N814WT is a 2014 Piper Aircraft PA-34-220T. It is a fixed-wing multi-engine aircraft with 7 seats, powered by a Cont Motor TSIO-360-RB rated at 220 horsepower. The registration is active, with the registrant based in Salt Lake City, UT. Its standard airworthiness certificate was issued in Sep 2014. It has been registered to its current owner since Dec 2014. This page also carries 1 NTSB event.
- 12 years old
2014
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On January 4, 2023, about 1456 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-34-220T, N814WT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near New Harmony, Utah. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot had flown from his home base of Salt Lake City Airport (SLC) the morning of the accident to check on a residence in the St. George area, and the accident flight was to be his return trip. A concerned family member reported the airplane overdue, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an Alert Notice (ALNOT). A search for the airplane was initiated and the wreckage was found the following day in mountainous terrain, about 3 miles north of New Harmony, Utah.
ADS-B data provided by the FAA indicated that the airplane departed from runway 19 at St. George Regional Airport (SGU) about 1439. The airplane continued on a northeast heading for six minutes, reaching a GPS reported altitude of about 10,000 ft. The airplane then began to descend and after reaching 9,000 ft one minute later, it made a 90° left turn while continuing to descend to 8,625 ft. For the next four minutes, the airplane continued on a northerly track toward rising terrain while crossing over and to the west of Interstate 15. After descending to 7,375 ft, the airplane turned 90° to the left toward an 8,300-ft-tall mountain peak. The airplane then began a climbing left turn, reaching 8,425 ft one minute later. The next ADS-B target, recorded 14 seconds later, indicated that the airplane had descend to 6,900 ft on a southerly heading. For the last 15 seconds, the airplane continued in a left turn, climbing to 7,525 ft about 2,000 ft west of the accident site (see figure 1).
Figure 1 – ADS-B Image of flight (the green line represents the path between the last recorded targets and does not depict the true flight path).
Multiple witnesses reported that the mountain range at the accident site was obscured by clouds. One witness, who was a pilot, stated that she was in her house in New Harmony, about 1 mile from the accident site, when she heard the sound of a low flying airplane. She checked its location using an aircraft flight tracking website, which showed the airplane flying directly overhead at 7,300 ft mean sea level (msl), an altitude she thought was unusually low for the area and terrain. She reported cloud bases of between 200 and 300 ft above ground level, with the surrounding mountainous terrain completely obscured. She watched on the website as the airplane made a 180° turn, and she listened outside but heard no significant changes in the pitch of the engines. She continued to listen as the airplane flew away, and the sound of the engines faded into the distance.
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. According to his most recent FAA medical exam, dated February 24, 2022, he reported 2,625 total flight hours, with 50 in the last six months. The pilot’s logbooks were not recovered.
Review of data extracted from the airplane’s integrated flight deck (IFD) indicated that most of the flights flown during the year leading up to the accident were direct between SLC and SGU, with some short local flights to airports just north of SLC.
According to family members, the pilot was based in Salt Lake City, but had a house in the St. George area, and routinely flew the accident route. The reason for the flight was to check on his house and another construction project in the area. They were not aware of any urgent reason for him to return that day, and although he was planning on leaving for a vacation, it was not until the following week.
The pilot’s daughter, who had a pilot’s certificate, stated that he was meticulous with his flight preparation and routinely flew using the autopilot. She stated that the airplane had a well-equipped avionics suite, including terrain awareness and weather. The pilot started flying in the 1990’s, and this was his third Seneca. She was not aware of any issues with the airplane or its autopilot, and while he sometimes flew under instrument flight rules (IFR) and in inclement weather, for the flights between Salt Lake and St George he typically flew under VFR and direct between the two airports. Earlier on the day of the accident, he had mentioned that there was a window in the weather before storms were coming through the area.
The airplane was manufactured in 2014 and purchased new by the pilot. It was equipped with a Garmin G1000 IFD, which included a primary and a multi-function display and a GFC 700 Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) autopilot. The airplane also included an Aspen Avionics EFD1000 primary flight display, configured as a backup system.
