N724HPRogers George T LANCAIR IVP · 2002

On March 8, 2014, about 1858 eastern standard time, an experimental amateur-built Lancair IVP, N724HP, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Hartsville, South Carolina. The private pilot/owner/builder and the two pilot-rated passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The flight originated from Darlington County Jetport (UDG), Darlington, South Carolina.

According to witnesses, the pilot had been having problems with the airplane's landing gear system and had been receiving a "gear unsafe" indication. Earlier on the day of the accident, a witness also saw the pilot/owner working on the airplane, and when queried, the pilot/owner advised him that he was troubleshooting an electrical problem.

Later that day, the pilot/owner and a pilot-rated passenger, departed UDG, flew around the local area, before landing at Hartsville Regional Airport (HVS), Hartsville, South Carolina. At 1510 the pilot/owner refueled the airplane with 50 gallons of fuel, and then at approximately 1610, took off alone and returned to UDG. About 1740, the pilot/owner departed from UDG on the accident flight, this time with two pilot-rated passengers aboard.

At approximately 1819, a relatives of the pilot/owner received text messages asking them to come to HVS, as the accident airplane's landing gear would not extend. At 1836 they received a second message to "Call 911." Around the time that the messages were received, a witness observed the airplane pass by him numerous times, at a "low" altitude, during an approximately 15 minute period. On the last pass, he could hear the airplane's engine running, and observed the airplane fly over the HVS about midfield point, at 600 to 700 feet above ground level. Then airplane then banked sharply to the left, pitched to about 25 degrees nose up, then descend rapidly in a nose high attitude until he lost sight of the airplane. Moments later, he heard the sound of impact, and a large fire and accompanying smoke were observed.

During the victim recovery and identification process it was determined that when the accident occurred, both pilot-rated passengers were in the front seats of the airplane and the pilot/owner was in the left rear seat of the airplane.

Pilot/Owner

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot/owner was 61 years old. He held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land, and a repairman experimental aircraft builder certificate with an inspection authorization for the accident airplane.

His most recent application for a FAA third-class medical certificate was dated February 8, 2012. He did not report his flight experience during that examination. On his application for an FAA third-class medical certificate, dated November 1, 2006, the pilot/owner reported that he had accrued 1,600 hours of total flight experience with 20 hours being accrued in the previous six months. Review of the pilot's logbook indicated that as of June 5, 1999 he had accrued approximately 441 hours of total flight time. The flight time reported to the FAA could not be reconciled, as no flight experience had been logged after the June 5, 1999 entry. The pilot/owner's most recent flight review was completed on September 25, 2004.

Left Front Seat Pilot

According to FAA records, the left front seat pilot was 75 years old. He held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent application for a FAA third-class medical certificate was dated March 11, 1991. On that date, he reported that he had accrued 200 total hours of flight time, with no hours in the last six months.

Right Front Seat Pilot

According to FAA records, the right front seat pilot was 29 years old. He held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent application for a FAA third-class medical certificate was dated June 13, 2012. On that date, he reported that he had accrued 100 total hours of flight time, with no hours in the last six months.

There was no evidence available to suggest that either the left or right front seat pilots had any previous flight experience in the accident airplane, or the accident airplane make and model.

The accident aircraft was a kit-built, four-seat, low wing, pressurized airplane, of composite construction. It was equipped with retractable tricycle-type landing gear, and was originally designed to be powered by a Continental TSIO-550, air-cooled, six cylinder, turbocharged engine, which produced 350 horsepower. The engine would typically have been mated to a three-blade, 76-inch diameter, variable pitch, constant-speed propeller.

The accident airplane had been modified by the pilot/owner by the installation of a Walter M601D turboprop engine that produced 724 shaft horsepower, driving an Avia V 508D, 99-inch diameter, three bladed, variable pitch, constant speed propeller, which was 22 inches in diameter larger, than the kit manufacturers recommended maximum of 77 inches.

The airplane in its modified configuration was capable of achieving cruise speeds in excess of 300 knots, at altitudes up to 30,000 feet.

According to FAA records on March 13, 1992, the airplane kit was purchased by Task Research Limited from Lancair International Inc. On August 14, 1993, Ownership was then transferred to Mogollan Custom Aircraft where build records indicated that numerous building tasks were accomplished.

On June 25, 2001, Ownership was once again transferred, this time to the pilot/owner.

On May 17, 2002, the pilot/owner completed FAA Form 8130-12 certifying that he had "fabricated and assembled" the airplane and that he "had records to support this statement" and would make them available to the FAA upon request. Then on July 8, 2002, the pilot also made a similar entry in the airplane's maintenance logbook.

