N8845ZCessna 172H

On May 14, 2022, about 1251 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172H airplane, N8845Z, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Miami, Florida. The pilot was fatally injured, two passengers were seriously injured, and five people on the ground received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

On the day of the accident, the pilot departed Miami Homestead General Aviation Airport (X51), Homestead, Florida, about 1145, and flew to North Perry Airport (HWO), Hollywood, Florida, where he landed about 1220. About 1223, the pilot added about 11.2 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel to the airplane. After loading his passengers, who were members of his family, he departed at 1238, destined for Key West International Airport (EYW), Key West, Florida.

According to one of the passengers, he and the other passenger arrived as the pilot was finishing putting fuel in the airplane. He observed the pilot using a checklist while they were waiting to take off. After takeoff, they headed east toward the shoreline to see the beach. About 15 to 20 minutes later, the pilot called air traffic control and said he had an engine problem and had to return. He told the passengers where he was going and said not to worry, it was going to be ok. The passenger did not hear anything wrong with the engine, and though the pilot seemed concerned, he was not panicking. The passenger could not remember anything else.

According to air traffic control data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot requested visual flight rules flight following from Miami Approach after takeoff from HWO. Radar contact was established when the airplane was about 6 miles south of Fort Lauderdale International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, at an altitude about 1,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot was instructed to stay below 2,000 ft and to remain clear of Class B airspace and was given the altimeter setting.

At 1248, while the airplane was southbound along Miami Beach at approximately 1,200 ft, the pilot transmitted: “Miami Approach…Mayday-Mayday-Mayday…54Z, uh lost engine power, uh looks like um…let’s see…I don’t know where I am going to put this down but I’m going down right here.” The airplane then turned northbound and began losing altitude. When the airplane was at approximately 500 ft, the controller provided the wind speed and direction (180° at 3 knots) and asked the pilot if he had time to provide the number of souls on board and fuel, to which the pilot replied, “There’s three souls, there’s um a road right here…a little bridge, I’m going to make that, 54Z.” This was the last transmission from the pilot.

The airplane touched down on the Herman B. Fultz Bridge, which passed over the Haulover Inlet. The bridge was about 1,257 ft long with a deck width of about 56 ft. The edges of the deck were equipped with sidewalks, railings, and streetlights. The bridge was configured with four traffic lanes (two northbound and two southbound) separated by a raised concrete median.

The airplane struck two vehicles before coming to rest on the bridge. Examination of the bridge revealed that the airplane touched down traveling north with the left main landing gear tire and right main landing gear tire straddling the raised concrete median. It then struck a northbound vehicle from behind, crossed over the median, and struck a southbound vehicle from the front , before it nosed over and came to rest on the northbound side of the bridge. A post-impact fire ensued. Measurements of the airplane’s ground path indicated that it traveled about 318 ft between striking the first vehicle until it came to rest.

Images of the airplane before touchdown indicated that the propeller was windmilling, the wing flaps were retracted, and there was no sign of smoke or fire.

According to FAA and pilot records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He also possessed a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant, a control tower operator certificate, and an aircraft dispatcher certificate.

His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on November 27, 2020. He had accrued approximately 149 total hours of flight experience, 101 of which were in the accident airplane make and model.

The accident airplane was equipped with fixed tricycle landing gear and was powered by a carbureted, air-cooled, horizontally opposed, 6-cylinder engine driving a metal 2-bladed McCauley fixed-pitch propeller.

No current airplane or engine maintenance records were provided by the owners of the airplane during the investigation. Both of the airplane’s owners stated that the current maintenance records were in the airplane at the time of the accident. The remains of a three-ring binder were found in the wreckage; however, the binder did not appear to contain any information consistent with the most recent annual inspection of the airplane. One of the co-owners reported that there were no flotation devices onboard the airplane.

An Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) was located at Miami Executive Airport (TMB), Miami, Florida, about 22 miles southwest of the accident location at an elevation of about 10 ft msl.

At 1053, TMB reported an air temperature of 28°C, and a dew point temperature of 21°C. These conditions represented a relative humidity of about 58 percent.

At 1153 and 1253, TMB reported an air temperature of 29°C and a dew point temperature of 21°C, which represented a relative humidity of about 55 percent.

An ASOS was also located at HWO, about nine miles northwest of the accident location at an elevation of about 10 ft. Between 1053 and 1253, HWO reported an air temperature of 29°C and a dew point temperature of 19°C. These conditions represented a relative humidity of about 55 percent.

Unofficial meteorological reporting stations near the accident site reported relative humidity values between 63% and 66% between 1230 and 1300.

