N567EMDassault Aviation MIRAGE F-1 · 1982

On May 24, 2021, about 1417 Pacific daylight time, an experimental Dassault Aviation Mirage F-1 Turbo-jet, N567EM, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Nellis Air Force Base, (LSV), Las Vegas, Nevada. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Draken International as a public-use aircraft in support of the United States Air Force’s simulated combat training.

The accident airplane was the No.1 (lead) airplane in a flight of 2 airplanes that were returning to LSV after completion of their Weapons School support flights in the Nevada Test and Tactics Range. The No. 2 airplane in the formation returned to LSV before the lead airplane since it reached its briefed fuel status first. About 15 minutes later, the lead airplane returned to LSV. While en route to LSV and about several minutes out, the lead pilot reported that the airplane was “code 1,” signifying that the airplane had no maintenance discrepancies.

A review of LSV airport surveillance radar and air traffic control communications revealed that the lead airplane entered the traffic pattern and reported initial for runway 3R at 14:16:05. At 14:16:26, the airplane was aligned with runway 3R, flying about 2,000 ft above ground level (agl) and at an airspeed of about 260 kts. The airplane broke right for the overhead pattern and while on downwind and approaching the final turn (a 180° turn towards the landing runway), at 14:17:12, the pilot reported that he would be accomplishing a low approach and then proceeding out to Flex (LSV 338/04).

As the airplane began the final turn it was about 1,400 ft agl, and the airspeed was 170 kts and slowing. Shortly after, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 1,000 fpm to more than 3,000 fpm. At 14:17:20, the airplane’s airspeed decreased below 160 kts, and the pilot reported “we are having a ugh flap issue” and the tower responded, “are you declaring an emergency” to which the pilot responded “affirm.” At 14:17:36 the last recorded point, about 400 ft agl, the airplane’s airspeed was 135 kts and slowing.

The airplane’s airspeed was slower than the listed low-speed limitation, without flaps (160 kts), for about the final 14 seconds of flight. Furthermore, the airplane continued to slow to below the low-speed limitation for the flaps extended. The flight manual advises that if the flaps do not lower, to land at a speed between 195 and 215 kts. The airplane continued to descend in the final turn in a bank angle in excess of 40°. The pilot ejected from the airplane but was fatally injured. Shortly thereafter, the airplane struck terrain in a residential area southwest of the approach end of the runway. The wreckage was consumed by a post-crash fire.

Ground personnel stated that during the preflight check of the slats and flaps the leading-edge slats operated appropriately but the flaps did not initially extend during the first cycle of the check. The pilot was able to correct the issue and completed at least two additional cycles during the operational checks of the slats and flaps with no further issue.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine and multi-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. He also held an experimental aircraft authorization for the DA-F1. The pilot was issued a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate on January 19, 2021, without limitations. The pilot logged 2,859 total hours of flight experience and 152 hours in the F-1 aircraft. He was a former fighter pilot in the United States Air Force.

The pilot had completed training provided by the company and was qualified in the F-1 airplane for the mission flown. The pilot appeared to be in good spirits and rested on the day of the accident and on the previous workday.

The F-1 Mirage was a French fighter and attack aircraft that was imported into the United States and registered under the experimental category. It is a single-engine, swept-wing, supersonic airplane capable of Mach 2+. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of over 35,000 lbs.

The airplane is equipped with high-lift devices consisting of two types of leading-edge slats and double-slotted flaps on each wing. The internal drooping slats occupy the 2/5 of the leading edge and have a camber of 25°. The external slotted slats occupy 3/5 of the leading edge, are in line with the drooping slats, and have a variable camber. The flaps have slots and slips in two parts (internal and external). Their camber is different and variable depending on the configuration. In the 1/2 extended position, the internal flap is about 28° and the external flap is 13°. In the fully extended position, the internal flap is about 48° and the external flap is 25°.

The airplane’s manual control of the high-lift devices was controlled electronically by the “SLATS-FLAPS” lever. This control level must be used on takeoff and landing and overrides the combat high-lift device controls. There were three positions of the handle: the forward position was fully retracted and guarded by a guard cover, the middle position was ½ flaps and slats completely extended. The rear position was flaps and slats completely extended. The slat control system and the two flap actuating jacks were supplied by the hydraulic system 1, ancillary subsystem.