The Garmin IFD included a synthetic vision system, which displayed terrain and obstacle clearance alerts on the primary screen, along with the topography immediately in front of the airplane. The system provided visual and audible alerts of terrain threats relative to the projected flight path. The G1000 Cockpit Reference Guide specifically stated that the terrain avoidance feature was not to be used as the sole means of navigation and terrain separation, and that it was only to be used as an aid to terrain avoidance.
The AFCS included return-to-level (LVL) and Electronic Stability and Protection (ESP) features. When LVL is activated, the autopilot returned the airplane to a wings-level attitude and zero vertical speed. LVL mode was activated by pressing a switch at the top center of the instrument panel and could be activated while the autopilot was engaged or disengaged. Regardless of autopilot status prior to activating LVL Mode, the autopilot would become engaged in the lateral and vertical modes of LVL. Selecting another lateral or vertical mode while LVL was active would activate that mode and cancel the LVL in that axis.
ESP functioned only when the autopilot was disengaged. When enabled, ESP provided a control force feedback “soft barrier” to return the airplane to a nominal operating envelope. If operating within the ESP envelope for an extended period of time, an “Engaging Autopilot” aural alert would sound, and the autopilot would automatically engage in LVL mode.
The autopilot could be disengaged manually by pressing the A/P DISC / TRIM INTER switch on the control wheel or activating either half or both halves of the manual electric pitch trim switch on the control wheel, or by pressing the AP key on the MFD. Autopilot disconnects or failures were accompanied by aural alerts and visual annunciations on the PFD.
The airplane was also equipped with an ice protection system, approved for flight into known icing conditions. It was designed for operation in light to moderate meteorological conditions defined in FAR 25, Appendix C, for continuous maximum and intermittent maximum icing conditions. The system consisted of pneumatic wing and empennage boots, a wing ice detection light, electrothermal propeller deice pads, electrically heated windshield panel, heated lift detectors, and a heated pitot head. The vacuum system consisted of a vacuum pump on each engine, plus plumbing, filtering and regulating equipment.
The flight manual supplement for the ice protection system stated that continuous attention was required by the pilot to monitor the rate of ice buildup in order to accomplish the boot cycle at the optimum time. Boots were to be cycled when ice had built to between 1/4 and 1/2 inch thickness on the leading edge to assure proper ice removal; repeated boot cycles at less than 1/4 inch could cause a cavity to form under the ice and prevent ice removal. Boot cycles at thicknesses greater than 1/2 inch could also fail to remove ice.
The airplane was serviced with the addition of 79.4 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation gasoline at SGU earlier in the day. Testing of fuel in the supply tanks at SGU revealed that it was clear and bright, with no contaminants.
There was no record of the pilot filing an instrument flight rules flight plan or requesting flight following.
A pilot who planned to depart SGU on a VFR flight to the SLC area about 1400 on the day of the accident stated that, before departure, he checked enroute weather and the reporting stations all indicated VMC along the route of flight. While on the airport ramp, he observed two airplanes flying in the traffic pattern, yet to the north, he could see clouds obscuring the mountains along his intended route. He considered departing and flying toward the New Harmony area to see if he could travel through the pass, but decided to cancel the flight and drive instead. As he drove through the pass and reached New Harmony, the area was completely enveloped in low clouds. Once he passed through to Cedar City, the cloud bases increased, and visibility was restored to what he considered to be VMC.
Surface Observations
About the time of the departure and accident, VMC conditions were reported at both the departure and arrival airports, along with airports enroute. Specifically:
An Automated Weather Observing Station (AWOS) at SGU about 31 miles south-southwest of the accident site at an elevation of about 2,885 feet, reported at 1456 calm wind, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 4,100 ft agl, a broken layer at 6,500 ft, and light rain.
