller instructed the pilot to maintain 9,000 ft msl. Over the following 45 seconds, the controller again asked the pilot to descend to 9,000 ft msl and provided the current altimeter setting; the pilot responded with “uh descending to nine thousand four seven whiskey tango.” This was the last transmission received from the flight.

A performance study based on ADS-B data indicated that, about 1 minute after the pilot’s last transmission, while on a track of about 070° and a groundspeed of 180 kts (calibrated airspeed 152 kts), the airplane turned into a tightening right turn before the airplane began to descend. Initially, the rate of descent did not exceed 3,000 fpm as the airplane’s groundspeed increased to over 200 kts. When the groundspeed was more than 210 kts, the descent rate rapidly increased in the right turn to over 10,000 fpm (see figure 1).

Figure 1. End of flight altitude, groundspeed, calibrated airspeed, and rate of climb/descent.

The debris field began on the eastern side of I-840 and concluded at a lake where the engine was discovered about 3,800 ft west. Airplane and personal effects debris were found on the highway, in heavily wooded terrain, and across residential properties.

A witness located outside of his home near the accident site stated that he was sitting on the front porch looking towards the west when he heard a loud “smack noise, like a strap smacking a metal roof or a loud whip.” The noise caused him to look up, and he saw the airplane breaking apart. There was no fire and no smoke. He observed parts of the airplane as they fell to the ground and he could hear and see the parts striking the ground around him, including a wing that impacted his neighbor’s yard. He described the weather at the time of the accident as “super windy” and noted it was beginning to rain. About 2 minutes after the accident, it began to rain “very hard.”

Previously, the pilot had owned a Piper PA-28R-201T (N38201) for several years; according to the pilot’s logbook, he had accumulated 348.2 total hours and 22.2 hours of actual instrument flight time when he sold the airplane in September 26, 2023. The pilot subsequently purchased N47WT on November 29, 2023. A review of his pilot logbook revealed that he had accumulated 366.4 total hours of flight experience, with 18.2 hours in the accident airplane make and model and 22.9 hours of actual instrument flight time.

Review of maintenance records revealed compliance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-20-04R2 on June 2, 2021. The AD required ruddervator inspections and modifications on the accident airplane make and model and also made the repetitive visual inspection of the empennage, aft fuselage, and ruddervator control system a one-time action with any subsequent repair and setting of the elevator controls, rudder and tab system controls, cable tensions, and rigging. The AD also added repetitive inspections of the fuselage and bulkheads that were required by the original AD (94-20-04.) The AD was the result of the need to add a repetitive inspection of the fuselage bulkheads and change other inspections from a repetitive to a one-time action. The actions specified by the AD were intended to prevent structural failure of the V-tail. On May 27, 2022, at 5,546.3 hours total time airframe, the ruddervator was repaired under the “Ruddervator Approved Repairs,” REV 6-6-2020 per the FAA-approved special repair process. It was subsequently inspected per the AD.

The closest official weather station to the accident site, Maury County Regional Airport (MRC), reported weather conditions at 1155 CDT, which included wind variable at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles or greater, few clouds at 2,600 ft above ground level (agl), scattered clouds at 3,500 ft agl, broken ceiling at 5,000 ft agl, temperature 22°C, dew point 17°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.76 inches of mercury (inHg).

MRC weather at 1210 CDT included wind variable at 4 knots with gusts to 10 knots, visibility 10 statute miles or greater, scattered clouds at 2,500 ft agl, scattered clouds at 3,000 ft agl, broken ceiling at 3,500 ft agl, temperature of 22°C, dew point 17°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.77 inHg. MRC was an automated station without a precipitation discriminator.

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh sounding for the accident site depicted a conditionally unstable atmosphere from the surface through 9,000 ft, then a stable atmosphere from 9,000 ft through 12,000 ft. The freezing level was at 12,040 ft. There was potential for convective activity and the maximum vertical velocity for an updraft in this atmosphere was calculated to be about 9,450 ft per minute; cloud cover was indicated between 2,500 ft and 10,500 ft. There were no non-convective or convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisories valid for the accident site at the accident time, and the closest Pilot Reports (PIREPS) indicated overcast conditions at 2,200 ft. Nothing of additional significance was reported via PIREPS.

The pilot had an account with ForeFlight and filed his flight plan and received a weather briefing. The flight path was created on May 13, 2 days before the accident, and set to be filed the morning before the accident flight with a planned departure time of 0900 CDT on May 15. The weather briefing information was provided to the pilot around 0600 CDT on the day of the accident, and he received a ForeFlight weather briefing package before departure. The weather briefing contained all the forecast information valid for the flight, some of which identified the chance for precipitation along the route. The Graphical Forecasts for Aviation (GFA) indicated variable (scattered to numerous) thunderstorm activity expected above the accident site at 1000 and 1300 CDT, with scattered to broken clouds between 2,700 and 10,000 ft and cloud tops to 12,000 ft. There were no AIRMETs valid for the accident site at the accident time. No lightning activity was observed within 25 miles of the accident site in the 10 minutes before and after the time of the accident.

A dissipating cold front across northern Tennessee, along with low- and midlevel troughs, made for an environment conducive to showers, clouds, and precipitation at the accident site. The weather radar imagery indicated a growth in areal coverage of precipitation targets along the proposed route of flight with the flight encountering precipitation by 1157 CDT. The flight then stayed in precipitation through the accident time (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Nashville Doppler radar reflectivity at 1201:24 CDT, with the accident site marked with a red circle and the location of the accident airplane with a black circle. The pink line shows the flight track.

A STARS maintenance replay of the accident sequence was reviewed; the Departure Radar West Controller at the BNA TRACON had settings for level 1 through level 5 precipitation active and available for view.