The airplane’s high-lift device selector switch had an EMERGENCY RETRACTION position for slat and flap emergency retraction. This position would take precedence over all other current functions selected. The combat flaps were for use during combat and increase the lift performance by 25% up to about 18° nose up.

The F-1 Aircraft Flight Manual for “Landing High-Lift Devices Fail to Extend” checklist calls to check the Slats/Flaps (S/F) circuit breaker, utility hydraulic pressure, and that the high-lift device selector switch in not at EMERGENCY RETRACT position; S/F light out. If the checks confirm the failure, set the slat/flap lever to IN and land without high-lift devices: angle-of-attack (AOA) incidence about 11°.

The no-flap landing speeds were incorporated in the hydraulic system ancillary shutoff emergency checklist. The checklist states that if the high-lift devices (slats and flaps) do not extend, land with and airspeed between 195 kts to 215 kts depending on aircraft weight and also with an AOA incidence about 11° as per the “Landing High-Lift Devices Fail to Extend” checklist. Given the accident airplane was at landing weight, its no-flap landing speed would have been about 195 kts, which assumes the airplane was straight and level and configured with the gear extended. Additionally, Draken International’s F-1 procedures call for no-flap patterns to be flown from a straight in approach.

The aircraft flight manual for the normal F-1 “Break” pattern depicts initiating the break to downwind about 350 kts, 60° of bank, throttle back to below 6,500 rpm and airbrakes as required. Abeam the runway, the airplane should be about 215 kts, configured with the airbrakes in, gear down, and flaps down. The pilot should, according to the manual, extend the downwind leg sufficiently to stabilize speed before the final turn. Approaching the runway at 45°, the key point for the final turn, airspeed should be about 160 kts and AOA incidence about 10°, and RPM about 7,300 rpm. During the final turn, airspeed should be about 150 kts and the pilot should use the AOA incidence indicator to control airspeed, less or equal to 13° (12° - 13° on average). Draken International flies their normally configured F-1s in the overhead pattern at a minimum of 165 kts in the final turn. Additionally, an incidence of 13°AOA is used only after touchdown and aerobraking, which would equal about 135 kts (assuming about a 1000L of fuel landing weight).

The airplane’s incidence indicator is attached to the left side windshield post and displays incidence (AOA) information. At a greater than 17° limit incidence, a warning horn activates, and cuts off when the incidence is reduced to 14°. The maximum permissible incidence (AOA) is 17°. According to the airplane’s flight manual:

The aircraft behavior at high incidence is very sound. The permissible limit is easily exceeded unless the incidence indicator is watched, the control forces on the control stick are very light and the buffeting level is low and constant. The control stick is often pulled up to the pitch travel limit without any obvious anomaly, especially with the combat flaps.

The airplane was scheduled on an Other Approved Inspection Program (AAIP). The program consisted of three levels of progressive aircraft inspections. The maintenance and inspection levels were organizational, intermediate, and depot. Organizational inspections consisted of servicing, preventive maintenance, and operational inspections. Intermediate level inspections consisted of intermediate inspections at an interval of 250 flight hours and a minor inspection at 800 flight hours. The depot inspections consisted of a major inspection at 2,400 flight hours.

The operator performed a daily inspection on the accident airplane prior to its flight. Additionally, the airplane’s last intermediate and depot level inspections were accomplished on November 9, 2020, at an airframe total time of 4,589.7 hours.

The F-1 Mirage was a French fighter and attack aircraft that was imported into the United States and registered under the experimental category. It is a single-engine, swept-wing, supersonic airplane capable of Mach 2+. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of over 35,000 lbs.

The airplane is equipped with high-lift devices consisting of two types of leading-edge slats and double-slotted flaps on each wing. The internal drooping slats occupy the 2/5 of the leading edge and have a camber of 25°. The external slotted slats occupy 3/5 of the leading edge, are in line with the drooping slats, and have a variable camber. The flaps have slots and slips in two parts (internal and external). Their camber is different and variable depending on the configuration. In the 1/2 extended position, the internal flap is about 28° and the external flap is 13°. In the fully extended position, the internal flap is about 48° and the external flap is 25°.

