N570TMRaytheon Aircraft 400A · 2000

On February 4, 2018, about 1924 eastern standard time, a Raytheon (Hawker) 400A airplane, N470TM, overran the end of the runway after landing at the Burke Lakefront Airport (KBKL) Cleveland, Ohio. The two pilots and two passengers were not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to Aircraft Holding Company One, LLC, and operated by Traffic Management Company, LLC, under the provisions of Title 14 Part 135 air taxi flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and the flight was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan that originated from the Teterboro Airport (KTEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, about 1804.

The pilots reported to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, that during as part of the preflight planning for the flight, they received NOTAMS (notices to airman) with a FICON (field condition) of 5/5/5, and they'd calculate landing distances for a wet or dry runway.

As the flight neared KBKL, the crew conducted their approach briefing and before the checklist was completed, the captain stated, "light snow .. maybe slippery". The crew contacted Cleveland approach control, who told them to expect the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 24R and circle to land on runway 6L. At 1901, the crew then monitored the airport's automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Lima, which, in part, was broadcasting a 2357 zulu [1857 EST] observation, wind 340 degrees at 17 (knots) gusts to 25 (knots), visibility 4 (miles), light freezing rain, sky conditions ceiling 700 overcast, temperature minus 3, dewpoint minus 4, altimeter 29.80.

The captain repeated to the first officer, 340 at 17, gust to 25, light freezing rain, "so the runway is going to be wet, 25-degree crosswind" ... adding that they were at the limit.

Cleveland approach then transferred the flight to the KBKL tower controller, who told the flight to circle north for runway 6L. The tower controller added that [airport] operations was on the runway approximately 20 minutes earlier and advised [ the runway] was starting to pick up traces of ice. The captain acknowledged the transmission and reported that they were getting moderate rime icing on the descent.

During the circling approach to runway 6L, the airplane got too close to obstacles and the crew elected to conduct a missed approach. The captain then requested to land on runway 24R. During the approach to runway 24R, the tower controller reported wind, of 020 [degrees] at 25 [knots] and 010 at 25.

After touchdown, the crew reported they applied maximum braking, but the airplane did not slow and skidded off the end of runway into the Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS).

The crew and passengers exited the airplane, and the crew reported that the fire department said they were delayed in getting to the airplane due to the slippery conditions. They added that from their observation the runway grooves, had been "smoothed out" by ice accumulations.

A first responder reported that he could see why the airplane left the runway; that the ramp and taxiways were very icy. He added that he did not travel down the runway, but the end of the runway and EMAS had a sheet of ice on it.

A damage assessment of the airplane indicated substantial damage to the fuselage and a collapsed nose gear.

A review of the airport operations log noted that a runway and field inspection recorded at 1900, noted a temperature of 31° F, and a braking coefficient (Mu) of 40+, with runways and taxiways wet. A log entry at 1930, after the incident, noted a braking coefficient (Mu) of 30-35, with runways and taxiways wet. Neither log entry gave any additional field conditions, such as the presence (or absence) of any contaminants on the paved surfaces.

A review of the KBKL Snow and Ice Control Plan, dated March 10, 2009 and revised March 31, 2017 noted:

• The airport does not have pavement surface sensors

• Operations personnel will be responsible to monitor the airfield as precipitation and airfield changes dictate.

The extent of monitoring must consider all variable that may effect the runway conditions, including any precipitation conditions, changing temperatures, effects of wind, frequency of runway use, and type of aircraft using the runway.

There is no timeline when a condition changes. An Update is disseminated as needed.

• The airport disseminates information on the runway via NOTAMS using the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) in determining runway conditions.

The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), basic dated October 12, 2017, Chapter 4, Section 3, Airport Operations:

4 3 9. Runway Condition Reports

a. Aircraft braking coefficient is dependent upon

the surface friction between the tires on the aircraft

wheels and the pavement surface. Less friction means

less aircraft braking coefficient and less aircraft

braking response.

b. Runway condition code (RwyCC) values range

from 1 (poor) to 6 (dry). For frozen contaminants on

runway surfaces, a runway condition code reading of

4 indicates the level when braking deceleration or

directional control is between good and medium.

c. Airport management should conduct runway

condition assessments on wet runways or runways

covered with compacted snow and/or ice.

1. Numerical readings may be obtained by using

the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM).

The RCAM provides the airport operator with data to

complete the report that includes the following:

(a) Runway(s) in use

(b) Time of the assessment

(c) Runway condition codes for each zone (touchdown, mid point, roll out)