On July 23, 2002, the pilot/owner made an entry in the engine logbook that he had installed the Walter engine. On that same day, an FAA designated airworthiness representative issued the pilot/owner his experimental operating limitations for the phase 1 initial flight tests. On September 3, 2002, the pilot made an entry in the aircraft logbook, stating that the airplane had accrued approximately 40 total hours of operation, that the prescribed test hours had been completed, and that the airplane was safe for operation. On September 30, 2004, at approximately 136 total hours of operation, the pilot/owner certified that the airplane had been inspected in accordance with the "N724HP Maintenance Inspection Program annual inspection and found to be in airworthy condition." This was the last entry recorded in the aircraft logbook.

Approximately 4 weeks later on October 26, 2004, at approximately 146 total hours of operation, the airplane and the pilot/owner were involved in an accident (NTSB Case ID ATL05LA012) at Sylvester Airport (SYV), Sylvester, Georgia. After the accident, the pilot/owner repaired the airplane. This required structural repair work, replacement of the Walter turboprop engine with one that he purchased from Air Lion Inc. with 1,662.3 total hours of operation on it, and repair and replacement of the main landing gear box, main landing gear, and other components. No maintenance logbook entries regarding the repairs to the airplane or the replacement of the engine were discovered during the investigation.

The recorded weather at Hartsville Regional Airport (HVS), Hartsville, South Carolina, located 1 nautical miles north northwest of the accident site, at 1855, included: calm winds, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 15 degrees C, dew point 7 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.04 inches of mercury.

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had struck two trees before making ground contact, and coming to rest next to a row of trees. Multiple pieces of wood were present on the ground which exhibited evidence of propeller strike marks.

Examination of the wreckage revealed that it had been exposed to a postcrash fire and that there was no evidence of any preimpact structural failure. Further examination revealed that it was equipped with extended-range fuel tanks, but no fuselage fuel tank, which indicated the airplane, was able to carry approximately 110 gallons of fuel. The wing flaps were in the up position, and flight control continuity was established from the cockpit flight controls, through breaks in the system that showed evidence of tensile overload, to the mounting locations of the flight control surfaces.

Examination of the propeller revealed evidence of S-bending, leading edge gouging, and chordwise scratching. Examination of the engine's single stage axial flow propulsor utilizing a borescope revealed evidence of rotational scoring and reverse bending on multiple turbine blades.

Examination of the landing gear system revealed that the landing gear handle was in the down position however, the nose landing gear was in the "up" position. The left and right main landing gear were partially extended, and the left main landing gear leg was fractured into two pieces. Examination of the main landing gear doors indicated that the right main landing gear door was closed during the impact sequence and the left main landing gear door was open during the impact sequence.

The landing gear system's hydraulic power pack fluid reservoir was designed to hold approximately 3 quarts of hydraulic fluid. When fully serviced, the fluid level could visibly be observed about 1 inch below the filler neck. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the fluid level of the accident airplane's hydraulic reservoir was below the secondary reservoir's pickup, and only contained about 10 tablespoons of fluid. The hydraulic fluid reservoir was otherwise intact, with no evidence of any fluid leakage. Due to the extent of fire damage, it could not be determined if the remainder of the hydraulic system was intact prior to the accident.

Further examination of the wreckage also revealed that the seat cushion for the right rear seat was displaced from its normal mounting position, and an access panel that was located beneath and allowed access to the main landing gear actuators, had been removed. Examination of the panel revealed scratch and pry marks on its topside, near one edge, and an open jackknife which belonged to the left front seat pilot was discovered on the floor, in close proximity to the panel.

Autopsies were performed on the pilots at the Newberry County Memorial Hospital Morgue on behalf of the Darlington County Coroner. The listed causes of death were Carbon Monoxide poisoning and thermal injuries.

Toxicological testing of the pilots was conducted at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Specimens from the pilots were negative for basic, acidic, and neutral drugs.

Landing Gear System

The main landing gear was constructed of gun drilled tubular steel. The main landing gear was retracted into the fuselage via full rack and pinion gears driven by the hydraulic system. The nose landing gear provided with the original kit was a conventional air/oil oleo strut with internal viscous shimmy dampening. Retraction was accomplished with a separate hydraulic cylinder and operated through the normal hydraulic system. A dedicated gas strut was used for emergency extension.

The landing gear doors were operated through a retract linkage and were held open by a spring in the same linkage. The main gear outer doors were opened by springs in their mechanical linkage; the inner doors were opened by the main gear strut riding on a nylon track on the individual door. They were spring loaded toward the closed position, and held closed in flight by a cable mechanism for the inner door and through mechanical linkage for the smaller outer door.