During the on-scene investigation, members of the ATC group compared radar display replays at both the ARTCC and TRACON facilities. The ATC group was able to compare the two different precipitation depictions while on scene at the ARTCC by reviewing the playback made on the ERAM (En Route Automation Modernization) system, which showed what the controller would have seen at the time leading up to the accident. Unlike the lack of precipitation depiction available on the STARS display at BNA TRACON, the area of precipitation was visible at the ARTCC. ERAM depicts precipitation levels between moderate (level 2) through extreme (level 6). The images below (figure 3) show the STARS radar display with the accident airplane circled.

Figure 3. The left STARS radar display photo depicts the accident airplane and weather on the route of flight at 1159:00. The right STARS radar display photo depicts the accident airplane but does not depict weather on the route of flight at 1201:00

The BNA air traffic control tower (ATCT) had previously logged STARS issues with the level 6 circular polarization from the airport surveillance radar (ASR-9) at the BNA TRACON. After the accident, technicians from the FAA’s Surveillance and Weather Group conducted a study to determine whether the ASR-9 level 6 polarization outage, as reported in the BNA ATCT logs, was a factor in the underreporting of the weather in this accident. The study concluded that, although the BNA ASR-9 was having issues with the circular polarization and was experiencing intermittent loss of data in the communication path between the radar and the TRACON, the issues did not affect the weather presentation provided to STARS. Additionally, the report concluded that the primary reason the storm was not displayed to the controller was that the storm was initially too small to survive the spatial smoothing processing in the ASR-9. The report recommended further study to determine if the BNA ASR-9 was consistently underreporting the weather.

Review of maintenance records revealed compliance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-20-04R2 on June 2, 2021. The AD required ruddervator inspections and modifications on the accident airplane make and model and also made the repetitive visual inspection of the empennage, aft fuselage, and ruddervator control system a one-time action with any subsequent repair and setting of the elevator controls, rudder and tab system controls, cable tensions, and rigging. The AD also added repetitive inspections of the fuselage and bulkheads that were required by the original AD (94-20-04.) The AD was the result of the need to add a repetitive inspection of the fuselage bulkheads and change other inspections from a repetitive to a one-time action. The actions specified by the AD were intended to prevent structural failure of the V-tail. On May 27, 2022, at 5,546.3 hours total time airframe, the ruddervator was repaired under the “Ruddervator Approved Repairs,” REV 6-6-2020 per the FAA-approved special repair process. It was subsequently inspected per the AD.

The wreckage was scattered and highly dispersed; it was oriented on a 262° magnetic heading and spread over 3,800 ft. The first pieces of wreckage recovered at the beginning of the wreckage path consisted of the separated elevator-rudders (ruddervators) that were found at an elevation of 909 ft. Both wings separated from the fuselage and were found about 2,000 ft further west, followed by the main fuselage fragments, seats, and instrument panel. The engine and propeller assembly was discovered at the end of the wreckage path; it impacted a lake and was submerged in 8 ft of water. About 90% of the airplane was recovered.

The left wing separated from the fuselage at the root and was largely intact. Blue fuel consistent with the smell of aviation gasoline spilled out from the main fuel tank at the wing root. The left wingtip fuel tank was intact and contained no fuel. The top, forward wing mounting bolt fractured and pulled through the wing spar attach fitting. The aft two mounting bolts pulled through both wing spar attach fittings. The left wing main spar displayed signatures consistent with bending overload separation in the downward (negative) direction.

The right wing was also separated from the fuselage. The right wingtip fuel tank separated from the wing and was split open. The wing’s forward spar attach point was intact and remained connected to the center section that was separated from the fuselage. The right wing’s rear spar was separated at the attachment point. The rear center section was separated from the fuselage. The right rear upper attach bolt was intact and retained in the center section “bathtub fitting,” which was also intact. The right rear upper wing fitting was fractured and pulled from the wing structure. The rear lower attach bolt was intact and retained in the rear lower wing fitting. The right wing contained a weather radar pod and hardware that had separated during the impact. The radar’s cockpit display was not installed, and the system’s circuit breakers were in a tripped/deactivated position.

The stabilator spars exhibited symmetrical deformation, where the spars were bent aft and twisted leading-edge down. The fracture surfaces had slant angles. The right stabilizer was separated and had more than half of the right ruddervator attached. The ruddervator trailing edge was separated and the skins were splayed open. Only a portion of the left inboard ruddervator was recovered. The deformation of the stabilizer spars on both sides exhibited features consistent with downward failure.

All three propeller blades remained attached to the hub and engine at the propeller flange. Two of the blades exhibited chordwise scraping and gouges on the upper camber of the blades and were missing 3 inches of their tips. The additional blade was bent forward mid-span about 50°.

The top and left side of the engine was severely impact damaged, with all of the cylinders exhibiting fin damage, and there was a 12-inch by 3-inch impact hole in the crown of the engine case. The alternator, starter, and both magnetos were separated by impact and were not recovered. The rocker covers for cylinder Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6 were missing due to impact damage. Cylinder Nos. 1, 3, and 5 had impact damage to their sparkplugs that prevented them from being removed. Cylinder Nos. 2, 4, and 6 were successfully examined with a borescope and exhibited normal wear and operational signatures. The interiors of cylinder Nos. 1, 3, and 5 could not be examined due to mud/silt from immersion.

The examination revealed no evidence of a preaccident anomaly with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.

An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident.

Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse for the pilot. No medications were found that would have likely contributed to the accident.

As the daughter of the pilot was also a student pilot and had access to the airplane controls, an autopsy was conducted; the autopsy of the student pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death of the student pilot was blunt force injuries and the manner of death was accident.

Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse for the student pilot. No medications were found that would have likely contributed to the accident.