An Automated Surface Observing Station (ASOS) was located at Cedar City Regional Airport (CDC2), which was located along the presumed route of flight, about 14 miles north-northeast of the accident site at an elevation of about 5,620 feet. At 1453, the station reported 11knot wind from 220°, with 10 miles visibility, and few clouds at 12,000 ft agl.
During the one-hour period before and after the accident, the SLC ASOS was reporting winds generally out of the south, with few clouds between 6,000 ft and 18,000 ft agl and 10 miles visibility.
High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) Model Sounding
A HRRR model sounding along the airplane’s inbound flight path earlier in the day indicated the potential for few to broken clouds between about 6,300 and 8,500 feet.
By 1500, weather conditions had deteriorated, with the model sounding for the accident site identifying clouds in the lower atmosphere from about 6,500 feet (msl) through 9,300 feet with the potential for freezing fog below. The freezing level was noted at about 6,300 feet. The potential for light rime icing was identified below about 8,800 feet, with moderate clear icing identified in about the lowest 100 feet of the atmosphere. Light low-level wind shear was also identified within the lowest 100 feet. The wind nearest the surface was from the south at a magnitude of about 10 knots, but the wind increased in magnitude to a westerly wind of about 30 knots near 15,000 feet.
According to Leidos Flight Services (LFS) and its third-party vendors using the LFS system, there was no contact with the accident aircraft on the day of or the day before the accident.
The pilot used ForeFlight for flight planning. Data provided by ForeFlight indicated that he had entered the route of flight into the application earlier in the day, and 20 minutes before takeoff he viewed weather imagery, including turbulence, lowest freezing levels, and aviation surface forecasts, along with wind speed forecasts at both the surface and 15,000 ft msl.
Previous Flights
Data extracted from the airplane’s IFD indicated that the pilot had flown the same route four times from July through to the period leading up to the accident. All flights followed the same general direct track between SGU and SLC. Weather for all those flights indicated VMC prevailed with 10 miles visibility and either clear skies, or few scattered or broken clouds along the route of flight.
The flight parameters showed that, for the four previous flights between SGU and SLC, the pilot departed from runway 19 and initiated a climbing left turn onto the downwind leg. About midfield he would engage the autopilot, setting the roll mode to wings level (WL) and the pitch mode to vertical speed (VS). Northeast of the outer limits of St. George, and as he approached the mountain pass to New Harmony, he was usually at an altitude of between 7,000 and 9,500 ft and climbing. He would then switch the autopilot roll mode to either GPS or heading (HDG) as the airplane flew climbed through and out of the pass at altitudes of between 10,000 and 11,500 ft. The airplane would then remain on a direct north-northeast track of about 13° to the SLC area.
The drive from SGU to SLC by car would have been about 320 miles and taken between 4 and 5 hours.
The airplane was manufactured in 2014 and purchased new by the pilot. It was equipped with a Garmin G1000 IFD, which included a primary and a multi-function display and a GFC 700 Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) autopilot. The airplane also included an Aspen Avionics EFD1000 primary flight display, configured as a backup system.
The Garmin IFD included a synthetic vision system, which displayed terrain and obstacle clearance alerts on the primary screen, along with the topography immediately in front of the airplane. The system provided visual and audible alerts of terrain threats relative to the projected flight path. The G1000 Cockpit Reference Guide specifically stated that the terrain avoidance feature was not to be used as the sole means of navigation and terrain separation, and that it was only to be used as an aid to terrain avoidance.
The AFCS included return-to-level (LVL) and Electronic Stability and Protection (ESP) features. When LVL is activated, the autopilot returned the airplane to a wings-level attitude and zero vertical speed. LVL mode was activated by pressing a switch at the top center of the instrument panel and could be activated while the autopilot was engaged or disengaged. Regardless of autopilot status prior to activating LVL Mode, the autopilot would become engaged in the lateral and vertical modes of LVL. Selecting another lateral or vertical mode while LVL was active would activate that mode and cancel the LVL in that axis.
ESP functioned only when the autopilot was disengaged. When enabled, ESP provided a control force feedback “soft barrier” to return the airplane to a nominal operating envelope. If operating within the ESP envelope for an extended period of time, an “Engaging Autopilot” aural alert would sound, and the autopilot would automatically engage in LVL mode.