The landing gear and flap system of the airplane were both actuated by a hydraulic system which was pressurized using an electrically-driven pump. This unit was referred to as the "power pack" because it comprised the electric motor, a small gear pump and a fluid reservoir into one unit. The pump would run in one direction only, pressurizing the system. A 700 psi accumulator was included to assist in landing gear and wing flap extension and retraction. When the pilot would operate the landing gear or flaps, high pressure fluid was routed in the selected direction. The landing gear handle and flap handle (on the instrument panel) were actually rotating valves which in turn, would route the fluid. A pressure switch was used to maintain system pressure (approximately 1100 psi) at all times when the master switch was turned on.

An electrically operated solenoid pin locked the gear handle into the down lock position. This switch had to be electrically activated to allow the gear handle to be moved out of the down locked position. An airspeed sensor switch would activate this solenoid pin, thus the solenoid pin would not retract and allow gear "up" until the airplane reached an airspeed of about 65 knots.

Landing Gear Operation

In the down position, the nose gear linkage would be "over centered" and the combination of the gas strut and normal hydraulic pressure would help hold it there. The main landing gear was held in the down (extended) position by a mechanical down lock pin located on each hydraulic actuation cylinder.

Retraction of the landing gear was accomplished by moving the gear handle to up position which would unlock the main gear down lock pins, then retract all three landing gear. As the landing gear became fully retracted, the hydraulic system would reach its maximum pressure and the pressure switch would shut off the pump. The landing gear would be held in the up position by hydraulic pressure.

The 700 psi accumulator in addition to assisting in landing gear and wing flap extension and retraction, would also absorb pressure bumps as well as allow the wing flaps to be operated several times without the system pressure falling below the "pump on" limit.

Emergency Gear Extension

As a gear down back up, a hand operated pump was installed. In the event of electrical failure or a line leak, etc. To use this system, the pilot would have to reduce airspeed to below 120, then pull the gear motor solenoid circuit breaker, and place the landing gear handle in the down position. In the kit manufacturer's original design, this would automatically allow the nose gear to drop down and lock due to the high pressure gas strut on the assembly.

The nose gear on the airplane though, was not the one designed and approved by the kit manufacturer for the airplane. Instead it was approximately 36 inches long and was designed by the pilot to provide clearance for the 99 inch diameter Avia V 508D propeller. It could not be determined, if it would also drop down and lock as the originally supplied nose landing gear assembly would.

The main landing gear was also designed to fall to a vertical position which was not fully down. At that time, the hand pump could be used to move the main gear into the full down position which then automatically would set the internal down-lock pins in the main gear cylinders.

FAA Required Inspections

According to the FAA; a condition inspection is the equivalent of an "annual inspection" for type certificated aircraft. Though Title 14 CFR Part 43 states that it does not apply to experimental airworthiness certificates, the operating limitations on experimental amateur built aircraft require that no person shall operate an aircraft unless within the preceding 12 calendar months it has had a condition inspection performed in accordance with the scope and detail of appendix D to Part 43, or other FAA-approved programs, and found to be in a condition for safe operation. This inspection was required to be recorded in the aircraft maintenance records.

Experimental operating limitations for operating amateur built aircraft are also issued for a particular aircraft and usually contain additional specific guidance from the FAA, which in the case of the accident airplane, also required that it not be operated unless it was inspected and maintained per an inspection program selected, established, identified, and used as set forth in CFR 91.409(e), (f), (g), and (h). This required that the pilot/owner select and identify in the airplane maintenance records an inspection program for inspection of the airplane, that it be approved by the FAA, and that the inspections also be recorded in the aircraft maintenance records.

Lancair Pilot Operating Handbook

The airplane's kit manufacturer published a suggested Pilot Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM). Review of this manual revealed that it contained guidance regarding maintenance, inspection, and operation of the airplane. With regard to the hydraulic system, the manual stated, "As with any hydraulic system, proper servicing is required." It also discussed required inspection periods advising that an annual condition inspection was required on all aircraft and that among other things, that the inspection must include the landing gear. It also advised that this inspection must be signed off in the "aircraft logbook" by an inspector, as well as any repairs necessary due to discrepancies found during the inspection. The POH/AFM also recommended two additional levels of inspections beyond the preflight inspections listed in the POH/AFM, and was to be conducted at 25 hour and 100 hour intervals. The "Recommended Servicing" section advised that the landing gear hydraulic reservoir be serviced each 100 hours.

The kit manufacturer's suggested POH/AFM also contained a section on emergency procedures, which included checklists for multiple emergencies including "LANDING EMERGENCIES," and systems emergencies for items such as "LANDING GEAR." Review of the checklist the pilot produced for use in the accident airplane revealed that it only contained three sections;

There were no emergency procedures, listed.