N91593Cessna 182M · 1969

On February 27, 2009, approximately 2345 central standard time, a Cessna 182M, N91593, owned by an individual, and operated by another individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain five miles north of Albany, Louisiana. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Dark night marginal visual flight rules (VFR) meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. A flight plan had not been filed. The cross country flight departed Slidell Airport (ASD), Slidell, Louisiana, at 2309 and was en route to Marksville Municipal Airport (MKV), Marksville, Louisiana.

The pilot planned to attend a skydiving event near the MKV airport that began the next day. A witness at the MKV airport said he had spoken several times during the day with the pilot. The pilot told the witness that his two passengers would be delayed and he wouldn’t be able to depart until about 2100. The pilot said he wanted to arrive by midnight because the weather at the MKV airport was supposed to be worse the next morning. At 2246 the pilot called the witness and said the "clouds are scattered at about 900 feet". The witness said he looked outside and then told the pilot the "clouds are low and scattered here".

After departing the ASD airport the pilot contacted New Orleans approach control and got radar flight following for his VFR flight to the MKV airport. Radar contact was lost at 2341.

A witness located about 1.6 miles south of the accident location said he heard a single engine airplane south of him traveling east to west. He heard the airplane make a very tight 180 degree turn and then it headed east. The airplane made another tight turn and the airplane "passed directly overhead going north to northwest". Two to three minutes later he heard the airplane "go to full power" and it sounded like it was "in a dive for about 2 seconds" then he heard the sounds of impact.

The witness reported that the weather was windy and misting rain occasionally. The witness said “I don’t know how low the cloud deck was but I never saw a single light on the aircraft. It sounded like it was about 800 to 1000 feet above me when it passed overhead“.

Several other witnesses near the accident site heard the sounds of impact and called 9-1-1 emergency with the first call logged at 2352. First responders found the wreckage in a wooded area and reported a smell of gasoline. There was no post impact fire.

The pilot, age 39, held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating. The pilot was issued a FAA second-class medical certificate on February 20, 2008, without waivers or limitations. At that time the pilot reported on his medical certificate application that he had a total pilot experience of 285 hours. The pilot's logbook was not located during the investigation and no other information about his pilot experience was available.

The pilot also held an FAA senior parachute rigger’s certificate. He frequently went to skydiving events to pack parachutes and he received compensation for that work. Certificates in the pilot’s flight bag show that he was certified by parachute industry associations as an "SL Jumpmaster" and as a "Vector Tandem Instructor".

N91593, serial number (S/N) 18259833, a model 182M, was manufactured by the Cessna Aircraft Company in 1969. It was a high-wing, single engine land airplane, powered by a Continental O-470-R engine, S/N 202651-9-R, rated at 230 horsepower, driving a McCauley 2-blade, constant speed, aluminum alloy propeller model 2A34C201C, HUB S/N 692690. The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses. Because of the airplane's year of manufacture shoulder harness installation was not required.

The airplane, originally configured with four seats, had been modified to carry parachutists and was configured with only one seat installed in the front left side of the cockpit. All of the remaining seats had been removed and lap belts had previously been installed to accommodate four parachutists sitting directly on the cabin floor. The door on the right side of the airplane had been modified to hinge at the top so that the door could be opened at altitude to allow parachutists to quickly and easily exit the airplane. After all parachutists had exited the pilot could then shut the right side door while he was in-flight and still seated in the left pilot seat.

The airplane was issued an FAA standard airworthiness certificate on May 19, 1969, and was certificated for normal category operations. The airplane was registered to the owner on August 15, 2008.

The aircraft maintenance records were not available for examination. A few selected pages of recent maintenance record entries recovered from the wreckage show that the most recent annual inspection was completed on October 20, 2008 at a tachometer time of 2,559.8 hours or an aircraft total time of approximately 4,461.5 hours. The aircraft tachometer in the wreckage was observed as 2,602.16 hours making the aircraft total time at the time of the accident as 4,503.85 hours.