The airplane’s manual control of the high-lift devices was controlled electronically by the “SLATS-FLAPS” lever. This control level must be used on takeoff and landing and overrides the combat high-lift device controls. There were three positions of the handle: the forward position was fully retracted and guarded by a guard cover, the middle position was ½ flaps and slats completely extended. The rear position was flaps and slats completely extended. The slat control system and the two flap actuating jacks were supplied by the hydraulic system 1, ancillary subsystem.

The airplane’s high-lift device selector switch had an EMERGENCY RETRACTION position for slat and flap emergency retraction. This position would take precedence over all other current functions selected. The combat flaps were for use during combat and increase the lift performance by 25% up to about 18° nose up.

The F-1 Aircraft Flight Manual for “Landing High-Lift Devices Fail to Extend” checklist calls to check the Slats/Flaps (S/F) circuit breaker, utility hydraulic pressure, and that the high-lift device selector switch in not at EMERGENCY RETRACT position; S/F light out. If the checks confirm the failure, set the slat/flap lever to IN and land without high-lift devices: angle-of-attack (AOA) incidence about 11°.

The no-flap landing speeds were incorporated in the hydraulic system ancillary shutoff emergency checklist. The checklist states that if the high-lift devices (slats and flaps) do not extend, land with and airspeed between 195 kts to 215 kts depending on aircraft weight and also with an AOA incidence about 11° as per the “Landing High-Lift Devices Fail to Extend” checklist. Given the accident airplane was at landing weight, its no-flap landing speed would have been about 195 kts, which assumes the airplane was straight and level and configured with the gear extended. Additionally, Draken International’s F-1 procedures call for no-flap patterns to be flown from a straight in approach.

The aircraft flight manual for the normal F-1 “Break” pattern depicts initiating the break to downwind about 350 kts, 60° of bank, throttle back to below 6,500 rpm and airbrakes as required. Abeam the runway, the airplane should be about 215 kts, configured with the airbrakes in, gear down, and flaps down. The pilot should, according to the manual, extend the downwind leg sufficiently to stabilize speed before the final turn. Approaching the runway at 45°, the key point for the final turn, airspeed should be about 160 kts and AOA incidence about 10°, and RPM about 7,300 rpm. During the final turn, airspeed should be about 150 kts and the pilot should use the AOA incidence indicator to control airspeed, less or equal to 13° (12° - 13° on average). Draken International flies their normally configured F-1s in the overhead pattern at a minimum of 165 kts in the final turn. Additionally, an incidence of 13°AOA is used only after touchdown and aerobraking, which would equal about 135 kts (assuming about a 1000L of fuel landing weight).

The airplane’s incidence indicator is attached to the left side windshield post and displays incidence (AOA) information. At a greater than 17° limit incidence, a warning horn activates, and cuts off when the incidence is reduced to 14°. The maximum permissible incidence (AOA) is 17°. According to the airplane’s flight manual:

The aircraft behavior at high incidence is very sound. The permissible limit is easily exceeded unless the incidence indicator is watched, the control forces on the control stick are very light and the buffeting level is low and constant. The control stick is often pulled up to the pitch travel limit without any obvious anomaly, especially with the combat flaps.

The airplane was scheduled on an Other Approved Inspection Program (AAIP). The program consisted of three levels of progressive aircraft inspections. The maintenance and inspection levels were organizational, intermediate, and depot. Organizational inspections consisted of servicing, preventive maintenance, and operational inspections. Intermediate level inspections consisted of intermediate inspections at an interval of 250 flight hours and a minor inspection at 800 flight hours. The depot inspections consisted of a major inspection at 2,400 flight hours.

The operator performed a daily inspection on the accident airplane prior to its flight. Additionally, the airplane’s last intermediate and depot level inspections were accomplished on November 9, 2020, at an airframe total time of 4,589.7 hours.

Examination of the accident site revealed that the jet airplane impacted flat desert terrain in the back of a residence about 1.5 miles southwest from the approach threshold of runway 3R. All major components of the airplane were found at the main wreckage site. The main portion of the fuselage came to rest by a flatbed semi-truck trailer on a heading of about 195° magnetic. Small fragments of aircraft debris were scattered several hundred feet from the accident site.

The wreckage site was at an elevation of about 1,791 ft msl. There was a postimpact fire that consumed the majority of the airplane wreckage.

