N7734HRobinson Helicopter R22 BETA · 1988

On August 19, 2024, at 1345 mountain daylight time, Southwest Airlines flight 1768 encountered turbulence during descent into Albuquerque International Airport (ABQ), Albuquerque, New Mexico. The flight was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California to ABQ. As a result of the turbulence, one flight attendant sustained serious injuries.

The flight crew reported that the enroute weather was visual meteorological conditions, mostly clear skies, with occasional light chop turbulence. They had been monitoring their electronic flight bag applications for turbulence forecasts, one of which predicted an area of moderate turbulence about 80 miles prior to the top of descent. The captain asked the cabin crew to sit down for about 10 minutes as they transited that area, during which the turbulence was also occasional light chop.

During the descent, at an altitude of about 12,000 ft, the aircraft experienced what the captain described as 2-3 seconds of moderate turbulence as the airplane flew through a cirrus cloud. The first officer recalled that it was the only cloud in the vicinity and described the turbulence (as they flew through it) as “light chop”.

After landing, the C flight attendant told the captain that during the turbulence, both of her feet left the floor momentarily, and that she landed awkwardly on her feet. The cabin crew left the airplane for their overnight. Shortly after, the B flight attendant returned to the airplane and told the flight deck crew that flight attendant C was having difficulty walking. She was later diagnosed with a fractured left tibia.

A post-accident review of weather records revealed that a convective significant meteorological information (SIGMET) was in effect for an area surrounding the accident, warning of either existing or expected thunderstorms. Convective SIGMETS imply the possibility of severe or greater turbulence. There were no airman’s meteorological information (AIRMETS) in effect for the accident area, and no pilot reports (PIREPS) reporting any turbulence within 150 miles of the accident location. Satellite imagery near the time of the accident showed areas of cumulous clouds to the west and southwest of ABQ, in the area of the accident. The convective conditions and presence of cumulous clouds near the accident were consistent with convectively induced turbulence.

Southwest Airlines flight 2493 (SWA2493) and a Textron Aviation, Inc. 560XL (N564HV) were involved in a runway incursion with overflight that resulted in a loss of separation at San Diego International Airport (SAN).

SAN was equipped with the Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X) surface radar system. The system was operational and functioned as designed. It produced both aural and visual alerts that indicated that there was an aircraft [N564HV] landing with another aircraft [SWA2493] still in position on the same runway. The local control (LC) controller immediately reacted to the ASDE-X alerts, and issued instructions to resolve the conflict, but not before standard separation had been lost.

The SAN Airport Traffic Control Tower (SAN ATCT) facility was equipped with two flight strip printers, one functioned as a primary device, and the second as a backup in case the first unit failed. In post incident interviews, the SAN ATCT personnel stated that they received no training on the use or troubleshooting of these printers. Prior to the incident, the primary printer jammed. During the post-incident interview with the operations supervisor (OS), they stated that they chose to troubleshoot the primary printer rather than switching to the backup, and that this drew their attention away from the operation at the time of the incident. FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-10-3, Tower Team Position Responsibilities, states in part:

Tower Team Concept and Intent: There are no absolute divisions of responsibilities regarding position operations. The tasks to be completed remain the same whether one, two, or three people are working positions within a facility/sector. The team, as a whole, has responsibility for the safe and efficient operation of that facility/sector.

The LC controller noticed a flight strip at their workstation that indicated an initial altitude for an uninvolved departing aircraft that was not in accordance with facility directives and contacted Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (SCT TRACON) to coordinate an appropriate altitude. This diverted their attention from N564HV and SWA2493 momentarily. During the post-incident interview conducted with the LC controller, they stated that they had used poor judgment in prioritizing their duties. This duty prioritization was not consistent with guidance contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-1-1, ATC Service.