The autopilot could be disengaged manually by pressing the A/P DISC / TRIM INTER switch on the control wheel or activating either half or both halves of the manual electric pitch trim switch on the control wheel, or by pressing the AP key on the MFD. Autopilot disconnects or failures were accompanied by aural alerts and visual annunciations on the PFD.
The airplane was also equipped with an ice protection system, approved for flight into known icing conditions. It was designed for operation in light to moderate meteorological conditions defined in FAR 25, Appendix C, for continuous maximum and intermittent maximum icing conditions. The system consisted of pneumatic wing and empennage boots, a wing ice detection light, electrothermal propeller deice pads, electrically heated windshield panel, heated lift detectors, and a heated pitot head. The vacuum system consisted of a vacuum pump on each engine, plus plumbing, filtering and regulating equipment.
The flight manual supplement for the ice protection system stated that continuous attention was required by the pilot to monitor the rate of ice buildup in order to accomplish the boot cycle at the optimum time. Boots were to be cycled when ice had built to between 1/4 and 1/2 inch thickness on the leading edge to assure proper ice removal; repeated boot cycles at less than 1/4 inch could cause a cavity to form under the ice and prevent ice removal. Boot cycles at thicknesses greater than 1/2 inch could also fail to remove ice.
The airplane was serviced with the addition of 79.4 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation gasoline at SGU earlier in the day. Testing of fuel in the supply tanks at SGU revealed that it was clear and bright, with no contaminants.
Shortly after the accident, the airplane wreckage became buried by snow due to a winter storm. An onsite examination was performed once weather conditions allowed, on January 8.
The airplane collided with terrain in a ravine at an elevation of 6,600 ft msl, about 200 ft below the surrounding ridgeline in an area interspersed with brush, juniper, and pine trees. The first identified point of impact was a 15-ft-long, 60° swath cut through a tree. From the tree, a debris field containing fiberglass and metal shards associated with a wing continued on a heading of 095°. A propeller hub and 3 detached propeller blades were 20 ft from the initial point of impact, and the main wreckage came to rest inverted on a heading of 170° about 55 ft farther. The left wing remained partially attached to the fuselage and sustained leading edge crush damage. The inboard section of the right wing remained partially attached, and its outboard sections were comingled with the fuselage.
The fuselage sustained extensive crush damage from the nose to the vertical stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer remained attached to the tail cone and was crushed and folded under the stabilator. Within the fuselage, remnants of fractured and separated seats, flight instruments, and cabin contents were identified.
All primary flight control surfaces were located at the accident site. Examination of the flight control system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, with all components exhibiting evidence of bending and overload damage consistent with impact. The avionics suite and autopilot sustained extensive fragmentation damage such that the operational status at impact could not be determined.
Examination of both engines did not reveal any evidence of catastrophic internal failure, and all six propeller blades exhibited significant leading-edge damage, along with varying degrees of tip curl, serration, chordwise striations, and S-bending. The turbocharger compressor wheels for both engines sustained severe rotational damage to all their blades, and exhibited tearing and bending opposite the direction of rotation. Both engine-driven vacuum pumps were intact and did not show evidence of pre-impact failure.
The IFD included a data logging feature, capable of storing a series of aircraft, autopilot, and engine parameters to an SD card mounted in the display. Although the IFD and the autopilot system were destroyed in the accident, the SD card survived, and its data was extracted.
The data indicated that the parameters for both engines mirrored each other during the entire flight and that both were producing power at the time of impact. Although a series of autopilot parameters were recorded, including commanded heading, selected heading and altitude were not recorded.
There was no evidence of bird strike or fire to the airframe, wings, or engines.
An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Office of the Medical Examiner, Taylorsville, Utah. The cause of death was blunt force injuries.
Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected Amlodipine in liver and lung tissues. Amlodipine is a blood pressure medication that is generally considered not to be impairing.
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