The ejection seat and parachute were found about one block away to the east-southeast.

A postaccident examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that the airplane’s configuration was consistent with the slats being extended and the flaps being retracted. Observation of the airplane’s engine revealed significant impact damage consistent with the engine operating at a high rotational velocity at the time of impact and that there was no evidence of internal catastrophic damage. The engine rpm gauge as found indicated about 7,100 rpm, which was consistent with “break” pattern procedures for a normally configured aircraft. Additionally, the position of the variable exhaust nozzle was consistent with the previous engine observations.

Examination of the Master Failure Warning light filament revealed that the amber portion of the light was likely illuminated. The amber light would illuminate an annunciator on the Failure Warning Panel, which depicts specific system failures, malfunctions, or cautions. Illumination of an amber light on both the Master Failure Warning light and Failure Warning Panel would allow for delayed action for the issue. If a red light was illuminated, it would call for immediate action.

Examination of the airplane’s Flight Data Recorder revealed that no flight data was able to be extracted from the unit. The recorder’s memory chips in the accident module were likely failed at the time of the accident.

Because of the post-crash condition of the airplane and the absence of onboard recorded data, the nature of the flap issue reported by the pilot could not be determined. No additional evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation were observed.

Draken International completed an assessment of the accident aircraft’s final turn performance by attempting to match the accident flight parameters (at a safer and higher altitude) in similarly equipped F-1 aircraft. An aircraft configuration of gear up, flaps up, and slats down was assumed. The assessment noted that the accident airplane’s overhead pattern track was flown at a tighter track than normal pattern spacing flown by the number two aircraft in the formation. During final turns, at various power settings, the assessment noted that the airplane required an additional 1,000 ft to 1,300 ft to recover from the end of the turn and also had a tendency to continue turning at the end of the profile (180-190 kts and 17° AOA). It also noted that the pilots needed to unload to roll wings-level to regain airspeed, and furthermore that the afterburner took about 5 seconds to light. All of the final turn test runs resulted in excessive AOA of 17° incidence or greater, except for one run, at a low power setting, which resulted in the airplane unable to turn more than 110°.

A review of the airplane’s performance charts indicated that the accident airplane’s no-flap configuration would have depleted energy even at maximum afterburner during the final turn and would be at or above 17°AOA incidence (the maximum limit).

Failure of the flaps to extend would require additional airspeed and AOA to compensate for the loss of lift, which would increase the airplane’s turning radius. Additionally, as shown in the organization’s flight assessment and airplane’s performance charts, there was insufficient thrust available to overcome the configuration issue of no-flaps while flying a final turn profile based on the flaps extended.

The airplane was equipped with a Dassault ESPAR solid-state FDR customized for use in the F-1 Mirage. The ESPAR was capable of recording between 3-6 hours of flight data and could record 25 parameters. The readout software then calculated additional parameters using the base recorded parameters.

The Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner, Las Vegas, Nevada, conducted an autopsy on the pilot. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was “blunt force injuries.”

The FAA's Forensic Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. The pilot’s results for the testing were negative except for positive results for ethanol in the muscle specimen.

The pilot had ethanol detected in the muscle tissue but not detected in the brain tissue. It is likely that some or all of the small amount of ethanol detected was formed by postmortem microbial activity.

Examination of the ejection hardware revealed that the ejection equipment functioned normally, and there was no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

A review of the airplane’s ejection seat envelope revealed that at 130 kts; at a bank of 45°, the minimum altitude was about 300 ft, and at 60° of bank, the minimum altitude was about 450 ft.

Draken International operated the airplane and was a contract air support organization that provided aggressor support, red air, and close air support for the United States military, Department of Defense, and allied militaries, globally. The organization operated one of the world’s largest commercial fleets of tactical ex-military jet aircraft consisting of the F-1 Mirage, A-4, L-159, and L-39 aircraft. The accident airplane was part of the contract to provide adversarial support to the United States Air Force at LSV.

Draken International accomplished both the maintenance of its airplanes and provided initial and recurrent ground and flight training to its F-1 pilots. The F-1 pilots interviewed stated that their F-1 training was thorough and was comparable to the flight training they received in their previous fighter aircraft. Additionally, the organization had a safety department that was managed by the Director of Safety. The safety department managed the organization’s Safety Management System (SMS).