At 2340, the automated surface observing system (ASOS) at Hammond Northshore Regional Airport (HDC) Hammond, Louisiana, located approximately 10 miles east of the accident site, reported the wind from 180 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, broken clouds at 1,800 feet, broken clouds at 2,600 feet, overcast clouds at 7,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees Celsius, dew point 20 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 29.90 inches of Mercury, with an observation that lighting was observed to the distant north.

At 2353, the automated surface observing system (ASOS) at Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport (BTR) Baton Rouge, Louisiana, located approximately 27 miles west of the accident site, reported the wind from 190 degrees at 15 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, broken clouds at 1,500 feet, overcast clouds at 2,100 feet, temperature 23 degrees Celsius, dew point 19 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 29.86 inches of Mercury.

At 2345, data from the weather radar near New Orleans, LA (KLIX), which was located about 42 miles south-southeast of the accident, identified areas of very light precipitation (reflectivity values of 10-25 dBZ) in the vicinity of the accident.

An Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) was in effect in the area of the accident that warned of the possibility of ceilings below 1,000’, and visibilities below 3 statute miles with precipitation and rain.

A witness located about 1.6 miles south of the accident location estimated at the time of the accident that the cloud bases were no higher than 1,000 feet above ground level and reported occasional misting rain.

U. S. Naval Observatory records for Albany, Louisiana on the day of the accident show that the sun set at 1924 and the “waxing crescent” moon set at 2147.

The following is a timeline of communications between the pilot of N91593 and Air Traffic Control (ATC).

2310: N91593 contacted New Orleans approach and requested flight following to the MKV airport.

2310: New Orleans approach advised radar contact at 1,500 feet mean sea level (MSL).

2132: New Orleans approach instructed N91593 to contact Baton Rouge approach, and the pilot responded.

2333: N91593 contacted Baton Rouge approach and advised he was enroute to the MKV airport.

2341: Last radar update at 2341:58 showed N91593 was at 1,600 feet MSL.

2343: Baton Rouge approach advised N91593 that radar contact was lost.

No further communications were received.

A direct course from the ASD airport to the MKV airport was approximately 290 degrees at a distance of 124 nautical miles. A review of the radar data from the first radar contact at 2310 showed the airplane was in a southbound climb from the ASD airport. The airplane then made a climbing right turn and proceeded to the north until reaching 2,700 feet msl at 2313 when it then turned left to track on an approximate course of 290 degrees. From 2313 until 2331 the altitude varied from 2,100 feet 2,700 feet.

At 2323 the airplane began a meandering course that continued for the remainder of the flight. At 2331 the airplane climbed and remained at an altitude that varied from 3,000 feet to 3,300 feet until 2341. At 2341, after making a turn to the southwest, the airplane turned approximately 180 degrees to the right and was briefly on a course to the northeast when it began to descend and turn to the north. At 2341:24 the airplane was at 3,200 feet prior to descending to 2,700 feet at 2341:40. The last radar contact at 2341:58 showed the airplane at 1,600 feet.

The accident site was located in relatively flat commercial timber lands with pine and oak trees to an estimated height of 80 to 100 feet. A handheld global positioning system (GPS) showed a location of 30 degrees 34 minutes 52 seconds north latitude and 090 degrees 36 minutes 05 seconds west longitude, at an estimated elevation of 65 feet MSL.

Investigators from the Safety Board, the FAA, Cessna, and Continental Motors examined the wreckage at the accident location on February 28, March 1, and March 2, 2009.

All major components of the aircraft were observed along a path of debris which began at the base of an approximately 100 foot tall pine tree where broken tree limbs, right wing skin, and the right wing tip were observed. All portions of the airplane were accounted for and were all located within an area approximately 1,200 foot long by approximately 200 feet wide. The path from first impact to the main wreckage was estimated at 160 degrees magnetic. Parts of the aircraft observed along the debris path included part of the right aileron, pieces of windscreen, the left cabin door window, and the right wing strut. The aircraft impacted soft muddy ground in a thickly wooded area.

All portions of the airframe in the main wreckage area suffered severe crushing damage. The forward cockpit and cabin area were unrecognizable. The nose and right main landing gear separated from the aircraft and the left main landing gear remained attached to structure.