HRRR Model Sounding

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model sounding along the western side of the airplane’s flight path at 1200 was retrieved from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Air Resources Laboratory and analyzed by the RAwinsonde OBservation (RAOB) program. Calculations made by the RAOB program identified light carburetor icing conditions from the surface to about 600 ft and moderate carburetor icing conditions above about 600 ft to about 4,300 ft.

A HRRR model sounding for near the accident site at 1300 identified light carburetor icing conditions from the surface to about 200 ft and moderate carburetor icing conditions above about 200 ft to about 5,000 ft.

The accident airplane was equipped with fixed tricycle landing gear and was powered by a carbureted, air-cooled, horizontally opposed, 6-cylinder engine driving a metal 2-bladed McCauley fixed-pitch propeller.

No current airplane or engine maintenance records were provided by the owners of the airplane during the investigation. Both of the airplane’s owners stated that the current maintenance records were in the airplane at the time of the accident. The remains of a three-ring binder were found in the wreckage; however, the binder did not appear to contain any information consistent with the most recent annual inspection of the airplane. One of the co-owners reported that there were no flotation devices onboard the airplane.

Examination of the airplane revealed that the post-impact fire had consumed most of the cabin and fuselage. The left main landing gear separated during the impact sequence. The right wing sustained compression damage from the wingtip to a point about 3 ft inboard of the wingtip. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator, outboard left wing, and the lower surfaces of both wings exhibited thermal damage and sooting. The wing flap actuator correlated to a flaps retracted (0°) position. The elevator trim actuator correlated to a 10° trim tab up position.

The right fuel tank remained intact; the left fuel tank was breached by thermal damage. Both finger screens were clean. There was no evidence of an inflight fire, and flight control continuity was established from the rudder, elevator, and ailerons to the flight controls in the cockpit.

The instrument panel was thermally damaged and burned through in several places. The airspeed indicator needle indicated about 65 mph. The throttle control was in the full forward position, the mixture control was full rich, and the carburetor heat control was closed (off). The primer was in and locked. The fuel selector valve handle was destroyed by the post-impact fire. The position of the valve was between “BOTH” and “RIGHT.”

The propeller remained attached to the engine. Blade No. 1 was curled aft at the tip; Blade No. 2 was bent slightly aft at the tip. The spinner was intact with no indication of rotational damage.

Both rear engine mounts had fractured during the impact sequence and the engine remained attached to the airframe by the forward mounts. Thumb compression and suction were obtained on all cylinders, and spark was produced by both magnetos on all leads. All the bottom spark plugs were normal gray in color. The Nos. 2 and 4 cylinder top spark plugs were normal gray in color. The top spark plugs in cylinder Nos. 1, 3, and 5 were oil fouled due to the position of the airplane when it came to rest. The carburetor heat air valve was functional.

The fuel strainer bowl contained a small amount of charred debris and was free of corrosion. When disconnected from the carburetor, a small amount of fuel was observed flowing from the line. The carburetor accelerator pump functioned normally and the inlet screen was clean. The floats were field tested by submersion in a container of water and did not exhibit any signs of leakage. There was a small amount of visible corrosion in the carburetor bowl. The oil filter contained some carbon deposits; the oil suction screen was clean.

Fuel Provider

Examination of the fuel provider’s facility did not reveal any evidence of fuel contamination or any anomalies with the fuel dispensing system. Additionally, all inspections were found to be up to date.

Cessna Model 172 and Skyhawk Owner’s Manual

According to the Cessna model 172 and Skyhawk Owner’s Manual:

Carburetor ice, as evidenced by an unexplained drop in RPM, can be removed by application of full carburetor heat. Upon regaining the original rpm (with heat off), to use the minimum amount of heat (by trial and error) to prevent ice from forming. Since heated air causes a richer mixture, readjust the mixture setting when carburetor heat is used continuously in cruising flight.

Flotation Devices and Accident Area

According to a family member, one of the passengers could not swim.

Examination of the area surrounding the accident site revealed that it was surrounded by large areas of water, residential homes, and high rises with significant congestion from boats and motor vehicles.

According to 14 CFR Part 91.509 (a), no person may take off an airplane for a flight over water more than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shore unless that airplane is equipped with a life preserver, or an approved flotation means for each occupant of the airplane.

Review of the flight indicated that the airplane remained over land or close to the shore during the entire flight.

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Miami-Dade County Medical Examiner Department. The cause of death was listed as plane crash.

Toxicological testing of the pilot was conducted at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory. The specimens from the pilot were negative for any drugs of abuse.