N57GXMooney M20R · 2005

The pilot of the single-engine airplane reported that during landing to the southeast, a gust of wind contacted the airplane's tail from the left side, causing the airplane to veer to the left. The airplane departed the runway, crossed a taxiway, and impacted a ditch. The pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the nose gear collapsed and the propeller was bent aft. The engine firewall was wrinkled below the left engine mount. The recorded weather at the airport, about the time of the accident, included wind from 080° at 10 knots.

On April 3, 2016, at about 0945 EDT, N57GX a Mooney M20P, executed an evasive maneuver while climbing through 7,500 feet for 9,000 feet in response to a traffic collision avoidance system alert from N758PK, a Cessna C172G, level at 8,000 feet. N57GX turned left and crossed below and in front of N758PK; the closest proximity was estimated to be 0.85 NM and 200 feet. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and instrument flight plans for both aircraft were filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 flights. N57GX originated at the Ocala International Airport-Jim Taylor Field (OCF), Ocala, Florida and was enroute to Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. N758PK originated at the Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota Bradenton, Florida and was enroute to Athens Ben Epps Airport (MLJ), Athens, Georgia. There was no damage to either aircraft, and there were no reported injuries.

History of Flight

At 0935:01, the pilot of N57GX contacted Jacksonville approach control and reported departing OCF, leaving 1,700 feet climbing to 2,000 feet on an instrument flight plan. The JAX air traffic controller transmitted "...is that 57GX?" After the pilot confirmed it was N57GX, the approach controller asked the pilot if he was squawking 7242 [sic]. The pilot responded that he was squawking 7642, and asked "…you want me to change to 7342?" The approach controller instructed the pilot to squawk 7342.

At 0936:48, the pilot of N57GX contacted JAX approach control and advised that he "would like to go back on course and climb to 9,000." The approach controller responded, "Mooney 7GX you are radar contact eight miles west of the Ocala airport, say altitude." The pilot of N57GX replied, "yeah I see that 57GX, we would like to go back on course to go towards Fort Myers." The approach controller replied, "…roger that, ah, cleared direct Lakeland, climb and maintain 5,000." The pilot of N57GX correctly read back the route and altitude clearance, and the approach controller then climbed N57GX to 9,000 feet. The pilot of N57GX correctly read-back the clearance.

At 0939:46, the pilot of N57GX asked the approach controller if he had seen "all of the traffic I had to avoid" referring to the VFR traffic in and around OCF. At 0939:55, the approach controller responded, "…affirmative sir, it was, ah, no factor for you. There is a lot of uh, VFR [visual flight rules] aircraft in the vicinity of the Ocala airport." The pilot responded, "well I would disagree with ya on that one, ah; I had to do evasive maneuvers to avoid a plane that was less than 2 miles out same altitude." The approach controller responded, "…yes sir, ah, we are watching you, just be assured that we are watching you. Sir, it was not a factor for you, sorry you had all that ah traffic there. You have additional traffic there about 2 to 3 o'clock about a mile same direction, altitude indicates 3,700." The pilot responded he had the traffic on the "fish finder."

At 0946:05 the conflict alert (CA) activated between N57GX and N758PK; an audible alert was emitted and a flashing "CA" was displayed in the radar data block. The alert continued until 0947:05.

At 0947:09, the pilot of N57GX broadcasted "Jacksonville approach." The approach controller responded, "go ahead I am watching you." The pilot of N57GX advised the approach controller, "yeah it looks like you didn't see that other traffic either, almost hit us." The approach controller did not respond.

At 0947:47, the pilot of N57GX transmitted, "did you say you saw the traffic that almost hit us or didn't see it. We had to take evasive action a second time with you (unintelligible)." The approach controller replied, "…we did see it there, he went by at 8,000." The pilot of N57GX asked the approach controller why he was not advised of the other aircraft. The approach controller responded, "…we did see it ah northbound going to M-J, ah M-L-J, we did see it."

At 0948:16, the pilot of N57GX transmitted, "you did see it and you didn't tell me about it, what's going on at JAX center?" The approach controller responded, "it's actually JAX approach." At 0948:22, the pilot of N57GX asked, "what's going on at JAX approach that you didn't advise me, I'm on an IFR flight plan, I thought I was getting separation service. If I didn't have collision avoidance we would have hit two airplanes possibly." The approach controller responded "…I appreciate your ah your patience today, I want you to contact Tampa approach, hopefully you'll get better service there, it's on ah 135.5."

Before changing frequencies, the pilot of N57GX transmitted "you're not paying attention." The approach controller responded that he was paying attention and the pilot responded, "you could have fooled me twice." The approach controller reiterated the Tampa approach control frequency.

There were no further transmissions from N57GX.

Radar Data

Radar data for this report was obtained from the FAA JAX terminal radar approach control (TRACON) and was of good quality. The data was plot playback (.PPB) derived from the Gainesville (GNV) radar sensor as part of the standard automation replacement system (STARS). The system provided a fused radar picture to the controller from radar sites in JAX, GNV, NIP, DAB or CTY. STARS should be operated in fused mode to the extent possible, and was in fused mode on the date of the incident.

Weather Information

The closest weather reporting station was the Villages heliport (19FL), Belleview, FL. The ASOS  weather for 1335 UTC was reported as:

Weather for KVVG at 0935 EDT was reported as wind 320 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, temperature 17° C, dew point temperature 06° C, altimeter 30.01 inches of mercury.

Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Procedures

Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order (FAA JO) 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, prescribes air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by personnel providing air traffic control services. Air traffic control personnel are required to be familiar with the provisions of FAA JO 7110.65 that pertain to operational responsibilities.

Required lateral radar separation when operating the radar system in fused mode is identified in FAA JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Chapter 5 Section 5, paragraph 5-5-4, Radar separation, which states [in part]:

b. TERMINAL. FUSION:

1. Fusion target symbol – 3 miles.

2. When displaying ISR in the data block- 5 miles.

When not utilizing lateral separation, air traffic controllers may utilize timed or vertical separation. FAA JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Chapter 4 Section 5, paragraph 4-5-1, Vertical Separation Minima, addresses vertical separation and states [in part]:

Separate instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft using the following minima between altitudes:

Up to and including FL 410- 1,000 feet.

When an aircraft comes in close proximity to other aircraft or terrain and obstructions, a Safety Alert shall be issued. Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order (FAA JO) 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, addresses Safety Alerts and states [in part]:

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a position/altitude that, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.