The airplane was equipped with an emergency locater transmitter (ELT) which was destroyed by impact damage.

The engine oil pressure gauge needle was observed in the green normal operating range. The cockpit mixture control was full rich, the throttle control was forward and sheared off, and the magneto switch was on BOTH. The tachometer needle was observed at the red line at 2,625 revolutions per minute (RPM). The needle on the vacuum gauge was observed at 2.8 inches of mercury. The vacuum pump was partially disassembled and the pump vanes were intact. The turn coordinator gyro was partially disassembled and exhibited rotational scoring.

Rudder and up (top) elevator control cable continuity was established. The down (bottom) elevator control cable was separated approximately 3 inches from the forward bellcrank. The left aileron and aileron balance control cables were continuous, and the right aileron cable exhibited overload type separation near the firewall area. The flaps and flap jackscrew were retracted. The elevator trim actuator measured 1 and 1/2 inches, or approximately 5 degrees nose up.

The pilot’s seat was fractured and twisted. The seat rails exhibited wear and were fractured and distorted. The pilot’s lap belt latch was fastened and the belt had been cut by first responders. No other seats were installed in the aircraft. No other straps or restraints were observed. A parachuting jump door and modified right main landing gear step were observed. Three packed parachutes, and a parachute riggers tool kit, a pilot’s flight bag, and several personal items were observed in the area around the main wreckage.

The fuel system was fragmented and the fuel tanks were compromised. The fuel tank caps were secure in place. The separated fuel selector handle was near the right tank position. The fuel selector valve was in the BOTH position. Fuel was observed in ground impact depressions near the main wreckage and the impact crater.

The engine and propeller were observed in a muddy impact crater approximately 3 feet below ground level. Engine oil was observed near the compromised oil sump. The throttle butterfly valve was wide open. The engine crankshaft propeller flange and propeller separated from the crankshaft, which could not be rotated by hand.

No pre-impact anomalies were observed on the airplane that would have prevented normal operation.

The engine and propeller were removed from the impact crater at the main wreckage location and moved to a secure location for further examination.

An autopsy on the pilot was performed under the direction of the Livingston Parish Coroner at the Earl K. Long Hospital Morgue, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 2, 2009. The cause of death was listed as "multiple crushing injuries to the body due to a plane crash".

An autopsy on one passenger was performed under the direction of the Livingston Parish Coroner at the Earl K. Long Hospital Morgue, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 2, 2009. The cause of death was listed as "massive crushing injuries to the body due to a plane crash".

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Aeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated: tests for CARBON MONOXIDE were not performed; tests for CYANIDE were not performed; NO ETHANOL detected in Heart; NO ETHANOL detected in Liver; NO DRUGS LISTED ABOVE detected in Heart.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from one passenger by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Aeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated: tests for CARBON MONOXIDE were not performed; tests for CYANIDE were not performed; NO ETHANOL detected in Liver; NO ETHANOL detected in Heart; NO DRUGS LISTED ABOVE detected in Liver.

On March 1 and 2, 2009 investigators from the Safety Board, the FAA, Continental Motors, and Cessna examined the engine at the facilities of the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Training Center in Walker, Louisiana.

The engine was disassembled and inspected. One propeller blade had separated from the hub and both propeller blades exhibited leading edge polishing, S-bending, and twisting. No pre-impact anomalies were observed on the engine which would have prevented normal operation.

The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-3, chapter 10, states the following about night flying: "Night flying requires that pilots be aware of, and operate within, their abilities and limitations.... Night flying is very different from day flying and demands more attention of the pilot. The most noticeable difference is the limited availability of outside visual references."

According to FAA advisory circular (AC) 60-4A "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation," "Surface references and the natural horizon may at times become obscured, although visibility may be above visual flight rule minimums. Lack of natural horizon or surface reference is common on over-water flights, at night, and especially at night in extremely sparsely populated areas or in low visibility conditions. A sloping cloud formation, an obscured horizon, a dark scene spread with ground lights and stars, and certain geometric patterns of ground lights can provide inaccurate visual information for aligning the aircraft correctly with the actual horizon. The disoriented pilot may place the aircraft in a dangerous attitude."